Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa by unknown
Decentralization in the 
Middle East and North Africa
Informal Politics, Subnational Governance, 
and the Periphery
Thomas Demmelhuber | Roland Sturm [eds.]
Nahoststudien. Middle Eastern Studies l 5
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Nahoststudien. Middle Eastern Studies
edited by 
Prof. Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber,  
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Prof. Dr. Claudia Derichs, 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Prof. Dr. Georg Glasze,  
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Prof. Dr. Mathias Rohe, M.A.,  
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Dr. Stephan Roll,  
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin
Volume 5
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Informal Politics, Subnational Governance,  
and the Periphery
Decentralization in the 
Middle East and North Africa
Thomas Demmelhuber | Roland Sturm [eds.]
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the 
Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data 
are available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de
ISBN 978-3-8487-8273-4 (Print)
 978-3-7489-2073-1 (ePDF)
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-3-8487-8273-4 (Print)
 978-3-7489-2073-1 (ePDF)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Demmelhuber, Thomas | Sturm, Roland
Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa
Informal Politics, Subnational Governance, and the Periphery





1st Edition 2021 
© Thomas Demmelhuber | Roland Sturm
Published by 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG 
Waldseestraße 3 – 5 | 76530 Baden-Baden 
www.nomos.de
Production of the printed version:  
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG 
Waldseestraße 3 – 5 | 76530 Baden-Baden
ISBN 978-3-8487-8273-4 (Print) 
ISBN 978-3-7489-2073-1 (ePDF)
DOI https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution
– Non Commercial – No Derivations 4.0 International License.
Onlineversion
Nomos eLibrary
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Preface
This book is the result of a five-year journey. During the course of our re-
search, the phenomenon of decentralization as a policy field that reconfig-
ures the relations between the center and the periphery gained momen-
tum, as did the scholarly debate in this field. At the same time, the political
map of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) transformed to become
more fluid and increasingly multipolar. New (aspiring) regional powers
trying to affect politics at home and abroad emerged during this time. In
this book, we attempt to explain the varying forms and functions of decen-
tralization by incorporating the role of neopatrimonial networks on the
subnational level in our analyses. We also aim to reflect on the diverse out-
comes of decentralization in MENA countries over space and time, and to
identify the puzzles and gaps in the literature for future avenues of re-
search on decentralization in the MENA region and beyond.
This research project was funded by a grant from the German Research
Foundation (DFG) from 2017 until 2021 (DE 1829/4-1 and STU 122/14-1).
We are grateful for the support that made it possible to conduct compre-
hensive fieldwork in Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan and to present our re-
search at national and international conferences. Unfortunately, due to the
tense political situation and deteriorating academic freedom in Egypt, we
had to cancel our planned fieldwork in the country.
Special thanks go to our research associates, Miriam Bohn and Erik
Vollmann, for their great work and relentless support. Many thanks go to
Sylvia I. Bergh for accepting our invitation to be part of this book with a
complementary international donors’ perspective on decentralization. We
are further grateful to Nadine Schnelzer, who was part of the project dur-
ing the kick-off phase in late 2017. Working in the field can only be suc-
cessful with colleagues and institutions on the ground. We owe much grat-
itude to the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Rabat, Tunis, and Amman; the
Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Rabat, Tunis, and Amman; the Heinrich
Böll Foundation in Rabat; the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) in Rabat and Amman; the Laboratoire des Recherches sur la
Transition Démocratique Comparée at the University Settat; the USAID
office in Amman; and numerous local organizations, activists, academics,
and journalists across Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. The main pillar of
this study are 162 interviews we conducted in the MENA region. This
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study would not have been possible without the cooperation of our inter-
viewees in the region – deepest thanks go to them.
We also thank Ellen Lust, who directs “The Program on Governance
and Local Development (GLD)” at the University of Gothenburg, for her
support and invitation to the GLD program’s activities and publications.
Our home institution, the Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürn-
berg, also provided us with abundant support, which enabled us to fully
concentrate on our research agenda. The numerous stages of publishing
our findings and the final stage of preparing this manuscript in particular
have always been a journey with many pitfalls. With the tremendous sup-
port of Sabrina Ahmed, Ibrahim Bebars, Katharina Griethe, Jenny Hecht,
and Katharina Nicolai (all FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg) it turned out to be an
easy trip. We thank all of them for their work and support.
Finally yet importantly, we are very grateful to our publisher Nomos.
Many thanks go to our senior editor Beate Bernstein and to the book se-
ries’ co-editors Claudia Derichs, Georg Glasze, Mathias Rohe, and Stephan
Roll for their excellent cooperation and for accepting us in the Nomos se-
ries “Nahoststudien”.
Thomas Demmelhuber and Roland Sturm Erlangen, May 2021
Preface
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Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa:
The Puzzle
Thomas Demmelhuber and Roland Sturm
Every country in the world needs a subnational governmental level – local,
regional, or both – to administer policies. Decentralization has accordingly
been in the limelight of scholarly debate both for OECD countries and for
other world regions such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) for
the last decades. For the MENA region this is a surprising finding as the
states of the region were once considered “the most centralized in the
world” (Kherigi 2017, 4). This debate on decentralization centers not only
on the regionalization of policy implementation, but also on the political
impact of the center on all subnational levels. Depending on the quality of
a state’s center-periphery relations, either the periphery’s influence may
shape the political structure to favor a federal or strongly decentralized
state (bottom-up decentralization), or it may inspire the center to strive for
the periphery’s de-politicization and to uphold the control of the periphery
(top-down decentralization). Decentralization initiated by the center (top-
down) is especially vulnerable to political games by autocratic regimes: As
autocratic power holders pretend to improve democratic representation by
de jure decentralization, they may delegate the “right to act”, but remain
hesitant to accept a subnational “right to decide”1.
The transfer of rule from the central government level to regional and
local levels leaves room for a variety of different scenarios for political,
constitutional, and cultural change. It moreover offers a wide array of pos-
sibilities for political instrumentalization, both to the benefit of political
elites in the capital and to actors involved at the regional and local levels.
All actors fight over decentralization for the same reasons: They fight over
the access, design, and output of state institutions, as meaningful decen-
tralization changes the basic parameters and setup of state power and au-
thority (Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke 2010, 1).
Political and academic debate on decentralization – which is but one of
several forms of power-sharing between the center and the periphery –
broadly carries a normative bias. Although decentralization does not per se
1.
1 For the distinction see, for example, Keman (2000, 196-227).
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undermine the dominance of the political center, decentralization is fre-
quently assumed to be a one-way street towards a greater level of democra-
cy and degree of good governance. We do not fundamentally question this
presumption. Our research, however, aims to solve the puzzle why the re-
sults of decentralization politics differ dramatically, even though the
rhetoric and motives that accompany the political phenomenon share a
similar spectrum across countries and regions. We believe that in order to
comprehend this discrepancy, the “menu of decentralization” must be un-
derstood within a broader setting of agency, historical context, and the re-
spective institutional designs, in order to account for the diverse outcomes
of decentralization across the MENA region over space and time. We un-
derstand decentralization as an instrument of high flexibility: In some cas-
es it is a tool that can be displayed without being put to use, in other cases
it is but a broken promise, and in yet others, decentralization is truly a first
step to local empowerment.
Decentralization – a story with many chapters
When it transpired that the mass uprisings rolling over the MENA from
2011 onward mainly originated far from the capitals of the region, the lim-
its of an approach neglecting the potential of subnational governance be-
came evident (Hoffmann, Bouziane, and Harders 2013). This lesson on po-
litical dynamism entered the scholarly debate and ensured some diversifi-
cation in approaches, perspectives, and awareness of cross-cutting issues.
Yet the mainstream of MENA Political Science retained its strong central
state bias. Only limited attention has since been payed to political change
at subnational levels of governance (Busse and Bank 2021). The current
resurgence and ongoing resilience of autocratic regimes in MENA seem to
validate this traditional focus on agency and institutional design from a
top-down perspective.
While local levels of government are of central interest regarding the co-
operation of countries with international donors and as reference points
for emerging challenges in the periphery – such as terrorist activities in
border regions or transnational migration routes – the regional level of
government has hardly been addressed at all. The dominating perspective
on center-periphery relations is that they are binary and encompass only
the relationship between the central state level and the local level. This re-
flects the worldview and self-perception of political elites, as well as their
practice of governing from afar. Central elites permit local elites only a sec-
ondary political status. They coopt them in order to neutralize them politi-
Thomas Demmelhuber and Roland Sturm
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cally and to streamline decision-making processes. Elite rotation – orches-
trated by the central state level – is an often-used mechanism to prevent
elites from gaining too much power in local settings (see chapter 4). Free
and fair elections at the local level with potential to undermine the grip of
central state elites on the local power game are the exception rather than
the rule. Instead, local elections are frequently postponed, abolished or ma-
nipulated. Autocratic regimes developed a broad toolbox for election man-
agement. It provides them with the ability to reconcile formal processes
with pre-determined outcomes. In any case, only a narrow corridor for lo-
cal autonomy exists.
When from 2011 onward the mass protests of the periphery spilled over
to urban spaces across the region, several MENA regimes responded to the
increasing uncontrollability of the political dynamics by broadening their
discourse on decentralization and local governance reforms. Resilient
monarchs, inter alia of Morocco and Jordan, used decentralization reforms
to stabilize their grip on power. This illustrates and strengthens the argu-
ment made by Heydemann (2007) on regionalization as a form of authori-
tarian upgrading (Vollmann et al. 2020) instead of a serious effort to de-
centralize power. Reform efforts primarily targeted the mobilized sections
of the population. Decentralization promised an end to wide-spread socio-
economic dichotomies and regional disparities along traditional lines of
friction between the center and the periphery. In addition, the reforms ad-
dressed the international community. Widely broadcasted narratives of do-
mestic reform aimed to communicate the sincerity of attempts to re-con-
figure national political orders in MENA. Even the formerly heavily cen-
tralized regimes Tunisia and Egypt opted for decentralization and intro-
duced according principles in their new constitutions. While in Tunisia,
the democratic transition was successful and the ensuing reform process
included substantial and challenging decentralization efforts, the re-autoc-
ratization in Egypt after two military interventions stifled all reform and
decentralization processes. The today remaining structures do not deserve
the label decentralization.
We conclude that despite different motives, objectives, and outcomes
decentralization has become a significant policy project for many MENA
governments. The states of MENA were once considered “the most central-
ized in the world” (Kherigi 2017, 4; Shalaby et al. 2020), which places the
region in stark contrast to other world regions (Harb and Atallah 2014;
2015). Moreover, hardly any quantitative data for the scope and quality of
decentralization in the MENA region is currently available (Har-
guindéguy, Cole, and Pasquier 2019).
1. Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa: The Puzzle
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For some MENA countries, decentralization offers a strategy to foster
democratic consolidation (Tunisia). For others, decentralization serves as
window dressing in symbolic and orchestrated reform processes (Algeria,
Oman), it enables authoritarian upgrading (Morocco, Jordan), or remains
a catchphrase exploited by hard-line autocrats (Egypt). From this tentative
list, it seems obvious that regime type matters for decentralization out-
comes. However, the list reveals no information on diverging or overlap-
ping content and processes of decentralization strategies. We need a deeper
understanding of the reciprocal effects between elite networks and decen-
tralization processes, in order to gain insight into the discrepancies of the
legal institutional designs of decentralization and their de facto outcomes.
To regard political decentralization in MENA only through the lens of
the Arab uprisings would fall short of grasping its potential, even though
the tremendous increase of decentralization rhetoric and actions since
2011 affects our research. Despite the centralist traditions of all MENA
states, we can observe decentralization debates and reforms in almost all
MENA countries since the early 1990s. In the 1990s and 2000s, decentral-
ization policies were implemented by top-down reforms. They were initiat-
ed by central governments in order to increase the respective regime’s ca-
pacity to govern the periphery, to create (output) legitimation by increas-
ing the efficiency and performance of their rule, and by allocating external
support and funds from international donors who were the first to advo-
cate political decentralization for the sake of fostering and/or supporting
good governance. What is more, decentralization seemed to be a panacea
for all political, economic, and social deadlocks, even as a tool for conflict
settlement as the cases of war-torn Sudan and Lebanon have shown par ex-
cellence. Heavily endorsed by the international community, for example
the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
and USAID, the expectations of reform projects were high and encom-
passed political, social, and economic improvement. Notwithstanding the
positive point of departure, the lack of coherence between objectives and
strategies runs like a thread through policy implementation. How can in-
ternational donors tackle the dominating conflicts between efficiency and
empowerment or between empowerment and corruption?
However, the reform projects must not be understood only from a
Western or an international donor’s perspective. The political, economic,
and social context factors in the respective countries with their varying po-
litical orders and legacies matter and are much more than an intervening
variable. It has become evident that the triggers of decentralization are
manifold: The strategic responsiveness of autocratic regimes targets both
the populace and the international community. But what does decentral-
Thomas Demmelhuber and Roland Sturm
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ization stand for in the MENA region? How can we explain variance in de-
centralization processes? Who are the relevant actors behind decentraliza-
tion, and how can we grasp their motives? Despite substantial research in
this field, a lacuna in research exists regarding the question of how to un-
derstand the numerous challenges facing decentralization in the MENA re-
gion.
Our approach in this book is empirical. We do not accept as a norma-
tive premise that decentralization matters and we are not concerned with
the question whether decentralization or centralization might be the better
alternative of governance. Instead, we orient ourselves along one central as-
sumption: The outcome of the decentralization processes driven by center-
periphery dichotomies in traditionally centralized states highly depends on
the role of informal politics and neopatrimonial networks at the central,
regional, and local level (first presented in Demmelhuber, Sturm, and
Vollmann 2020). This applies both to the transition from a more central-
ized to a more decentralized state and for the stability and efficiency of in-
stitutional decentralization.
The premise of this book builds on neopatrimonial networks as an ex-
planatory factor for the varieties in outcome of decentralization at the local
and regional level. The respective objective is to provide a deeper under-
standing of decentralization processes correlative to their influence.
Neopatrimonialism is a predominant pattern of authoritarian rule in most
MENA countries. It implies a deep-rooted entanglement of modern state
bureaucracy with a strong and broad-spanning net of personal relations.
Neopatrimonialism – as our findings for Tunisia show – remains a con-
stant challenge for democratization and the consolidation of democratic
order. With our comparative study of Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and
Egypt, we can present a broad perspective on the dynamics of neopatrimo-
nialism in MENA countries and we can help generate an understanding of
difficulties in and requirements to implementing decentralization reforms
in the region.
The book is based on a research project funded by the German Research
Foundation from 2017 to 2021. The project allowed us to pursue seven
field work trips to the region and to conduct 162 interviews with politi-
cians and state employees, civil society actors, researchers, journalists, and
foreign observer organizations on the central, regional, and local govern-
1. Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa: The Puzzle
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ment levels (plus five interviews with representatives of donor organiza-
tions for Sylvia Bergh’s chapter).2
The book’s rationale and outline
This book contributes to research on subnational governance in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa by investigating political, economic, and social
links between top-down decentralization strategies and neopatrimonial
elite networks for three levels of governance: the central, regional, and lo-
cal levels. Based on qualitative and quantitative data, the book offers con-
ceptual insight for the comparative study of decentralization worldwide.
The book presents findings on Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt based
on our conceptual approach and comprehensive field work. The wider
framework of decentralization and the role of informal institutions, fiscal
relations, and neopatrimonial networks therein is a point of departure for
a new understanding of subnational governance. By deconstructing decen-
tralization as a contested topic of an ongoing political, economic, and so-
cial debate, we provide additional insight into the puzzle of top-down de-
centralization and its effects. Our analysis entails a four-part agenda: (1)
Understanding decentralization from the perspective of the periphery
rather than the central state level, (2) evaluating how decentralization takes
place in neopatrimonial and thus largely informal contexts, (3) using fiscal
policy and informal financial flows to shed light on decentralization (in-
cluding deviant behavior such as corruption) and (4), providing conceptu-
al insight for the study of international donors’ role in decentralization
processes.
The book starts with a conceptual chapter authored by the editors on
decentralization in MENA across space and time, beginning with the gene-
sis of MENA statehood. Guided by a thorough historical analysis of the
emergence of nation-states in the region, this chapter develops the concep-
tual approach for the analysis of decentralization processes. The authors
suggest that decentralization is inspired, channelled, and instrumentalized
by informal neopatrimonial elite networks on the national, regional, and
local levels of government. Fiscal and budgetary policies are then intro-
duced as empirical tools to investigate the gap between normative intents
2 For security reasons we conducted field work in three out of four countries.
Shrinking political spaces in Egypt and the increasing repression of academics in
the country did not allow us to do field research in Egypt (see chapter 3).
Thomas Demmelhuber and Roland Sturm
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and purpose of formal decentralization, such as local empowerment, and
the diverging outcome and greatly more complex reality of decentraliza-
tion.
In view of the importance of fieldwork to our study and the need for an
exploratory approach, the empirical part begins with a chapter on the pit-
falls and challenges of doing fieldwork research at the subnational level in
MENA countries. As put forward by Miriam Bohn, Thomas Demmelhu-
ber, and Erik Vollmann, field research in non-democratic contexts is prob-
lematic. Even prior to the Arab uprisings, the clustering of autocratic
regimes in the MENA region held great challenges regarding the access to
the field, access to data and archives, and the identification of potential in-
terview partners or participants for survey research. In most cases, research
was possible only within legal “grey zones”, as official permissions to con-
duct research are difficult to acquire. For international scholars, access to
the field was usually granted via tourist visas and fieldwork was conducted
with the implicit tolerance of the security apparatus. Even so, among the
research community there exists an implicit shared knowledge regarding
the scope of possible research, restricted by “red lines” known to the in-
formed researcher in the field. With the alleged murder of the Italian PhD
student Giulio Regeni at the hands of Egyptian security forces in 2016
(Egyptian authorities have rejected all responsibility) and other cases of ar-
bitrary imprisonment of international scholars in MENA countries (for ex-
ample Matthew Hedges in the UAE 2018), the situation of academic re-
search has settled into a new reality. As Grimm puts it: “Authoritarian
Middle East regimes don’t like academics” and this “trend signals a mas-
sive rollback of the auspicious research climate” (Grimm 2018). On the
turn side, these developments have at least and last triggered debate on
fieldwork conditions among academia, funding bodies, and multipliers of
international cooperation. The goal is to attain a more sensible risk assess-
ment when planning and doing fieldwork in MENA countries (Glasius et
al. 2018; Grimm et al. 2020).
For the research on this book, these developments required us to look
for a maximum return on insights we could gain through fieldwork. The
empirical findings on the roles of neopatrimonial elite networks in the po-
litics of decentralization and in fiscal policies are presented by Miriam
Bohn and Erik Vollmann (both worked as research associates in the re-
search project) from a comparative perspective in two separate chapters.
Their contributions, which provide indicators for the degree of verifiable
decentralization, are guided by our working hypotheses (see chapter 2).
The chapter on the role of neopatrimonial elite networks in decentral-
ization is based on the premise that MENA politics are a product of for-
1. Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa: The Puzzle
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mal-legal institutions entwined with informal rules that gain salience
through highly personalized structures of power relations. Though the pe-
riphery has always been central to this type of personalized governance,
the subnational dimension of neopatrimonialism has remained a lacuna in
the comparative research literature on MENA states.3 In light of the revival
of decentralization efforts and discourses following the Arab uprisings,
Miriam Bohn and Erik Vollmann, however, argue that the analysis of the
relationship between local governance reforms and neopatrimonialism is
key to a better understanding of governance and policy formulation in the
MENA region. Decentralization reforms have a significant impact on pa-
tron-client relations between the central and the subnational levels. They
provoke a principal-agent problem, but also create a new set of incentives
for a number of policies. Thus, a systematic analysis of central and subna-
tional elite dynamics is essential to broaden the understanding of decen-
tralization under neopatrimonialism. Both authors conclude that the
country-specific interplay of central and subnational elite networks im-
pacts the legal framing and the practical outcomes of decentralization pro-
cesses, and vice versa.
The chapter on fiscal policies in times of decentralization builds on the
same assumption, namely that the boom in decentralization rhetoric and
action after 2011 were reactions to protests caused by long-standing local
government malfunction and economic deprivation of the periphery. In
all four investigated cases, the discourses and reforms use a language of
“positive discrimination” and promise a reformed relationship between
the center and the periphery. In theory, this should lead to an improve-
ment of subnational administrative efficiency and an empowerment of the
long-neglected periphery. In the setting of ambiguous legal contexts and
high influence of traditional patron-client relationships within the central
state level, decentralization reforms do not always result in the participa-
tive, democracy-enhancing, and reconciliatory model that governments
and international donors advertise. The establishment of subnational insti-
tutions with sufficient and independent funds that allow the sovereign exe-
cution of tasks and fulfillment of rights is a necessary precondition for
meaningful decentralization. Both authors show that fiscal decentraliza-
tion is the litmus test for the willingness of political rulers to commit
3 Hertog (2011, 5) offers, for example, an inspiring narrative of state-building in Sau-
di Arabia since the 1930s relying on a “heterogenous system of formal and infor-
mal, rent-based clientelism in which vertical links” to the rapidly emerging central
state level dominate.
Thomas Demmelhuber and Roland Sturm
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themselves to decentralization and for tackling the deficits of local gover-
nance in a region.
This book is above all the result of a research project investigating do-
mestic politics in four countries. In order to capture the international di-
mension of the decentralization discourse, we invited Sylvia Bergh to con-
tribute to our book. She analyzes the perspective and impact of interna-
tional donors on decentralization reforms for the cases of Morocco and
Tunisia. By focusing on two donors in two countries (World Bank and
German GIZ), with five program/project case studies, Bergh illustrates that
aid support does not operate in a linear continuum, but is dependent on
several contextual variables and incentives. In other words, it matters what
form aid takes and how it is delivered. Donors are aware of their role, but
are convinced that the struggle for good governance is worth the deficits of
decentralization efforts.
Main findings: Decentralization, a theater of reform?
For the examples of Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt, our findings il-
lustrate a strong impact of agency and institutional design on the outcome
of decentralization processes. Neopatrimonial elite networks matter to the
content and roll out of decentralization strategies in the MENA region.
There is also robust evidence that regimes are cautiously watching the un-
folding dynamics of decentralization reforms in order to avoid unintended
(and potentially threatening) consequences for regime stability and power
balances. In other words, setting up the institutional design for decentral-
ization does not preclude “reforms of the reform”: As the Jordanian case
shows, negotiations to revise decentralization laws are a continuous pro-
cess. The intention of central governments is to minimize the side effects
of local autonomy and to reduce political emancipation.
Our analysis of Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt reveals how differ-
ent elite networks use formal and informal institutions within a decentral-
ized state structure to maintain or widen their influence, resources, and
power (see chapter 4). The empirical analysis also clearly illustrates that de-
centralization can constitute a “Pandora’s box” to the political regimes,
filled with intended and unintended consequences. Although in all four
case studies decentralization is formally and informally designed to benefit
the regime, the regimes are circumstantially hesitant to fully commit to
the legal framework they have supported. Regimes fear the possibility that
it could backfire and result in high transaction costs for the center. Based
on numerous interviews, both Bohn and Vollmann present a trajectory
1. Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa: The Puzzle
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showing how the monarchies Morocco and Jordan have spanned a solid
network of patron-client relations between the center and the periphery
across subnational state institutions. Through this network, the Jordanian
regime closely observes the management of Transjordanian and Palestini-
an communities – overwhelmingly to the benefit of Transjordanian tribes.
When decentralization affects this set-up, the Jordanian regime reacts with
harsh repression or modified modes of cooptation. Subnational actors in
Morocco are likewise carefully divided and controlled by a net of state
agents, whose dominance over subnational councils remains unbroken.
While party elites engage actively in elections and political competition,
they are dependent on alliances with local notables, party coalitions and
deference to the makhzen (the royal court as the powerhouse of the king
and his closest associated elite groups) as well as its national and subna-
tional representatives.
Though both Morocco and Jordan grant some minor autonomy to sub-
national institutions, formal and informal practices that can curtail the
power of peripheral actors permanently play out in the background. In all
four countries, elite rotation between major subnational positions is a
common practice to contain the influence of certain individuals, especially
that of governors with far-reaching powers. In all four cases, the structure
of elite networks and their respective behavior affects the de facto outcome
of decentralization. Bohn and Vollmann present robust empirical data,
which illustrates that Jordan and Morocco are playing a sensitive balancing
game and oscillate between the wish to appease the international commu-
nity and to present themselves as reformers on the one hand, and the need
for strategies to manage socio-political and economic conflict on the
ground on the other. A decentralization reform deeply interferes with a
country’s patron-client structure and its outcome depends on the central
and subnational elites’ reactions. The competitive clientelism and gerry-
mandering that accompanies subnational elections, as well as elite capture,
for example by corruption, easily twists the logic of a decentralization re-
form.
Our research on the four countries shows that the era of fiscal decentral-
ization has not yet arrived in the MENA region (see chapter 5). While all
cases in our sample use the language of decentralization and subnational
finance, meaningful fiscal decentralization has yet to emerge from half-
hearted legal changes and official rhetoric. Though comparable and reli-
able data are still rare, we can detect some trajectories in absolute spending
when we compare the subnational fiscal situation of Egypt, Jordan, Moroc-
co, and Tunisia before and after the Arab uprisings. In a meticulous inves-
tigation of fiscal data, Vollmann and Bohn show that all countries in-
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creased subnational state expenditures since the 1990s – boosted by IMF
structural adjustment programs. It is remarkable that additionally Moroc-
co and Tunisia record significant progress after 2011. Tunisia’s path to de-
centralization is still inconclusive, but it suggests a radical break with the
hyper-centralization during the years of Ben Ali’s regime. In Jordan and
Egypt, however, the usual annual fluctuations of subnational expenditures
remained in place even after 2011. Far-reaching fiscal decentralization
could have a significant impact on pre-existing neopatrimonial networks
between the center and the local level. The Jordanian regime is not willing
to go down that road at present. All in all, the research by Vollmann and
Bohn presents robust data that support our basic assumption that fiscal de-
centralization is the litmus test for the willingness of the center to commit
itself to decentralization.
Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco have all emphasized that the regional lev-
el has to play a central role within their reform packages, but only Moroc-
co has chosen the path of meaningful regionalization and has thus fully
left the “stage of a mere reform theater”. This decision is beginning to
show in the financial allocations the Moroccan regions receive. Nonethe-
less, the bulk of subnational spending, most of the revenue generation,
and the largest share of salaried employees remain at the local level. If the
regions are meant to become more than investment hubs at the hands of
national initiatives and central state actors, Morocco needs to further accel-
erate its regional financial decentralization.
Regional disparities are central to the decentralization agendas in all
four countries. The analysis suggests that decentralization is used in differ-
ent ways to target the center-periphery nexus. Surprisingly, Tunisia still
seems to uphold its preferential treatment of the capital and the Sahel, the
traditional origin of its political elites, when we compare per capita expen-
ditures of local councils. While Morocco’s central northern regions also
seem to be the continuous winners of subnational council expenditures in
absolute terms, the per capita analysis shows a more nuanced picture:
Strategically important peripheral regions such as the Western Sahara or
the conflict-prone Oriental region (on the border to Algeria) spend more
financial state resources per capita than the northern center. Political redis-
tribution also occurs in Jordan: Zarqa, Irbid, and the capital Amman have
the largest percentage of Palestinian communities amongst all Jordanian
governorates. The authors’ evaluation illustrates that majority-Transjorda-
nian rural governorates traditionally connected to the regime receive larger
amounts per capita than Zarqa and Irbid, the two largest and most urban-
ized governorates after Amman.
1. Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa: The Puzzle
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The data presented by Vollmann and Bohn provide robust evidence that
fiscal decentralization in MENA suffers from overwhelming dependence
on central state transfers, weak subnational revenue generation, and prob-
lems with (local) tax collection. Combined with strong administrative
oversight and general reservations of central actors and ministries towards
subnational entities, the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments is
small in all countries. Therefore, as the cases of Morocco, Tunisia and Jor-
dan suggest, the capacity of subnational governments and their willingness
to spend the small amounts they are provided with is limited.
Subnational governments thus often seem ill-equipped to contribute to
the success of decentralization reforms in a meaningful way. Better human
and financial resources as well as improved implementation capacities are
crucial for successful subnational governance. A change in political culture
that makes political success and autonomous decision-making less extraor-
dinary at the subnational level is also necessary. Political cultural change
has to be accompanied by convincing new regional narratives for which
we found but scarce evidence. Strong political will of the central regimes
would be necessary to move reform projects forward. Without a doubt,
this would challenge both established neopatrimonial networks and as-
sume the political conviction of MENA regimes that decentralization is
the way forward. We have found no circumstantial evidence that such a
development exists, or that such a crucial turning point might manifest in
the near future.
In times of the COVID-19 pandemic, the political impetus for change is
under tremendous pressure. The crisis has served as an excuse for re-cen-
tralizing certain powers under the pretext of fighting the virus. Yet, as the
chapter authored by Bergh demonstrates, decentralization debates in the
countries are interwoven with international donor programs that – de-
pending on their loan volumes – have a significant impact on the changing
center-periphery relations. In the donors’ view, greater autonomy should
be allocated to subnational levels that hold a significant potential for local
citizens to challenge neopatrimonial networks.
Outlook – a roadmap for further research
The scope of our research and the robust results derived from our qualita-
tive and quantitative data gives some insight into potential trajectories for
further research. First, informal institutions are crucial to studying the role
of neopatrimonial networks. At the same time, their analysis is the most
difficult task: They are informal, ever changing, fuzzy, vague, and complex
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by definition. Fieldwork produces elite maps, but only limited informa-
tion on power relations inside neopatrimonial networks and the parallel
world they embody next to traditional state institutions. Even in “normal
times” this is a major challenge for empirical research. When the trans-
parency of decision-making processes further erodes and power struggles
move behind the scenes in times of crisis, it becomes an insurmountable
obstacle. The reality of shrinking political spaces and the consistent re-
silience of autocratic regimes will certainly remain a challenge for future
research.
Second, fiscal policies haven proven to be a promising indicator and
starter to trace the scope, quality, and outcome of decentralization. Addi-
tional policy fields might also offer promising entry points for future re-
search, such as the health sector, infrastructure or public services on the
subnational levels. Everything that immediately affects the living condi-
tions of the general population can locally and regionally provoke the
question: Where is our institutional access to representation and decision-
making?
Third, MENA governments and regimes are learning from each other
when it comes to strategies and modes of regime survival. Are they also
learning regarding the implementation of decentralization strategies? The
conceptual approaches derived from the international dimension of au-
thoritarianism (in particular diffusion theory) might offer tools to trace
possible emulation effects among MENA countries.
Fourth, another crosscutting issue in our sample was the common chal-
lenge all MENA governments have been facing when dealing with elec-
toral cycles at the local level following decentralization efforts. They were
all challenged by the success of actors from the spectrum of Political Islam.
On the one hand, there seems to be a trend to curtail these dynamics by
relying on various repressive measures. On the other hand, our results hint
that moderate Islamists are also looking abroad for inspiration or best-prac-
tice models from like-minded Islamist groups, organizations, and parties.
Systematic comparative research on this topic is still deficient.
Fifth, based on the exploratory research on Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt,
and Jordan, the MENA region might offer an interesting context to expand
the sample by using a fuzzy-set comparative qualitative analysis that also
includes testing additional variables and an interregional perspective for
Sub-Saharan cases.
These potential avenues of further research show that the scholarly de-
bate on decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa has just be-
gun with an ever growing “to-do list”. A debate on meaningful decentral-
ization is always also a debate on the quality of democracy. Decentralized
1. Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa: The Puzzle
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rule without corresponding decision-making by elected representatives is
difficult to imagine. As the experience of the OECD world shows, this first
step to regional and local empowerment is much less dangerous to the
ability of the center to govern than, for example, the experiences of France
or Poland illustrates. However, this insight also tells us that the regime
type matters and the involved elites matter even more.
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Conceptualizing Decentralization and the History of
Statehood in the Middle East and North Africa
Roland Sturm and Thomas Demmelhuber
Decentralization, “the transfer of rule from the central government level to
regional and local levels” (Demmelhuber, Sturm, and Vollmann 2020), has
been on the rise globally since the early 1990s (see Figure 1). Decentraliza-
tion is one among several forms of power-sharing between the center and
the regions in a nation-state1. It is a broad category which subsumes top-
down and bottom-up processes of social, constitutional and cultural
change. Its implementation carries a normative quality (see Wibbels 2006,
166): The concept implies improved democratic standards when imple-
mented (see Jones 2009) and it is regularly included in a broad set of in-
dices on the quality of democracy.2
These effects of decentralization are difficult to prove as, among others,
Treisman3 has demonstrated. He argues, “it is hard to reach any general
conclusions about whether political – or administrative, or fiscal – decen-
tralization will improve or impair the quality of government and econo-
mic performance.” (Treisman 2007, 274)4 Therefore, any one-size-fits-all
prescriptions of decentralization are not particularly helpful (see
Hutchcroft 2001, 24). It would moreover be incorrect to assume that the
predominance of autocratic regimes in the MENA countries precludes de-
centralization by definition. On the one hand, there is no rule of thumb
for normative judgments. It is moreover of high importance to move be-
yond the association of authoritarianism with centralization and democra-
cy with decentralization. […] The process of decentralization may some-
times promote democracy, but it is quite easy to conceive of an “autocratic
decentralization” in situations where authority is devolved to authoritarian
enclaves at the local level (Hutchcroft 2001, 33).
2.
1 Nation-state is hereby a descriptor of the analytical (national) level and not a nor-
mative concept within the notion of Westphalian statehood, see also Tilly (1992).
2 For example, V-Dem Institute (2020).
3 See also, for example, De Vries (2000).
4 See also Kaiser and Ehlert (2009).
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Decentralization can upgrade as well as downgrade and/or challenge au-
thoritarian rule (see Vollmann et al. 2020). On the other hand, despite a
consistently high number of resilient autocracies both in the MENA (see
Kneuer and Demmelhuber 2021) and worldwide (see Lührmann and
Lindberg 2019), decentralization has been in vogue as a political reform
initiative for more than three decades. Figure 1, based on data retrieved
from the Varieties of Democracy index, illustrates this trend of increasing
electoral modes on the local government level in MENA countries and
worldwide. The critical juncture of the Arab uprisings led to a further
boost in decentralization rhetoric, although decentralization implemented
on the ground – as shown in Figure 1 with “local government elected” as
proxy indicator – increased only marginally.
Decentralization and elections on the local level over space and time
V-Dem (2020) coding: 0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected. 1: Gen-
erally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly. 2: Generally, the local as-
sembly is elected but not the executive. 3: Generally, the local executive is elected
and there is no assembly. 4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no
executive. 5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.
Figure 1:
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Varieties of decentralization beyond international donors’ hope
What are the triggers for decentralization? What does decentralization
stand for in the MENA region? How can we explain variance in decentral-
ization processes? Who are the relevant actors behind decentralization and
how can we grasp their motives? Despite substantial research in this field,
the question of how to understand the numerous challenges facing decen-
tralization in the MENA region constitutes a gap in research.5
The approach we have chosen in this edited volume is empirical, as we
do not accept as a normative premise that decentralization matters and we
are not concerned whether decentralization or centralization might be the
better mode of governance. We go beyond normative assumptions that de-
centralization is a necessary precondition or even a booster for democrati-
zation: Western donors, including the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank, as well as local civil society activists have been en-
couraging decentralization reforms for decades. They expected decentral-
ization to enhance local autonomy, democracy, accountability and the
overall socioeconomic situation of a country (for this perspective see chap-
ter 6; see also Vollmann et al. 2020). However, one decade after the Arab
uprisings began, only Tunisia managed to continue down the bumpy path
of democratic consolidation with numerous stress factors still to come (see
Demmelhuber 2018).
Where and what is the region in MENA statehood?
When comparing decentralization efforts we are confronted with an un-
solved problem of institutional design. So far, there is no consensus on
what constitutes a region in a domestic setting. In MENA countries the
definition and denomination is deeply influenced by the colonial/imperial
era and the process of state-building that began in the early 20th century. In
every state of the world there are subnational tiers of government that are
often tied to distinct purposes, such as water or electricity grids. Adminis-
trative needs foster administrative decentralization. Any empowerment of
a region – even in a limited and/or cosmetic form – has an impact on the
policy- and decision-making in a country independent of its regime type.
5 See both for the research base and the still persisting research questions the pro-
gram on “Governance and Local Development (GLD)” at the Department of Polit-
ical Science, University of Gothenburg.
2. History of Statehood in the Middle East and North Africa
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In MENA countries, this kind of empowerment is frequently an informal
side effect of decentralization, as our cases demonstrate, rather than a de-
liberate strategy. This side effect is a conspicuous one. Whether the accep-
tance of regional approaches legitimates regional governance often de-
pends on resources redistributed (we focus on fiscal policy) and the ability
of regions to integrate into the neopatrimonial power games that traverse
all levels of subnational government. All regions in MENA countries have
in common that they provide an additional stage (in addition to local gov-
ernment) for the struggle between efficiency and participation in gover-
nance. Table 1 summarizes the choices for regional policy styles that might
develop as a result of this struggle.
Regional policy styles




Regional identities strong subsidiarity partnership
Regional identities weak exploitation loyalty to the center
In our case studies, regional policy styles are less dichotomous than Table 1
seems to suggest. Informal decision-making processes and networks at play
help avoid an attack on political dominance of the center, even if identity
conflicts or conflicts over resources remain possibilities. However, loyalty
to the center is but one factor that defines the relationship between the
center and the regional governance level. Further factors include the quali-
ty of top-down dominance and the influence of new models of partner-
ships (e.g. cooptation of local elites for party lists) that may impact elec-
toral contests. Institutional design allows relative flexibility in structuring
the future of decentralization. But “central agencies”, “top-down models”
and “regional agencies” (see Table 2) remain more important than the op-
portunities a bottom-up decentralization process would provide. It is re-
markable how little attention is paid to transactional costs of national and
regional governance in the MENA countries, especially when the center
expects regions to be more than compliance managers.
Table 1:
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transaction costs
The narrow definition of efficiency that guides the countries in MENA
when they implement decentralization, as well as the countries’ tendency
to avoid meaningful regional and local participation, become manifest in
the high restrictions and limitations to electoral arenas at the local level
(see Figure 1). But the lack of regional and local involvement is not a one
way-street. Local and regional administrators often see themselves in a tra-
dition of obedience and loyalty toward the center and rarely developed a
strong impetus to shape regional and local governance.
Structure matters
We accept and pay tribute to the fact that governments and parliaments in
the MENA region have partially opted for implementing decentralization
measures. The methods and means of these efforts often correlate with the
history of state-building in MENA since the early 20th century. This in-
cludes a colorful mixture of pre-state patterns (in particular going back to
the Ottoman era) and external engineering on behalf of European powers
during the colonial/imperial era (see Hudson 1977). Historical and con-
temporary social science research on the MENA region has shown that pre-
and early modern identities, as well as the selection of representatives,
were often attached to cities or certain landscapes. For a long time after in-
Table 2:
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dependence, domestic regions and regional identities no longer played a
formal role, although regional identities remained in people’s minds (see
Visser and Stansfield 2008). Local or regional identities were considered
obstacles to the development of a national identity and the consolidation
of national sovereignty (see Philipp 1994). In the ideologically dominant
discourse of nationalism that prevailed for many years, there was a fierce
competition between territorial (local) nationalisms of newly established
independent states and the narrative of a unifying Arab nationalism. Both
preferred a centralist concept of statehood for the sake of forging a nation
(see the works of al-Husri; see also Tibi 1990 a/b) and defending the nation
against external adversaries (in particular after the independence of Israel
1948; Gershoni and Jankowski 1997).
There is a broad consensus in Middle East Political Science research that
the personal and often informal exercise of power is of great importance
for understanding MENA politics. This implies a certain ad hoc character
of state order, which leads to a mosaic structure of societies in the region.
For this reason, some state-building processes such as in the Gulf region
have even been called “historical accidents” (Anderson 1991, 3). State or-
der is both the result and cause of constant social struggles and negotiation
processes. The personal or dynastic character of state rule in the MENA re-
gion led to a concentration of power in a few centers, while the center’s
power and influence over people and territory waned and fragmented as
the spatial distance to the center increased (see Herb 1999). Each political
order was thus based on the interaction of the center and peripheral
groups who defended their autonomy against efforts of the center to con-
trol them. The center integrated local groups and created statehood by uti-
lizing traditional pre-state modes of rule, as Hertog (2011, 10) vividly illus-
trates for the case of Saudi Arabia:
The modern Saudi state was created rapidly […] through the decisions
of a few Saudi royals. In this hierarchical, vertically divided hub-and-
spoke system, the only common denominator has been the central role
of the Al Saud ruling family as patrons and controllers of the purse
and the only macro-level political force in the kingdom.
Particularly in peripheral regions, there is often a deep-rooted network of
autonomous subsystems that has evolved over centuries. Mielke et al. ex-
amined this as a dimension of social order in the absence of statehood (see
Mielke, Schetter, and Wilde 2011). These structures only partially build on
a legal basis. In many cases, they are based on informal claims. The exercise
of power is usually legitimized through a ruler’s specific personal qualities
that allegedly guarantee the continuation of local traditions (see Hertog
Roland Sturm and Thomas Demmelhuber
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2011). The strong interdependence reproduced in neopatrimonial net-
works and patronage-based relations, which function as a recognized cate-
gory of order in the relationship of municipalities, regions, and the nation-
al level, can deprive decentralization efforts of their normative goal (such
as, for example, dismantling socio-regional center-periphery dichotomies).
It is precisely the informality of political and social orders that counteract
the aims of decentralization.6
In the MENA region, the transfer of sovereignty to lower levels of gov-
ernment based on the principle of subsidiarity (see Table 1) has nowhere
taken hold (see Demmelhuber and Sturm 2016). The idea that efficient
centralized governance is superior to models of regional empowerment re-
mained unchallenged for a long time. The colonial legacy, the nation-
building process, and the clustering of autocratic regimes among MENA
states were unfavorable conditions for decentralization. This may be one
reason why in international comparisons MENA countries are thus far vir-
tually non-existent in databases (see Harguindéguy, Cole, and Pasquier
2019), with the exception of Morocco and Egypt. Our research results (see
chapters 4 and 5) will provide a more nuanced picture by taking a closer
look into the cases of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan.
Institutional reform as booster
Decentralization in the MENA region is first and foremost a strategy of na-
tional governments. They respond to the (financial and political) pressure
of donor nations or feel forced to accommodate ethnic minorities and/or
local elites who are important to securing stability and security as well as
economic success. The institutional consequences of decentralization re-
forms have many aspects. For practical reasons, governments may decide
to deconcentrate public administration, that is to say ministries open up
branches in a country’s periphery or at least implement representation that
both monitors and tries to steer regional activities. Lower level public ad-
ministration may be short-lived regarding details of their tasks and powers.
This is a flexible and convenient transmission belt for central government
initiatives, but on the downside rigidifies a hierarchical relationship with
the regions. A constant threat to the regime is the possibility that reports
on regional needs and on resistance regarding central government inter-
6 See, for example, current findings on Tunisia by Yerkes and Muasher (2017).
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ventions are whitewashed to please the upper levels of public administra-
tion and the political elite in the capital.
At least in theory, the entrenchment of decentralization in national con-
stitutions is a step forward. Through textualization, legal minimum stan-
dards for routes of regional participation come to be. Whether constitu-
tional provisions play a role in national politics in reality is an empirical
question. In the MENA region, as in other countries with written constitu-
tions, we can expect many degrees of deviance from the standards and
practices a constitution aims to uphold. And yet, constitutional rules allow
discussions on the spirit of legal privileges and procedures, both by the ju-
dicial branch of government and by the general public. What is more im-
portant, written constitutions may legitimize decentralization and may
provide a forum for further constitutional change. The essence of decen-
tralization, however, lies not in the constitution itself but in society. It is
society that entrenches decentralization and makes it meaningful in practi-
cal terms despite being permanently challenged by underlying neopatri-
monial networks, as our research on Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan
demonstrates.7 Wibbels (2006, 167) calls the structural consequences of di-
versity that stem from the forces underpinning institutions rather than
from the institutions themselves “institutional endogeneity”. Institutional
endogeneity strengthens the argument for our bottom-up empirical ap-
proach in contrast to the top-down expectations that models of decentral-
ization create. We are, of course, well aware of the paradox inherent to de-
centralization: Its progress finally depends on the willingness of the center
not the wishes of subnational legal entities.
Measuring decentralization
Because of the absence of federalism in MENA countries (see Mallat
2003)8, the arena between the national and local level often remains an ill-
defined category from a constitutional perspective. Here Elazar’s concepts
of self-rule and shared rule (1987) are helpful, as they move beyond rigid
constitutional terminology. They make it possible to center in on the polit-
ical process of decentralization and the balance or imbalance established
7 For a similar discussion on federalism see Thorlakson (2003).
8 The federal constitution of the Iraq, for example, has no substantial consequences
and Iraqi statehood is by definition fundamentally challenged. For a more opti-
mistic view see Mingus (2012).
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between central and local powers. Shared rule in MENA countries is above
all informal rule, whereas formal self-rule scarcely exists and/or does little
to shift the power balance in nation-states. Genuinely regional tasks are of-
ten still de facto in the hands of local officeholders. However, the local lev-
el pursues very different priorities and distinct political logics. Moreover,
local politics is not necessarily the product of decentralization since it
builds on a long political tradition, which in the course of decentralization
has been confronted with new political impetus.
In addition to administrative decentralization and regionalism in a na-
tion-state, regions in the Middle East and North Africa can be defined by
the decentralization of policies. Constitutionally anchored decentralization
is often, but not always, the pre-condition for policy decentralization. Na-
tional security policies, for example, can develop regional structures with-
out a formal revision of competences in a nation-state. Meaningful decen-
tralization and resulting financial independence is a prerequisite for sub-
stantial policy making. But how can this be organized? A number of em-
pirical questions have to be asked: Which level of government collects tax-
es, how much do they collect, how much autonomy do subnational levels
of government have in setting tax policy, and how are revenues shared
across levels of government (see Wibbels 2006, 169)? It is said that “country
experiences by and large suggest that there is need to supplement the de-
centralization of spending responsibilities with the assignment of signifi-
cant sources of revenue to subnational governments.” (Lalvani 2002, 25;
see also Hankla 2009, 640).
Any budget for the regions in MENA countries can naturally be co-fi-
nanced by regional sources and/or taxes. The allocation of funds is, how-
ever, above all a strategic tool for the center to provide incentives that cre-
ate loyalty (not least by the access to corruption that a budget makes possi-
ble9) and distribute resources to support preferences for regional develop-
ment as endorsed by the center. Ironically, research has shown that partici-
pation of the center in subnational government (shared rule) helps to
avoid corruption excesses, which are more prone to occur in situations of
local and regional self-rule. There seems to be an agreement in literature
that decentralization as such is no panacea for corruption (see Neudorfer
and Neudorfer 2015).
Virtually all decentralization indices make use of fiscal variables (see
Harguindéguy, Cole, and Pasquier 2019, 12). Budgetary allocations can be
block grants or categorical grants, which are meant to improve the effi-
9 As has been shown by Kuenzi and Lambright (2019).
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ciency and effectiveness of policies. Block grants tend to increase the re-
gional and local budgetary autonomy, whereas categorical grants involve
the center in subnational decision-making. In Wibbels’ (2006, 170) view:
The more decentralized governments rely on intergovernmental trans-
fers, the greater the incentive for subnational politicians to engage in
the kind of overspending that can threaten the overall economic
health of a nation.
This, he suggests, can be avoided by granting subnational spending powers
that encourage tax competition and favor less intrusive governments on
the local level. As of now, these powers are out of reach for subnational
governments in MENA countries. Regional budgets can lead to political
gains as well as political power compromises between central and regional
elites and/or subordinates. Such budgets function as a seismometer of tec-
tonic changes in the power relationship between the center and the re-
gions.
Empowerment and its limit
In the MENA region, decentralization may function as a concession to
(emerging) rival power centers, be they ethnic strongholds, territorial pow-
er centers of oppositional actors, economic hotspots, or (in rare cases) con-
ditions by donors. Decentralization remains flexible and its effects are
highly informal. As long as the role of the center is left unchallenged, a
wide range of administrative and organizational changes is possible. The
changes’ success above all depends on efficiency criteria and on their fit
with the dominant power relationships in a society. The form and legal
characteristics of decentralization arrangements may differ, but they con-
verge when it comes to resources, supporting networks, and the role of the
center. For the center decentralization is a governance problem. A more
successful and robust steering process and change management is more
important than participatory democracy or the empowerment of regional
elites.
Empowerment is predominantly only the second step. It follows the cre-
ation of preconditions for regional elites to attain relative autonomy.
Neopatrimonial networks have a regional dimension, but they do not
automatically create regional autonomy. These networks are inclined to
support authoritarian political cultures. In these environments, regional
decision-makers tend to rely on traditions of obedience and formality.
They do not see constitutional or institutional change as opportunity struc-
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ture, but as a new environment for the power games they know. Networks
infiltrate formal structures of authority, they penetrate institutions and ad-
ministrative routines of policymaking (see Hutchcroft 2001, 27). It is there-
fore problematic to assume as De Vries does, that “local elites do not sup-
port decentralized responsibility for issues having national or global causes
and consequences.” (De Vries 2000, 218). Local elites’ tactical value for
maintaining neopatrimonial networks is worth more to central elites than
the issues at stake. Hence, the scope literature on neopatrimonialism and
the role of patronage networks both generally and in the region in particu-
lar is as diverging as it is comprehensive. At times the literature even de-
veloped a hegemonic character (see Erdmann and Engel 2006; Ruiz de
Elvira, Schwarz, and Weipert-Fenner 2018). Its focus was primarily on the
central state level, including the respective constellations of actors. The po-
litical relevance of neopatrimonial networks in the periphery is admittedly
acknowledged, nevertheless, previous research usually leaves the question
of the role of patronage networks in processes of decentralization unan-
swered.
Conceptual roadmap: How to grasp the informal in a formal setting?10
We argue that decentralization in the MENA region can only be under-
stood by looking at the role of neopatrimonial networks at all levels of
government, i.e. the central, regional and local levels. Policies of decentral-
ization are guided, inspired and used for their purposes by informal per-
sonal networks. They penetrate the central (national), regional and local
levels of government. Decentralization processes, how they emerge and
how they function, are hence more than the result of constitutional re-
forms. The impact of decentralization depends heavily on the degree and
quality of informality and its framing by neopatrimonial networks.
We attribute special importance to elite networks at the regional level
who are connected with their counterparts at both the central and the lo-
cal levels of decision-making. We assume that these neopatrimonial net-
works, because of their strategic position between the national and local
level, can have the ability to shape the outcome of decentralization pol-
icies. We derive three vital characteristics of governance in the MENA re-
gion from the literature: (1) Formal rule is centrally organized but fluid,
10 The conceptual argument is based on Demmelhuber, Sturm, and Vollmann
(2020).
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with autonomous social fragments in the periphery. (2) Neopatrimonial-
ism is a basic principle of governance throughout the region. This implies
a systematic interplay of formal and informal politics. (3) The integration
of research on elite actor networks on the regional and local levels into our
research agenda is overdue.
We assume that interactions between formal and informal institutions
will change the outcome of decentralization: State authority may for exam-
ple be impeded by insufficient funding or dependence on regime elites.
Mere delegation of administrative tasks can be exploited by sub-national
elites and actors and redefined in order to steer policies towards au-
tonomous decision-making. This results from interactions of informal and
formal institutions. After their independence in the 20th century, MENA
states were centralist states, but statehood in the Westphalian notion of na-
tion-states often remained precarious. Because of arbitrary boundaries and
“divide et impera” tactics under colonial rule, the formation of the MENA
states began without political unity or (a national) identity of the people.
Decentralized structures often served colonial/imperial powers’ interest by
excluding actors while promoting and fostering other actors on the local
level. The centralist regimes of the new states employed a personal or fami-
ly-based logic of governance, heavily reliant on neopatrimonial networks
(see Herb 1999). The citizens’ loyalty to the national regimes’ rule re-
mained in competition with other strong social ties based on religion, eth-
nicity or, most importantly, tribalism – especially in the periphery of the
MENA states. Formal governance remained wanting in the provinces
where a pre-state social order of autonomous sub-entities prevailed. To
govern in the MENA periphery, rulers had to work with or against those
sub-state patrimonial authorities. In a pivotal contribution on the impor-
tance of family and tribe in MENA politics after formal independence,
Charrad elaborates on the strategies of the Moroccan, Tunisian and Iraqi
leaders to establish their regimes’ rule over national and local neopatrimo-
nial networks. She identifies patterns of marginalization and integration
(or shifts between those patterns) as strategies of the center when dealing
with local networks (see Charrad 2011).
The importance of traditional authorities and institutions in the periph-
ery remains high. Regimes still need to deal with local or regional elites to
assert peripheral governance. The importance of personal patron-client
networks and the interplay of formal and informal politics for efficient
governance results in a high degree of flexibility of neopatrimonial rule in
the Middle East and North Africa. It is logical to assume that the same flex-
ibility will be found when looking at decentralization policies. The impact
of informal decentralization policies is likely to be even more important
Roland Sturm and Thomas Demmelhuber
36
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:15
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
than legal norms imply. To assess the impact of neopatrimonial networks
on the national, regional and local levels of government, we have to identi-
fy the political elites involved and their interests in decentralization pol-
icies (see chapter 4). Hence, we argue that the neopatrimonial network of
elites at the national level is accompanied by neopatrimonial networks on
the regional and local levels of a country. The center, or even sectors of the
center, can interact with lower-level networks. In some cases they are tight-
ly interwoven with them. For our approach, it is crucial to acknowledge
the existence and relevance of neopatrimonial networks on the regional
and local levels. We also need to analyze their possible connections with
the national level. While direct cooperation or interaction between the
regime and the regions has the potential to marginalize the regional level,
we assume that this context still is important for a (limited) role of the re-
gions in formal decentralization reforms. Neopatrimonial networks facili-
tate interactions between the central government and the regional and lo-
cal levels. It is possible, as we show in this chapter, to identify different
kinds of networks and to trace them. First and foremost, regional position-
al networks are based on the formal status of regional decision-makers.
This formal position is always open to constitutional engineering, but
above all dependent on the role of informal power bases and informal de-
cision-making. The identification of relevant elite actors and their interac-
tions is the key issue for an explanation of the variance in the outcome of
decentralization processes. Previous investigations of elite networks were
macro-level studies, primarily interested in the regime’s perspective. The
thematic focus on decentralization allows for updated elite mapping that
integrates actors beyond the center who are politically relevant for decen-
tralization reforms (for methodological reflections, see chapter 4).
Top-down and bottom-up factors of decentralization
Decentralization is the transfer of rule from the central level to regional
and local levels. It is often a deliberate formal process implemented by cen-
tralist regimes, but it is nevertheless (1) influenced by informal clientelist
and patronage networks in the center, the region and in the municipali-
ties, and (2) does have an impact on the creation and functions of those
networks. Decentralization modes encompass the top-down (central)
regime decisions and actions as well as bottom-up activities and the feed-
back of local and regional actors when enabling, using, or circumventing
changes of governance. The strategies of MENA rulers since the 1990s gave
preference to a top-down (driven by the regime) implementation of decen-
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tralization, mostly – but not only – by establishing or strengthening formal
institutions. Another strategy is the endorsement of neoliberal reforms and
privatization of local service provision. Instead of increased regional ac-
countability and efficiency, as results of these reforms scholars have ob-
served the strengthening of central state influence due to the elimination
of traditional checks and balances (see Bergh 2012; Clark 2018). The semi-
nal approach by Hutchcroft (2001), however, points to the possibility of
(informal) bottom-up decentralization as an attempt of local patrimonial
networks to fill in the voids left by weak capacities of the central regime.
Most comparative studies with a macro-level perspective did not capture
this notion of decentralization. Yet it seems of high relevance in the case of
MENA regimes, who are generally characterized by a high fragmentation
of the centralist regime’s capacity in the periphery.
Although formal provisions for decentralization have a strong potential
to determine structural and policy outcomes, we expect that for decentral-
ization in the MENA region the impact of informal processes is of even
greater importance. Central aspects for the efficacy of decentralization pro-
cesses are the perceived legitimacy of decentralization and/or people’s sup-
port, the goals of the involved neopatrimonial networks, and the strength
of local and regional actors.
As argued above, we expect that decentralization in MENA is shaped by
the interplay of formal and informal institutions and is driven by the rela-
tionship of neopatrimonial networks on different levels of governance.
Neopatrimonial governance in the MENA region stands for an ongoing
struggle of the central government with socio-political fragments in the pe-
riphery. Neopatrimonial networks can therefore shape, use or undermine
the institutional setting of a given state, depending on their respective
goals:
(1) MENA states have witnessed the co-optation of local elites through the
central regime, thus circumventing the restrictions of formal institu-
tions. Do actors on the regional political level defend the formal stan-
dards of decentralization policies? Or do they align with informal gov-
ernment strategies? The latter is likely to attract formal support and re-
sources by the central government.
(2) Central elites might experience decentralization as a possibility to
widen their influence on different political levels or offices. To the
central elites, the networks at the lower levels should function as an ex-
tension of their spheres of influence. However, the situation may arise
that newly empowered regional elites appear as threats to national lev-
el networks, which could prove as a barrier to successful cooperation.
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(3) If strong local and regional actors exist, they may strive for greater au-
tonomy by making use of formal decentralized institutions. But if the
legal setting of decentralization politics lacks local and/or regional sup-
port, or mirrors the patronage networks on the national level, they
may try to circumvent such institutions.
Fiscal policy and decentralization
The undisputed importance of informal institutions in MENA states im-
plies that the evaluation of the normative claims of decentralization can
only be a point of departure, a blueprint for officially presented intentions
that must be compared with the de facto outcome of the respective re-
forms. We suggest fiscal policies as a testing kit for the true quality of re-
gional power-sharing. Using fiscal policies as an indicator allows us to
trace decentralization. Financial relations between the national and sub-na-
tional levels of political systems can serve as an important indicator of the
de facto implemented level of decentralization strategies. Fiscal policy
leaves its imprint on other policy fields as well. The ability to tax one’s
population has been described as a regime’s extraction capacity. It is a
proxy for a regime’s capacity to govern (Cheibub 1998; see also Lieberman
2002). This establishes a direct link between taxation and the governability
of a political regime. But in the MENA region, tracking taxation may be
insufficient to deduce political realities, if it is used as the sole indicator for
the capacity to control public finances. This is particularly true for rent
economies who do not have a tax-burden, or are dependent on taxes only
to a very small degree. The analysis of taxation data and the division of tax
revenues between the different levels of the political system provides addi-
tional information on central state’s capacity to govern, or on the corre-
sponding capacity of sub-national governments. There is some evidence
that sub-national institutions occasionally fall short of their potential in tax
collection, either because of a lack of administrative efficiency, or even in-
tentionally in order to uphold local support (Harb and Atallah 2014). An-
other explanation may be a narrow tax base and structural factors (e.g. in-
formal economies). A broader approach to understanding budgetary pol-
icies of MENA states is thus necessary (see Lust and Rakner 2018). Local
budgets are not interesting per se, but they provide facts that help under-
stand the readiness of central governments to decentralize. Accordingly, a
significant change in resource allocations may signal the empowerment -
or conversely the loss of power – of the subnational level. Local budgets
are an indicator of the possible degree of power-sharing. If national gov-
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ernments decentralize fiscal policy and reduce financial oversight, they
thereby promote a higher degree of decentralized decision-making process-
es.
Conclusion
Decentralization is a vividly discussed topic among populace and govern-
ments in many parts of the Middle East and North Africa. International
donors such as the IMF or the World Bank, Arab civil society activists and
organizations, as well as some researchers have articulated great expecta-
tions. But in reality, the outcomes of decentralization reforms and their
consequences at the local and regional level are yet unknown or unclear at
best. Nonetheless, the topic presents an excellent opportunity to develop a
broader and deeper understanding of governance and governability under
the condition of neopatrimonialism in MENA countries. Neopatrimonial-
ism is the informal, all-embracing and penetrating feature in the interplay
of the central, regional and local levels of the Middle Eastern and North
African state. Based on an assessment of the quality and nature of neopatri-
monial networks in the MENA region, we identify, track and explain the
causes and outcomes of political decentralization. By doing so, we present
a more dynamic and elite-driven understanding of decentralization pol-
icies in MENA countries. We hereby moreover demonstrate how focusing
on the composition, change, and interdependence of neopatrimonial net-
works relevant for decentralization attempts is a promising alley of re-
search to help explain the variety of outcomes of decentralization reforms.
By utilizing fiscal policy and informal financial flows to investigate decen-
tralization in depth, we aim to provide conceptual insights for the study of
decentralization worldwide.
References
Anderson, Lisa. 1991. “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle
East.” Political Science Quarterly 106 (1): 1–15. doi:10.2307/2152171.
Bergh, Sylvia. 2012. “‘Inclusive’ Neoliberalism, Local Governance Reforms and the
Redeployment of State Power: The Case of the National Initiative for Human
Development (INDH) in Morocco.” Mediterranean Politics 17 (3): 410–426. doi:
10.1080/13629395.2012.725304.
Roland Sturm and Thomas Demmelhuber
40
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:15
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Charrad, Mounira M. 2011. “Central and Local Patrimonialism.” The ANNALS of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 636 (1): 49–68. doi:10.1177/0
002716211401825.
Cheibub, José A. 1998. “Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Govern-
ments: Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships.” World Politics 50 (3): 349–
376. doi:10.1017/S0043887100012843.
Clark, Janine. 2018. Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco: Strategies of Centralization
and Decentralization. New York: Columbia University Press.
De Vries, Michiel S. 2000. “The Rise and Fall of Decentralization: A Comparative
Analysis of Arguments and Practices in European Countries.” European Journal
of Political Research 38: 193–224. Accessed October 29, 2020. https://link.springer
.com/article/10.1023/A:1007149327245.
Demmelhuber, Thomas. 2018. “Die Politische Ordnung in Tunesien und die
Beziehungen mit der EU seit 2011: Dezentralisierung als Blaupause?” Accessed
October 29, 2020. http://iep-berlin.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/demmelhube
r.pdf.
Demmelhuber, Thomas, and Roland Sturm. 2016. “Warum gibt es keinen
Föderalismus in den arabischen Ländern? Zur Dialektik von Autokratie und
dezentraler Herrschaft.” In Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2016, edited by
Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen, 165–178. Baden-
Baden: Nomos.
Demmelhuber, Thomas, Roland Sturm, and Erik Vollmann. 2020. “Decentraliza-
tion in the Arab World: Conceptualizing the Role of Neopatrimonial Net-
works.” Mediterranean Politics 25 (4): 499–521. doi:10.1080/13629395.2018.15593
91.
Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg. “Governance and Lo-
cal Development.” Accessed October 29, 2020. http://gld.gu.se.
Elazar, Daniel J. 1987. Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa. Alabama: The University of
Alabama Press.
Erdmann, Gero, and Ulf Engel. 2006. “Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a
Catch-All Concept: GIGA Working Paper No 16.”. Hamburg: GIGA.
Fowler, Luke. 2020. “Governance, Federalism and Organizing Institutions to Man-
age Complex Problems.” Public Administration 98 (3): 713–729. doi:10.1111/
padm.12638.
Gershoni, Israel, and James P. Jankowski, eds. 1997. Rethinking Nationalism in the
Arab Middle East. New York: Columbia University Press.
Hankla, Charles R. 2009. “When is Fiscal Decentralization Good for Governance?”
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 39 (4): 632–650. doi:10.1093/publius/pjn034.
Harb, Mona, and Sami Atallah. 2014. “Decentralization in the Arab World must be
Strengthened to Provide Better Services.” LCPS Policy Brief (11). Accessed Octo-
ber 30, 2020. http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/publications/1401092788-policy_brie
f_11_lcps.pdf.
2. History of Statehood in the Middle East and North Africa
41
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:15
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Harguindéguy, Jean-Baptiste P., Alistair Cole, and Romain Pasquier. 2019. “The
Variety of Decentralization Indexes: A Review of the Literature.” Regional &
Federal Studies. doi:10.1080/13597566.2019.1566126.
Herb, Michael. 1999. All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the
Middle Eastern Monarchies. New York: State of University of New York Press.
Hertog, Steffen. 2011. Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi
Arabia. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press.
Hudson, Michael C. 1977. Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Hutchcroft, Paul D. 2001. “Centralization and Decentralization in Administration
and Politics: Assessing Territorial Dimensions of Authority and Power.”
Governance 14 (1): 23–53. doi:10.1111/0952-1895.00150.
Jones, Erik. 2009. “The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decen-
tralization.” Parliamentary Affairs 62 (4): 691–697. doi:10.1093/pa/gsp018.
Kaiser, André, and Niels Ehlert. 2009. “Federalism. Decentralisation, and Macro-
Economic Performance.” In Parlamente, Agendasetzung und Vetospieler: Festschrift
Für Herbert Döring, edited by Steffen Ganghof, Christoph Hönnige, and
Christian Stecher, 69–92. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
Kneuer, Marianne, and Thomas Demmelhuber. 2021. Authoritarian Gravity Centers:
A Cross-Regional Study of Authoritarian Promotion and Diffusion. Conceptualising
Comparative Politics: Polities, Peoples, and Markets 11. New York, NY: Rout-
ledge.
Kuenzi, Michelle T., and Gina M. S. Lambright. 2019. “Decentralization, Executive
Selection, and Citizen Views on the Quality of Local Governance in African
Countries.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 49 (2): 221–249. doi:10.1093/
publius/pjy031.
Lalvani, Mala. 2002. “Can Decentralization Limit Government Growth? A Test of
the Leviathan Hypothesis for the Indian Federation.” Publius: The Journal of
Federalism 32 (3): 25–45. Accessed October 30, 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable
/3330965.
Lieberman, Evan S. 2002. “Taxation Data as Indicators of State-Society Relations:
Possibilities and Pitfalls in Cross-National Research.” Studies in Comparative
International Development 36 (4): 89–115. doi:10.1007/BF02686334.
Lührmann, Anna, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. “A Third Wave of Autocratization
is here: What is New About it?” Democratization 26 (7): 1095–1113.
doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029.
Lust, Ellen, and Lise Rakner. 2018. “The Other Side of Taxation: Extraction and So-
cial Institutions in the Developing World.” Annual Review of Political Science 21
(1): 277–294. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-042716-102149.
Mallat, Chibli. 2003. “Federalism in the Middle East and Europe.” Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law 35 (1): 1–14.
Mielke, Katja, Conrad Schetter, and Andreas Wilde. 2011. “Dimensions of Social
Order: Empirical Fact, Analytical Framework and Boundary Concept.” Accessed
October 30, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88405.
Roland Sturm and Thomas Demmelhuber
42
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:15
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Mingus, Matthew S. 2012. “Progress and Challenges with Iraq’s Multilevel Gover-
nance.” Public Administration Review 72 (5): 678–686. doi:10.111/j.1540-6210.201
2.02538.x.
Neudorfer, Benjamin, and Natascha S. Neudorfer. 2015. “Decentralization and Po-
litical Corruption: Disaggregating Regional Authority.” Publius: The Journal of
Federalism 45 (1): 24–50. doi:10.1093/publius/pju035.
Philipp, Thomas. 1994. “Nationale Einheit und Politische Mehrstaatlichkeit der
Araber in der Gegenwart.” In Nationalismus im Mittelmeerraum, edited by Hans-
Jürgen Lüsebrink, 114–129. Passau: Passiva.
Ruiz de Elvira, Laura, Christoph H. Schwarz, and Irene Weipert-Fenner. 2018.
Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of
Dependency. Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Democratization and Govern-
ment. Milton: Routledge. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gbv/detail.actio
n?docID=5453462.
Thorlakson, Lori. 2003. “Comparing Federal Institutions: Power and Representa-
tion in Six Federations.” West European Politics 26 (2): 1–22. doi:10.1080/0140238
0512331341081.
Tibi, Bassam. 1990a. Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry. 2nd ed. Edited by Marion
Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tibi, Bassam. 1990b. “The Foundations of Sati‘ Al-Husri’s Political Theory.” In
Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry, edited by Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter
Sluglett. 2nd ed., 125–141. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tilly, Charles. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 - 1992. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
Treisman, Daniel. 2007. The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political
Decentralization. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
V-Dem Institute. 2020. “Global Standards, Local Knowledge.” Accessed October
29, 2020. https://www.v-dem.net/en/.
Visser, Reidar, and Gareth Stansfield. 2008. Iraq of its Regions: Cornerstone of a
Federal Democracy? London: Hurst.
Vollmann, Erik, Miriam Bohn, Roland Sturm, and Thomas Demmelhuber. 2020.
“Decentralisation as Authoritarian Upgrading? Evidence from Jordan and Mo-
rocco.” The Journal of North African Studies, 1–32. doi:10.1080/13629387.2020.17
87837.
Wibbels, Erik. 2006. “Madison in Baghdad? Decentralization and Federalism in
Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 9 (1): 165–188.
doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.062404.170504.
Yerkes, Sarah, and Marwan Muasher. 2017. “Tunisia’s Corruption Contagion: A
Transition at Risk.” Accessed October 30, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/
2017/10/25/tunisia-s-corruption-contagion-transition-at-risk-pub-73522.
2. History of Statehood in the Middle East and North Africa
43
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:15
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:15
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Doing Research on Subnational Levels of Autocracies:
Field Work and Methodological Approach
Miriam Bohn, Thomas Demmelhuber, and Erik Vollmann
Field research in non-democratic contexts is challenging. Even prior to the
Arab uprisings the clustering of autocratic regimes in the MENA region
held great obstacles regarding access to the field, access to data and
archives, and identification of potential interview partners or participants
for survey research. In most cases, research played out within legal “grey
zones” in terms of official permissions to conduct research. International
scholars were granted access to the field via tourist visas and fieldwork was
conducted with the implicit toleration of the security apparatus. Even so,
there is a tacit knowledge among the research community regarding the
unvoiced but clearly defined “red lines” that limit the scope and possibili-
ties of research and movement in the field.
The Arab uprisings were more than a turning point for the social and
political configuration of the region. The newly evolving political map im-
pacts research on and in the region. The reasons for this are manifold, but
three related aspects stand out: First, in times of popular upheavals narra-
tives of alleged clandestine interventions by external actors lent cause to
ruling regimes to identify actors from abroad purportedly responsible for
instability and turmoil (also referred to as “the third hand”, Wessel 2018).
This led to a tremendous increase in suspicion toward foreign researchers,
who are increasingly considered agents of external intelligence or other ex-
ternal parties. Second, the security apparatus in most MENA countries in-
vested a lot in domestic surveillance techniques, both in offline and on-
line, making it even more difficult to acquire the consent of potential in-
terviewees. And third, in times of changing makeup of political power and
not fully established top-down capacities, competing security/police
branches may lead to diverging interpretations of what is allowed and law-
ful and what is not. Experiences of arbitrary arrests and misuse of power
have been the consequence for many researchers in the MENA region.
This fundamental change has led to a thriving literature in the field of how
to do research in authoritarian contexts, which was long overdue (Glasius
et al. 2018; Grimm et al. 2020). Based on these context factors, our research
was driven by several methodological premises, benchmarks, and tools.
3.
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Case selection and period of investigation
In this book we analyze the interplay of neopatrimonialism and decentral-
ization in Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt. To detect changes and con-
tinuities over time, we concentrate on the period from 1990 until 2020. As
the most vital public discussions and reform endeavors regarding decen-
tralization – as well as our fieldwork – took place after the Arab uprisings,
the focus of our analysis is the period after 2011. The local governance dis-
cussions in the 1990s vastly reflected international donors’ calls for subna-
tional governance reforms and liberalization. We use the decentralization
reforms of that era as a necessary baseline to assess the trajectories of
change and continuity in the current generation of reforms. This broad
timeframe enables us to capture major dynamics that show an impact on
the development of decentralization in each country: continuing patterns
as well as specific events. Despite a variance in regime type, size, urbaniza-
tion and colonial history, our four cases experienced the Arab uprisings as
heavily centralized authoritarian regimes with limited potential to pacify
protests with classic instruments of a rent economy (e.g. increasing social
welfare, subsidies). All four were considered neopatrimonial (see Table 1)
at the time, and opted for a decentralization reform or enshrined it in their
constitutions as a reaction to the protests. While major and regionally ex-
ceptional reforms followed in Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, Egypt’s
propensity for reform has been curbed ever since the power transition to
as-Sisi in 2014 (see Figure 1).
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Increase in local government power (V-Dem)
V-Dem (2020). Combined index of the existence of elected local governments and
their power vis-à-vis nonelected actors on the same level, range between 0 (non-ex-
istent or subordinate) and 1 (existent and dominant).
Attempts to decentralize longstanding neopatrimonial structures unite
these four countries. They are low- to middle-income MENA countries
that cannot rely on rentierism alone to appease the protesters. Beyond
these similarities, the four countries vary on important characteristics. In
order to illustrate similarities and differences of the four cases under inves-
tigation, Table 1 summarizes major demographic and socio-economic fea-
tures of each country. Egypt has the largest population, but also the lowest
urbanization rate (despite a concentration of inhabitants in and around
the Nile Valley). Jordan and Tunisia share a similar population size, but
Jordan’s degree of urbanization is significantly higher with a score of 91%
of the population living in urban spaces. Jordan also encompasses by far
the smallest territory in our sample. Central state power need not spread
far from the capital Amman to reach the Jordanian hinterland, whereas
Moroccan let alone Egyptian regime power is stretched thin over vast land-
scapes with dispersed populations. This might be an incentive to decentral-
ize to increase the state’s capacity in the periphery.
All our cases started as autocratic regimes. Morocco and Egypt both de-
teriorated from moderate to hardline autocracies between 2010 and 2020,
Figure 1:
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while Jordan kept up its status as moderate autocracy. The most profound
change occurred in Tunisia: The country developed from a hardline autoc-
racy in 2010 to a defective democracy in 2020 in the aftermath of its politi-
cal upheaval (see Table 1). Neopatrimonialism has been present in all
countries for long periods of time. Comparing the V-Dem local govern-
ment index of 2010 and 2019 (see Table 1), Egypt kept almost the same rat-
ing while Jordan and Morocco show slight decreases. Tunisia shows the
biggest change with a score of 0.84 in 2010 and only 0.08 in 2019. This
would suggest a full turnaround of neopatrimonial power structures. On-
going corruption perception, the persistence of the old economic elites
and the importance of favoritism cast doubt on that score. The corruption
perception index remains relatively unchanged in the young democracy
since 2012 and is on the same level as in the other political regimes. More-
over, survey data for the Global Corruption Barometer suggest that more
Tunisians experienced increasing corruption in 2019 than the population
of our other cases. This replicates the high popular skepticism of 2016,
where Jordanians and Tunisians very clearly led our list of cases in terms of
distrust. The percentage of people reporting they had to pay a bribe over
the course of the previous year also remains relatively constant throughout
the Tunisian transition. The level is significant, though it is lower than
that reported for the other countries of the sample. The percentage of peo-
ple who perceive government officials as corrupt are on a comparably high
level in all four cases. Egyptian, Moroccan, and Tunisian local councils
were (slightly) more often perceived as corrupt than their central govern-
ments in 2016. In 2019 (after the Tunisian decentralization reform), the
young democracy drew equal to Jordan, where more people believe the
government to be corrupt than members of local governments.
Country characteristics in comparison
Egypt Jordan Morocco Tunisia
Population (2019) in
million
100.4 10.5 36.5 11.7





43 91 63 69
Table 1:
1 Second value with disputed areas (primarily the Moroccan-controlled Western Sa-
hara).
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Cairo: 9.6 Amman: 19.5 Rabat: 5.2 Tunis: 19.9
Wealth group / GNI

































2010: 0.68 2010: 0.51 2010: 0.41 2010: 0.84
2019: 0.67 2019: 0.36 2019: 0.3 2019: 0.08
     
Corruption
perception Index2
2019: 35 2019: 48 2019: 41 2019: 43
2015: 36 2015: 53 2015: 36 2015: 38




2019: / 2019: 55% 2019: 53% 2019: 67 %
2016: 28% 2016: 75% 2016: 26% 2016: 64%
Paid bribe 2019: / 2019: 4% / wasta:
25%
2019: 31% 2019: 18%
2016: 50% 2016: 4% 2016: 48% 2016: 9%
2013: 36% 2013: 37% 2013: 49% 2013: 18%
Government offi-
cials / Local govern-
ment councilors
2019: / 2019: 36% / 28% 2019: 37% / 38% 2019: 31% / 27%
2016: 27% /
36%
2016: 34% / 24% 2016: 35% / 39% 2016: 31% / 32%
Own depiction based on data by BTI 2020; World Bank 2020; V-Dem 2020; OECD
and UCLG 2019; Transparency International 2020a; b.
Analyzing subnational dynamics under authoritarianism: Methodological
approach
The main argument of this book is that elite dynamics and interactions be-
tween all levels of governance – central, regional, and local – influence the
process and the outcome of decentralization. Different strata of elites re-
spond to the incentives of reforms and make use of or react to formal and
informal practices and institutions that accompany such reforms, in order
2 From 0 (highest level of corruption) to 100 (clean).
3 Percentage of respondents.
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to maintain or gain more influence as well as to undermine the position of
others. Eventually, elite behavior twists the logic of the decentralization
process, leading to different outcomes from what was expected as a result
of the de jure framework, for example in terms of elite representation
within subnational institutions, or the efficiency and equality of public ser-
vice distribution and economic development.
The analysis of elites is an important branch in current political science
study. In order to widen our understanding of politics “beyond the center”
(Hoffmann, Bouziane, and Harders 2013) it is necessary to extend the fo-
cus beyond the state as the main actor and the central level as unit of analy-
sis. Including elite perspectives at different levels of politics is one way to
accomplish this necessary shift in research. Conducting fieldwork inter-
views with elites can be a viable method to create original data that helps
us to look beyond a static understanding of the state and the regime, and
to reveal regime interactions with different strata of the populace. How-
ever, the research on elites is very heterogonous and up until now, litera-
ture does not provide a common understanding or definition of elites and
how to approach them (Morris 2009; Mikecz 2012; Cochrane 1998; Rice
2010; Perthes 2004). For the purpose of this book, we employ a broad un-
derstanding of elites as a privileged group within society, characterized by
proximity to power or with a particular expertise (Morris 2009, 209). Fol-
lowing the argument of Woods (1998, 2106ff.), elites have (1) privileged
access to resources that may not only be material but also encompass coer-
cion, organizational, administrative, or symbolic capital, as well as knowl-
edge and psycho-personal elements (e.g. charisma). (2) Not every individu-
al has particular access to all resources, but they are interlinked by net-
works of social or professional relations. Lastly, elites are (3) socially or dis-
cursively constructed as elite by the recognition of their elevated status vis-
à-vis the population. Accordingly, this allows us to not only include the
top-regime elites into our analysis but also to consider oppositional, profes-
sional, regional, local, or societal elites.
In the empirical chapters we employ a mixed method approach using
established findings within the literature, official state sources, media re-
ports, and original fieldwork. Our argument draws on fieldwork in Moroc-
co (April 2018 – May 2018 and October 2018 – December 2018), Jordan
(April 2018 – May 2018, October 2018 – November 2018 and January 2020
– February 2020), and Tunisia (October 2019 – November 2019 and Jan-
uary 2020 – February 2020), where we conducted semi-structured inter-
views (n = 162) with politicians and state employees, civil society actors, re-
searchers, journalists, and foreign observer organizations on the central, re-
gional, and local government levels. Because of the political situation in
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Egypt, the deteriorating academic freedom and major security issues, we
decided not to conduct fieldwork in our fourth case study. Instead, we re-
lied on an evaluation of existing literature, official state channels, media re-
ports and country experts.
We employed clusters of open questions in three blocks relative to (1)
the framework of decentralization and its implementation, (2) the finan-
cial organization of subnational governance, as well as (3) elite networks
and the interactions between actors and institutions. Since the interviews
were conducted in an authoritarian (or transitional) environment, the safe-
ty of our interview partners had priority. Though decentralization is not
per se a “hot topic” in relation to security interests of authoritarian
regimes, special care is important when dealing with state-elite relation-
ships, discrepancies between the text of laws and their implementation as
well as country-specific “red lines” (e.g. the decentralization process in Mo-
rocco is strongly connected to the king, the unsolved Western Sahara
question, and even the protest movements in the northern Rif region). We
thus decided not to specify the date of the interviews and the position of
the interviewees (see Glasius et al. 2018 for an extensive discussion of ob-
stacles and techniques during fieldwork in authoritarian environments).
Fieldwork description
Conducting fieldwork in the periphery of MENA countries is challenging.
Every researcher aiming to analyze the subnational levels of government is
confronted with a variety of vital questions: How can I get in touch with
people far away from urban areas? How do I get there? Is it safe to stay
overnight? How do I interact with local officials? How far can I go with my
questions? In order to answer some of these questions and provide some
insight into fieldwork on the subnational levels, we divided this section in-
to two parts: the preparation phase and the actual field work.
Preparation phase ahead of the field trip
Planning potential interviews from abroad is difficult. It is possible to
reach out to international organizations before the visit and to arrange
meetings with them. However, local organizations or individual intervie-
wees are hard to contact from abroad. Emails remain unanswered and es-
tablishing contact via mobile phone or instant messaging services is limi-
3. Doing Research on Subnational Levels of Autocracies
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ted to a small pool of pre-existing contacts. Even if this is the case, the con-
tact person will usually ask the researcher to reach out to them as soon as
they have arrived in the country to make an appointment. The focus of the
preparation phase is thus the creation of a research plan, a questionnaire
for interviews, and to collect sufficient information on safe research tech-
niques in authoritarian contexts.
Conducting fieldwork in the periphery
Accordingly, the engagement phase of fieldwork usually starts upon ar-
rival. The essential device for the researcher is a local SIM card as many in-
terviewees rely exclusively on mobile phones for the coordination of ap-
pointments. The next step is thus to reach out to contacts via calls, instant
messages and emails. The initial recruiting of interviewees is based on (1)
suggestions of colleagues who were kind enough to share contact informa-
tion and (2) on a pool of observer organizations (especially the German po-
litical foundations). The latter are usually engaged in cooperation projects
and other forms of support concerning decentralization and were thus a
relevant source of information. Consequently, their experience and con-
tacts opened up the access to relevant actors in the field who, in turn, were
usually helpful to identify further potential interviewees. This eventually
led the way into the regions and enabled us to conduct interviews with lo-
cal government officials and observer organizations. Based on an evalua-
tion of official organizations, news reports and legal documents, we also
searched for additional persons of interest and either tried to find their
contact credentials (e.g., LinkedIn, Facebook, email) or asked other con-
tacts for their help to get in touch with them. However, lacking a connec-
tion to a colleague or preexisting contact, potential interview partners were
sometimes harder to motivate for an interview.
A trip to peripheral regions differs significantly between the countries.
In small countries like Jordan, it was most convenient to arrange a driver
for one day who would drive from one interview to the other, and then
back to the city in the evening. It is also the safest way to travel to the pe-
riphery, especially for female researchers. In the region, most of the times
we had a contact person who already waited for us on arrival to take us to
the interviews. We deliberately decided not to use recording devices in our
interviews. Due to the authoritarian (or transitional) research environment
we worked in, we tried to minimize risks and vulnerabilities to surveil-
lance (digital and otherwise) for both our contacts and us (Ryan and Ty-
nen 2020). We stored contact information of our interviewees and the
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notes we took separately and encrypted sensitive files. Lack of word-for-
word-transcripts may result in the loss of some information, but overall it
was more compatible with the dynamic interview settings we found our-
selves in: Depending on the interviewee, sensitive questions had to be
asked with caution, if at all. Some were eager to provide information, oth-
ers rather hesitant, especially when asked for names, informal practices,
and financial flows. Recording the interviews can thus further irritate in-
terview partners and may prompt them to withhold important informa-
tion. In addition, many interviews took place in noisy surroundings like
coffee shops, restaurants or hotel lobbies, sometimes we changed locations
in the middle of an interview as our contacts wanted to show us some-
thing. At times, interviews evolved into group interviews when our con-
tacts introduced us to colleagues and partners.
Most of our interviews were conducted in French and English. For
some interviews, especially those outside the city centers, we arranged a
professional interpreter or a colleague who is fluent in the local Arabic di-
alect. Our interviews were semi-structured encounters based on an open
questionnaire that we prepared in coordination with the research team.
However, we stayed open-minded and adapted the questions with respect
to the position or background of each interview partner. We frequently in-
corporated important news or questions raised by prior interviewees into
our set of questions to permanently advance our understanding of the is-
sues. During an interview, it is rarely possible4 to ask each question pre-
pared for the questionnaire. Often interview partners raise their own
points or open up a new perspective, which may eventually change the
structure of the interview. Flexibility is thus extremely important to ac-
commodate the different insights and backgrounds of our partners as well
as the different lengths of the interviews (from 30 minutes shared between
interviewee, translator and interviewer to three hours one-on-one).
Public finance and subnational data: Issues of quality and availability
While elite relations are vital for our understanding of decentralization un-
der neopatrimonialism, the fiscal relations of center and periphery are an-
other important tool to assess the state of decentralization in the MENA
region. Reliable and long-term data on public finance are very scarce in the
4 It would also not have been sensible to do so. Not every contact is in the position
to inform in detail on all three topics of our interview structure.
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region and the situation is even worse for subnational finance. Conse-
quently, most quantitative studies on the workings and effects of (fiscal)
decentralization exclude the Arab world from their analyses.5
Even when we focus on macro level data independent of decentraliza-
tion, the MENA region lags behind other world regions in data accessibili-
ty and quality. It is the only region that saw a decline in its statistical capac-
ity (i.e. data quality and accessibility) between 2005 and 2018. Its mean is
now last among world regions behind Sub-Sahara Africa (see Figure 2).
Even where the World Bank registers relatively high levels of statistical ca-
pacity, we still face a lack of micro level data (Arezki et al. 2020). Defini-
tions and accumulations of core state statistics might deviate from overar-
ching World Bank definitions and thus vary between cases.
Development and statistical capacity of world regions in 2018
Arezki et al. (2020, 17).
Figure 2:
5 Ivanyna and Shah (2014) are an exception among large-n studies on decentraliza-
tion in this regard.
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The problem seems accentuated when working with data on subnational
phenomena. Data on subnational finance was often inaccessible for parts
of our period of investigation (Jordan, Tunisia). Our analysis sometimes
suffers from a palpable lack of disaggregated data (Egypt, Morocco), miss-
ing data from parts of the reporting subnational entities (Jordan, Tunisia)
or reported values that vary between different official ministry sources
(Tunisia, Jordan).
Statistical capacity score for MENA countries, 2018
Arezki et al. (2020, 18).
World Bank data suggest the highest statistical capacity for Egypt (see Fig-
ure 3). This high value, however, does not translate into an easier access to
subnational data for our purposes of investigation – on the contrary. The
Egyptian regime faces allegations it would hide its vast military spending
through artificially downsizing military resources in state statistics. Many
comparative social science datasets have not updated their latest ratings on
Egypt because access to the field and other sources of information have be-
come ever more difficult to acquire.
Kandil (2020) claims that the shortfalls in the quality and accessibility of
official data in MENA countries cannot solely be explained by insufficient
resources or new procedures: “National statistics centres in most MENA
countries were set up decades ago, so they have had enough time to build
capacity; the dearth of adequate, accurate, reliable and timely data has to
be explained by unwillingness to share information.” (Kandil 2020)
Figure 3:
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In this region as in other world regions, the possibilities and incentives
for governments to manipulate reported data, e.g. in times of crises to
guarantee stability, are seldomly discussed but often presupposed prob-
lems of political economic analyses (Aragão and Linsi 2020; Wallace 2014).
The problem is not unique to autocratic regimes, but likely more accentu-
ated in some, as for example data problems in Egypt suggest.
We acknowledge these limits and accept that an analysis of subnational
fiscal data in the MENA region may inevitably show gaps at times. Never-
theless, even with fragmented data it is possible to reveal certain trends
over time. We are also aware that official fiscal data may not always docu-
ment the de facto numbers, especially not under the condition of neopatri-
monialism. Interviews with subnational government officials, civil society
organizations and country experts can make up for this by helping to de-
tect possible inconsistencies in fiscal flows and the politics behind the pre-
sentation of data. In our analysis, whenever possible, we combine quantita-
tive data on fiscal decentralization and local finance with qualitative mate-
rial from original field research and secondary literature to shed light on
the dynamics of fiscal decentralization in the MENA.
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Untangling Elite Networks and Decentralization in the
Middle East and North Africa: Neopatrimonialism
Revisited
Miriam Bohn and Erik Vollmann
Politics in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is an amalgamation
of formal-legal institutions and informal rules built on a highly personalist
structure of power relations known as neopatrimonialism. Though the pe-
riphery is central to this type of personalist governance, the subnational di-
mension of neopatrimonialism was vastly neglected in past research. Since
both our understanding of autocracy and neopatrimonialism build upon
the notion of power-centralization in the hands of the ruler and the central
regime, the state-centeredness of most research on the MENA region is rea-
sonable. In light of the revival of decentralization efforts and discourses
following the Arab uprisings of 2010/11, however, we argue that a thor-
ough analysis of the relationship between local governance reforms and
neopatrimonialism is key to advancing our understanding of governance
and policy formulation in the MENA region. Though mostly not consid-
ered to be part of high politics, decentralization reforms have a significant
impact on patron-client relations between the central level and the subna-
tional territories of the body politic (Cammack et al. 2007; Demmelhuber
et al. 2020). A systematic analysis of central and subnational elite dynamics
is thus essential to broaden our understanding of decentralization under
neopatrimonialism. Patron-client networks are asymmetric power rela-
tions with a clear dominance of the ruler as “prime patron”, yet he is also
dependent on the compliance and the successful management of his clien-
telist networks. We argue that the country-specific interplay of central and
subnational elite networks has an impact on the de jure formulation and
the de facto outcome of decentralization processes, and vice versa.
The purpose of this contribution is to examine which role neopatrimo-
nialism and elite dynamics play in shaping the process and outcome of de-
centralization, with a focus on the post-2011 developments in four MENA
countries (Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt). A core element of
neopatrimonialism is a well-balanced interplay of both formal and infor-
mal institutions. Neither the idealistic absence of the informal (legalistic-
bureaucratic) rule, nor the complete dominance of informal politics (patri-
4.
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monialism) alone can explain politics in the political system (Erdmann
and Engel 2007). We focus on the de facto process and outcome after the
implementation rather than the de jure formulation of the reforms. Based
on fieldwork interviews and observations as well as the literature on
neopatrimonialism, decentralization and informal institutions, our analy-
sis explores three main questions:
• How do national and subnational elites use both formal and informal
institutions in their attempt to gain and maintain influence, resources,
and power?
• Decentralization processes have the potential to reconfigure elite net-
works from the center down to the local level and can thus be both
threat and opportunity for different strata of elites. Can we see signifi-
cant changes in elite constellations between the center and the subna-
tional levels?
• How does elite behavior explain the deviations between the legal insti-
tutional design of decentralization and its de facto outcome?
The inclusion of regional disparities is crucial to understand the logic of
subnational governance in the MENA. The regimes have been using
neopatrimonial networks to handle the periphery for decades, but the dy-
namics of 2011 revealed the limits of this supposed security network, as
most of the protests originated from the socio-politically neglected periph-
ery. Over time, most political and economic power in MENA countries
was concentrated in the center and a few well-connected regions. The re-
sult was a major gap between urban and rural regions concerning public
services, development, and political influence. Consequently, the imple-
mentation of decentralization reforms in MENA countries may on the one
hand contribute to appease peripheral populations by granting them more
venues of participation, authority over subnational state affairs, and by
boosting their economic development. In addition, reforms may increase
central control over the periphery depending on the legislative design. On
the other hand, not only does decentralization challenge existing clientelist
structures that have been used to stabilize the regime for decades (Clark
2018), it also means giving away power to a population that has proven its
willingness to stand up against the regime if necessary. Therefore, our em-
pirical analysis adds center-periphery disparities to the examination of our
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three research questions as these disparities are main drivers of recent de-
centralization processes (Vollmann 2020).1
Decentralization, neopatrimonialism and elites in the MENA
Decentralization in the MENA
Decentralization is the transfer of competences from the central govern-
ment level down to the subnational levels of government, for example to
the regional and the local political administration (Demmelhuber et al.
2020). Despite a historical tradition of strong elites in the periphery,
MENA regimes are nowadays infamous for their centralized state order.
Decentralized power arrangements among various traditional leaders (e.g.,
tribal or religious) characterized the MENA region long before Western
states imposed their colonial rule upon the territories. When colonial pow-
ers established a centralized, bureaucratic state administration, they en-
gaged with the traditional elites in form of decentralized power sharing to
make them comply with the new state. After gaining independence, the re-
gion’s new rulers built upon the colonial state administration and contin-
ued to centralize their power. They assumed a variety of strategies that si-
multaneously upheld and marginalized the position of traditional elites.
For instance, the new power holders used strategic co-optation of local no-
tables (e.g. Morocco) and marginalized their power via formal-legal mea-
sures such as the merger of municipalities (e.g. Jordan) (Charrad 2011;
Harb and Atallah 2015; Vollmann 2020; Shalaby et al. 2020; Demmelhu-
ber et al. 2020; Bouabid and Iraki 2015).
Though Western donors generally advocate decentralization in MENA
countries, even World Bank researchers no longer deny that the topic is
much more complex than it being a technical measure leading to good
governance. Politicians and bureaucrats fight over decentralization for the
same reasons they fight over the design of state institutions: Their power
1 Our analysis draws on original fieldwork in Morocco (April 2018 – May 2018 and
October 2018 – December 2018), Jordan (April 2018 – May 2018, October 2018 –
November 2018 and January 2020 – February 2020), and Tunisia (October 2019 –
November 2019 and January 2020 – February 2020) where we conducted semi-
structured interviews (n = 162) with politicians and state employees, civil society
actors, researchers, journalists, and foreign observer organizations on the central,
regional, and local government levels. For an extensive fieldwork description and
our rationale behind the case selection see chapter 3.
4. Untangling Elite Networks and Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa
61
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:15
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
and authority are at stake (Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke 2010, 1). A meaning-
ful delegation of tasks and power away from the center should be an
anathema to the interest of centralized authoritarian states. Are decentral-
ization reforms thus just “window dressing” without any meaningful im-
pact on governance in the MENA? Building on the literature on neopatri-
monialism and informal politics, we argue that local governance reform
and the relationship between national and subnational elites are pivotal to
understanding politics even in the highly centralized MENA region.
Neopatrimonialism and decentralization
Despite different pathways for the organization of power and of approach-
es towards the periphery, the personalist character of politics is indis-
putable in all our four cases.2 Drawing on V-Dem data, neopatrimonialism
has clearly been present in the four countries for a long period of time (see
Figure 1). The rulers built their power on extensive patron-client networks
that laid the foundation for neopatrimonial political systems. Consequent-
ly, a systematic amalgamation of legal-formal institutions and informal
elite interactions characterizes the political process in Jordan, Egypt,
Tunisia, and Morocco (Demmelhuber et al. 2020).
Neopatrimonialism is a type of rule that combines features of two We-
berian ideal types: bureaucratic-legalistic rule and patrimonialism (Eisen-
stadt 1973; von Soest 2010; Erdmann and Engel 2007). Legal-rational insti-
tutions exist and visibly structure the state organization. We see the formal
separation of the public and private sphere and officials holding positions
in bureaucratic organizations. However, authority is heavily personalized
and state elites exercise their legally-defined powers “as a form not of pub-
lic service but of private property” (Clapham 1985, 48). Moreover, the tra-
ditional linkages of authority might persist, though in a less pronounced
2 While Tunisia’s transformation process resulted in an extremely positive rating by
V-Dem, neopatrimonial networks especially between economic elites and ministe-
rial elites are still intact (see the section on Tunisia in this chapter). Also, the per-
ception of public corruption is high. A majority of Tunisians was convinced that
corruption had risen during the last year both in 2016 (64%) and 2019 (67%).
Tunisians experience it as a national and subnational problem. 31% of the popula-
tion believes the government to be corrupt, as do 27% regarding local councilors
(2019) (Transparency International 2020a; b). We thus argue that the strong
neopatrimonial character, which characterized Tunisian politics over decades, has
not been fully eradicated.
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version of patrimonialism, by taking on a more transactional character
(Sigman and Lindberg 2017; Erdmann and Engel 2007).
Neopatrimonialism in the MENA region
V-Dem (2020), data ranges between 0 (low neopatrimonialism) and 1 (high neopat-
rimonialism, composite index of indicators for the three dimensions clientelism,
presidentialism, regime corruption.
Empirical approaches propose three features of neopatrimonialism:
clientelism, i.e. the targeted exchange of goods and services for political sup-
port, presidentialism, which we translate into its core meaning of systematic
power concentration in the hands of the ruling regime, and the elites’ use of
public office and resources for private or political benefit (Sigman and Lind-
berg 2017, 5–6; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). The last dimension in-
cludes the common occurrence of corruption as an informal institution
(Teorell 2007; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Current measurements of
neopatrimonialism such as the Varieties of Democracy Index of Neopatri-
monialism (see Figure 1) even use (regime) corruption as a proxy indicator
for this third feature. The relatively high perception of local government
corruption in our four cases also underlines the value of neopatrimonial-
ism for the analysis of subnational government reforms. In Morocco, 38%
of the populace in 2019 perceived local governments as corrupt. Central
government officials were rated as equally corrupt (2019: 37%). We see al-
most the same level of corruption perception in the case of Tunisia, where
Figure 1:
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27% of the population view subnational councilors as corrupt (31% for
government officials). Jordanians also experience high levels of local gov-
ernment corruption with 28% in 2019, but the central government is be-
lieved to be more corrupt (by 36% of the population in 2019). Subnational
perception of corruption is also very high in Egypt, with 36% in 2016,
more so than the central state officials (2016: 27%).3 In this setting, gover-
nance is “the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules
that regulate the public realm” (Hyden, Court, and Mease 2004). We agree
with Sigman and Lindberg (2017) in their evaluation that neopatrimonial-
ism is not a form of “African exceptionalism” but a common trait of most
developing countries.4 Since power concentration that “resists delegating
all but the most trivial decision-making tasks” (Bratton and van de Walle
1997, 63) is a defining feature of neopatrimonialism, decentralization
should stand in normative opposition to it. However, the personalist char-
acter of politics in neopatrimonial rule implies cooperation with elites on
the ground to formulate and implement state politics. Dealing with subna-
tional politics is therefore a core challenge of neopatrimonial state organi-
zation. On the one hand, the cooperation with local elites is necessary to
govern the periphery, but on the other hand (subnational) elite power can
also be a threat to the regime. An authoritarian regime’s management of
subnational elite structures is thus a necessary perspective to better under-
stand the logic and functioning of neopatrimonial rule. For instance, elite
rotation is a commonly applied strategy of neopatrimonial rulers to keep
elites from gaining too much power within one locality (von Soest 2010).
Therefore, we argue that analyzing the interplay of formal and informal in-
stitutions and systematically integrating the elite perspective is necessary to
understand local governance reforms under neopatrimonialism.
Elites and decentralization5
The ruler and the regime elites are the dominant players in the network of
patron-client relations. Thus, they decide on the rules for other elites’ ad-
3 Data based on Transparency International 2020a; b.
4 Informal institutions are, to a degree, present in all world regions and can some-
times improve political processes and outcomes also in democratic contexts. We
would also like to state that personal relations of subnational office holders and the
importance of local notables are as well to be found in Western local politics. They
are not per se anathema to democracy.
5 To gain a deeper understanding of our definition of elites, see chapter 3.
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vancement, rotation, or if need be punishment, by withholding rewards,
privileges, and access to state resources. Elite-regime-relations might be
asymmetric, but they are reciprocal. The regime relies on the support of
well-connected elites and their clients for the formulation and implemen-
tation of politics, and builds on their resources and capabilities to form a
basis of support for the regime.
Accordingly, the cooptation and management of elites are vital strate-
gies of both authoritarian and neopatrimonial regimes (Gerschewski 2013;
Heydemann 2007; Vollmann et al. 2020; Hinnebusch 2012; Aalen and
Murias 2018). Since central patron-client networks usually reach to the lo-
cal level, decentralization challenges both the structure and the rules of ex-
isting patron-client-relationships as well as the formal institutional land-
scape they are embedded in. MENA regimes tend to limit reform processes
to purely administrative decentralization. They delegate responsibilities to
state agents and subnational branches of central ministries, thereby cir-
cumventing the potential regime-threats of political or fiscal decentraliza-
tion. Nevertheless, reform processes offer incentives for different strata of
elites to engage with state institutions and the political regime, for instance
through the creation of new jobs. New ways of participation offer the pos-
sibility to gain positions of prestige and access to state resources that in
turn can be redistributed within the own personal network. Participation
may even provide a chance to influence policies (Lust 2009). Decentraliza-
tion can thus help to bind strong subnational elites, including opposition-
al actors, to the regime. However, the bottom-up reaction largely depends
on the actions and attitudes of influential subnational elites towards the
regime, which brings back in the regional question. Some regions are
highly loyal to the central regime, other locations may be centers of oppo-
sitional activism or anti-regime forces. In the latter case, decentralization
offers oppositional actors a new platform to gain voice on the subnational
levels of governance and to expand their own clientelist networks. There-
fore, regime strategies such as the systematic fragmentation and disorgani-
zation of party systems, as well as the repression of opposition also influ-
ence the outcome of decentralization processes. Additionally, the preva-
lence of informal practices such as election fraud and vote buying have a
profound influence on the distribution and intentions of elites across sub-
national institutions. Elected members’ focus on service provision in the
sense of competitive clientelism (Lust 2009) strongly affects the outcome
and performance of decentralization (e.g. transparency and economic de-
velopment) – in many cases to the disadvantage of the broad public or
poor and less influential communities. Closely related is elite capture, the
possibility of elites to influence development processes in accordance with
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their personal interests and priorities. With this practice, elites retain access
to resources they usually would not have (Rajasekhar et al. 2018, 22). Not
only central elites can benefit from elite capture via decentralization. As
Johnson et al. argue, half-hearted decentralization efforts can enable local
elites to capture major shares of public resources originally allocated to the
poorer part of populations (Johnson et al. 2003). Elite capture thus has a
significant impact on the outcome of decentralization: It may dispropor-
tionately benefit certain individuals or groups over others. The most likely
beneficiaries are strong, pro-regime elite networks rather than poor com-
munities or regions with oppositional background. Overwhelmingly, these
practices help ensure pro-regime majorities within subnational institutions
instead of ensuring a heterogeneous mix that represents the community.
Controlled spaces for political competition can appease and contain both
the opposition and other elites without seriously endangering the status
quo. To prevent strong subnational elites from gaining high degrees of in-
fluence within a community or a region, authoritarian regimes apply
strategies such as elite rotation amongst appointed members of central and
subnational institutions. Hence, decentralization reforms may offer addi-
tional incentives for political participation and contestation. At the same
time, the newly established competition may also be part of the regime’s
strategy to balance power relations between elites on all levels of govern-
ment, as new struggles for influence and resource distribution between dif-
ferent institutions emerge (see also Vollmann et al. 2020).
Elites and decentralization in Morocco
Center-periphery relations: Reformism in the king’s name
The kingdom of Morocco is a unitary state with a centralized power struc-
ture surrounding the monarchy and its makhzen, i.e. the palace and its
clients consisting of – amongst others – the king’s advisors, economic
elites, high-level bureaucrats, the security apparatus and loyal traditional
elites (Hissouf 2016). The makhzen is the country’s core elite network,
which originates from the pre-colonial sultanate. It was originally based on
religious and tribal symbols and rituals of authority, and has “formalized”
and amalgamated those traditional modes of rule into the bureaucratic
state apparatus of modern Morocco (for a rich historical introduction see
Daadaoui 2011). Core administrative elites still largely come from makhzen
families that have served the sultanate since the 15th century. The monar-
chy is the largest economic player in Morocco and has used liberalization
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and privatization policies of the 1990s and 2000s to strengthen its ties with
the kingdom’s economic elite. Business power was traditionally and is still
concentrated in the hands of only few families (Walter 2017; Lagarde,
Bencheikh, and Khrouz 2011; Akdim 2013).6 The current king Mo-
hammed VI. advocated a strong shift away from his father’s style of rule
and introduced a myriad of modernization and democratization reforms
that earned him his reputation as a reformer. Despite the high praise his
reforms received from the international community after the Arab upris-
ings, Moroccan politics have shifted back to a strategy of modernization
without democratization wherein the “flaws” of democratic actors are off-
set by “getting things done” interventions of the monarchy with (re-)in-
creased repression (e.g. against the freedom of the press). Accordingly, Mo-
rocco is still considered a hardline autocracy (BTI 2020) despite interna-
tional applause and the king’s sterling international reputation as a re-
former and moderating and stable anchor in the region. The king’s latest
diplomatic success led the US government to officially recognize Moroc-
co’s rule over the disputed Western Sahara area in exchange for the nor-
malization of the kingdom’s diplomatic ties with Israel. The Western Sa-
hara conflict has dominated Morocco’s external policies for decades. The
regionalization approach to decentralization is deeply interwoven with the
regime’s attempts to gather international support for its claims over the
Western Sahara by granting increased autonomy to the area (Collado and
García 2015; White 2015).7 While the new Moroccan constitution of 2011
formally reinforced the power of democratic actors (e.g., the king now
needs to choose the prime minister from the strongest party in parlia-
ment), the palace’s power remains largely unrestricted. Policy projects are
still mostly dependent on the king’s approval or based on initiatives not
from the government, but from the king’s own cabinet. Though Moroccan
parties are relatively strong in comparison to other MENA contexts and
6 The economic elites are often labeled as “Fassi” for those former merchant families
originated from Fez, although they have since largely relocated to Casablanca. Eco-
nomic and political power intertwine as the Fassi are often coopted by the palace
into high-level state positions or compete for an MP status. Fassi are not restricted
to – but very much include – the el Fassi family. As the patrons of the Istiqlal party
with Abbas el Fassi as prime minister (2007–2011) the el Fassi illustrate that struc-
ture (Bencheikh 2011; Akdim 2013).
7 The normalized relations with Israel further improve Morocco’s standing with the
West. Although there is a moderate risk to alienate parts of the Moroccan popula-
tion over the perceived betrayal of the popular Palestinian cause, Morocco has long
had relatively good relations with Israel and the two states have carried on their
economic and intelligence cooperation despite the lack of diplomatic relations.
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political competition exists, it is closely regulated and the legal parties do
not question the monarchy’s superiority. Though Mohamed VI. describes
his rule as “technocratic”, removed some of his father’s elites from major
positions (Zerhouni 2004) and introduced “fresh blood” into the apparatus
(e.g. his friends and co-students from the collège royal), the overall struc-
ture of the Moroccan elites remained intact.
Despite the top-heaviness of Moroccan politics, subnational politics and
decentralization deeply penetrate the kingdom’s political structure. The
new constitution of 2011 was presented not as a reaction to protest, but as
a necessary change to accommodate a report by the Consultative Commis-
sion on Regionalization. This emphasizes (political) decentralization as a
principle of the Moroccan state. It was followed by an (ongoing) ambitious
decentralization reform that vastly increased the power of the regional lev-
el in 2015 – at least on paper. The monarchy has used decentralization as a
tool to uphold and increase its central power since independence. King
Mohamed V. encouraged the creation of rural Amazigh parties to neutral-
ize the urban dominance of the Independence Party (Istiqlal) that tried to
diminish his powers. Decentralization reforms were moreover used to
(successfully) motivate parties to end their boycott of national elections,
while upgraded municipal powers made it attractive to compete in local
elections. The redrawing of subnational administrative maps, the division
of subnational councils or increase of jobs in subnational institutions were
used over time to react to crises or to stifle opposition from below
(Bouabid and Iraki 2015).
Decentralized power structures: Top-heavy decentralization, sophisticated
oversight and new regionalism
Today, three subnational government tiers form the institutional back-
bone of decentralization in Morocco: municipalities, provinces and prefec-
tures, as well as regions. All of them are all under the auspices of the Min-
istry of the Interior (MoI): An elected column (directly or indirectly) ac-
companies an appointed column of administrative control organs, which
represent the state and the king. In 2018, the elected column comprised (1)
1503 municipalities (90% of which have less than 35,000 inhabitants), (2)
63 provincial councils (rural), and 12 prefectural councils (urban), as well
as (3) 12 regional councils (until 2015: 16), whose members were directly
elected for the first time in 2015. Subnational councilors are also represent-
ed on the national level via indirectly elected members of the second
chamber of parliament.
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The councils are flanked by appointed representatives of the MoI on
each subnational level: The wali controls the regions, and simultaneously
governs one of the provinces and prefectures of the region. He is the nomi-
nal representative of the Moroccan king in the regions and controls the de-
cisions of the regional council. The governors on the provincial and prefec-
tural level hold the central position of state control as they oversee the
provincial as well as the municipal council decisions (legal state control of
elected subnational elites). The governor also leads the agents of state at
the local level: The caid (rural) or pasha (urban) acts on the municipal level
with close control over local security and local councils. Beneath them, the
muqadeem (urban) or sheikh (rural) works as part of everyday administra-
tive life in municipal districts (Houdret and Harnisch 2018; Tafra 2017).
This system of administrative oversight (tutelle) stems from French colo-
nial heritage. The center, however, used it to reinforce the ties between the
monarchy and the early-independence Moroccan tribes. They were thus in-
tegrated into the official state structure, but the bureaucratic selection log-
ic and chain of command from the MoI replaced the tribal origins over
time (Charrad 2011; Vollmann et al. 2020; Bouabid and Iraki 2015; Vene-
ma and Mguild 2002).
Subnational governance in Morocco has been modified by a host of re-
forms that increased the de jure influence of decentralized actors (especial-
ly on the local level) under the constant dominance of the representatives
of the tutelle. In the independent kingdom, the first municipal charter and
the elections of 1960 predate the first constitution (1962) and national elec-
tions (1963). The elected councils, however, primarily worked as an assist-
ing organ to the caid, functioning as the executive organ of the MoI in the
municipalities. Local politics primarily brought the makhzen’s “eyes and
ears” to the ground. Local politics were a tool to ensure national unity in
the young state, “to replace the tribe as the focus of local loyalty and to
consolidate monarchic power at the local level” (Bergh 2020, 26). A second
municipal charter elevated the position of the local council president, who
became the executive organ of the municipality (de jure replacing the
caid). The administrative oversight could, however, step in at any point. At
the same time slow administrative procedures led to weak capacities for
implementing projects. The tax reforms of 1989 improved the funds of
Moroccan local governments by entitling them to a fixed share of the
VAT, though the skill level and experience of local staff and councilors re-
mained low (Bergh 2020; 2017). While municipalities and provinces / pre-
fectures were mentioned in the constitution of 1963, the new constitution
of 1992 also recognized the regions, though their role remained vague.
Hassan II had first created seven regions in 1971, between 1997 and the
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new reforms of 2015 Morocco counted 16 regions (Reifeld 2014). Under
the rule of Mohamed VI., the decentralization discourse developed a new
drive that led to a new municipal charter in 2002, which was amended in
2009. In 2010 a consultative commission on regionalization was formed.
The latter’s report became the foundation of the post-2011 reforms as well
as the discursive anchor for the creation of a new constitution in 2011. The
core element of the decentralization reforms in this time was the formal
integration of Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into local govern-
ments (possibility for official partnerships between subnational govern-
ments and associations and integration into consultative commissions).
The reforms also enforced local development plans and reduced the overall
number of local councils that had sky-rocketed in the 1990s (Bergh 2017;
Bouabid and Iraki 2015).
Neopatrimonial networks and decentralization: New arenas for controlled
competition, training grounds for political actors, dominance through scattered
responsibilities
The post-2011 reforms increased the prerogatives, funding (see chapter 5)
and salaries of (some) decentralized actors8. The regions received the
largest formal “upgrade” of all subnational territories and are now respon-
sible for a myriad of tasks (partly overlapping with those of other institu-
tions). Subnational elections have always played a role in Moroccan polit-
ics and the local and regional elections of 2015 offered the national politi-
cal parties a widened arena to compete for influence. Since parliament is
widely regarded as relatively powerless, political parties try to influence
subnational politics via decentralized councils. As the national elections re-
ceive less and less attention by the voters, the importance of subnational
elections becomes evident by their higher turnouts in recent history (see
Figure 2). Subnational political competition upholds the importance of
gaining the support of local notables. Political parties are often center-
heavy and lack a decentralized party structure. Therefore, the clientelist
“manhunt” to charm local elites into becoming candidates on their party
tickets in order to appeal to those notables’ networks is widespread and
8 The salaries of all types of council presidents and their vice-presidents have in-
creased considerably. The focus on regions is also visible here as the (now directly-
elected) regional presidents receive the same remuneration as national ministers.
Regular council members do not receive remuneration which greatly diminishes
their capacities to control the presidium and get fully involved in council politics.
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not free of central-state involvement (Tritki 2015; Desrues 2016). Reports
of straightforward vote buying are also common (interviews Rabat May
2018). Subnational party politics are often described as largely absent be-
tween elections and the perception of a widespread absence of party actors
and subnational councilors provokes criticism (interviews Rabat, Ifrane,
Sefrou May 2018).
Development of voter turnout in Moroccan elections
Own depiction. Subnational elections cover local elections for all years and region-
al elections since 2015.
Decision-making power, access to funds and even remuneration are con-
centrated in the presidium of the councils.9 As the council presidents (or
mayors at the local level) are elected from amongst the council members,
the building of council coalitions is necessary. This has helped to restrict
the influence of individual parties. As large strata of the party system are
coopted “administration parties”, the potential for an opposition to the
regime in subnational councils is weak. The last elections have seen the rel-
ative success of the moderate Islamist Party for Justice and Development
(PJD) that can be considered the closest there is to a regime opposition in
the legal party spectrum. But its dominance in subnational seats did not
Figure 2:
9 Moroccan law does, however, know a remuneration for political group leaders and
heads of committees, an arrangement that could foster the development of party
structures and capacities.
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translate into a majority of council presidencies (Sturm and Vollmann
2020).
The regional presidencies are mainly controlled by presidents who for-
merly held ministerial or governmental positions, who have economic ties
to the state and the monarchy, or who have had positions in king-led com-
missions (Sturm and Vollmann 2020; Vollmann et al. 2020; Tafra 2017). A
prime example is the regional council president of Fès-Meknès, Mohand
Laenser, whose party Mouvement Populaire only won 5 of the 69 regional
council seats (7%, to compare: PJD won 22 seats, PAM 15). Laenser had
been active in ministerial positions since 1969 (Tafra 2017). Between 2012
and 2013, he was Minster of Interior, a position closely controlled by the
palace.
The background of regional leaders also demonstrates the importance of
subnational politics for the central elites: While the career paths of elites in
Morocco are mostly considered to be centripetal, the former career paths
of regional presidents on the central level as well as of some metropoles’
mayors hint to an increasing importance of subnational politics. The Mo-
roccan state has long supported the connection of subnational and nation-
al politics by allowing actors to hold both subnational and parliamentary
mandates. This has encouraged subnational elites to strive for a role on the
national level. Decentralization thus contributes to the renewal of national
elites and its formal institutions are targeted both by national and subna-
tional elites (Sturm and Vollmann 2020). The newly upgraded regions are
in dire need of attention and well-known actors. Though clearly the focal
point of recent reforms, the regional councils lack the de facto power and
financial clout to make their mark on Moroccan politics. The nation, the
city or village and even to some degree the province or prefecture are root-
ed in the minds of Moroccan citizens. The regions, however, are an artifi-
cial and relatively new institutional level. Accordingly, prominent national
figures such as the controversial former regional president of Tangér-
Tétouan-Al Hoceima, Ilyas El Omari, a media owner and former president
of the palace-related Party for Authenticity and Modernity, can help and
increase their visibility. Otherwise, regional councils face the threat of be-
ing sidelined by national ministries and the wali (interview Rabat Nov
2018). Though the decentralization laws of 2015 stress the independence
of each tier of subnational government and the non-existence of a hierar-
chy, some municipal actors perceive the regions as a threat. Overlapping
tasks and underfunding in combination with the possibility to “upstream”
council tasks to higher levels of government contribute to a competition of
elected councils (interviews Rabat May 2018, Casablanca, Tanger Nov
2018, Settat Dec 2018). Though agents of the MoI no longer officially con-
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trol council decisions before they are carried out (ex-ante tutelle), its repre-
sentatives still dominate the councils. They are present at the meetings and
the now established ex-post control still upholds an important role for the
administration. Especially in rural areas, the representatives of the tutelle,
as has been reported, often behave as if they would preside over the coun-
cils. The latter often only reluctantly take the initiative without the ap-
proval of the king’s “eyes and ears” on the ground (interviews Rabat May
2018, Casablanca Dec 2018). The neopatrimonial concentration of power
in the hands of the central regime is thus reproduced through the de facto
persisting culture of tutelle.
Well-connected local elites (e.g., landowners, businesspersons) who
were elected to subnational councils are treated differently and are even
courted at times (interviews Rabat, Ifrane May 2018). Moreover, unclear
legislation, a delay in its implementation or follow-up legislation, as well
as the insufficient training of many councilors contribute to an ongoing
dependency of subnational councils on administrative oversight (inter-
views Rabat, Marrakesh May 2018, Rabat, Casablanca, Nov 2018). The
tutelle institutions follow a principle of rotation to decrease their potential
for rivalling the central regime, which is a common feature of neopatrimo-
nialism. The high-level state representatives (wali; governor) are presented
as non-political actors and indeed are often career bureaucrats. Though the
tutelle represents the central state subnationally, other central actors need
to be considered in our analysis. Central state initiatives for development
that are often connected to the king such as the Initiative for Human De-
velopment (INDH), large and prestigious projects as the economic center
of the TANGERMED port in Tanger or the restructuring of the Bouregreg
delta in the capital region of Morocco are carried out on the national level.
Subnational councils need to cooperate with national ministries, or re-
sponsibilities are sidelined by the creation of semi-private agencies for the
implementation of projects. The “agencification” of large urban planning
projects is one increasingly popular mode to circumvent formal institu-
tional settings (sometimes including ministries). This takes political power
away from subnational (and sometimes national) institutions in the name
of liberalization and a friendly climate for international investment
(Amarouche and Bogaert 2019). The dispersion of institutional power en-
sures that institutional elites cannot get too powerful and organize an op-
position to makhzen politics.
Central ministries and their administration, too, are often reluctant to
give away power to decentralized or deconcentrated actors. The ongoing
process of increased deconcentration (administrative decentralization)
aims to strengthen subnational ministerial service provision. As the wali’s
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role in the coordination of regional ministerial services has increased by a
law passed in late 2018, this could result in a necessary challenge of the re-
luctance of state administration elites to decentralize (Zaki 2019). We see,
however, also the possibility that democratically legitimated elites are side-
lined in the process, as the deconcentration law does not deal with subna-
tional councils.
Another group of elites cannot be neglected when dealing with decen-
tralization in Morocco: Civil society organizations. In the past, the regime
used local governance reforms to coopt political parties. We now witness
the same patterns with civil society organizations which led to the estab-
lishment of a codified role in subnational governance (Clark 2018). Subna-
tional councils are obliged to work with NGOs and they are included in
official local politics (e.g., subnational planning), or are involved in the
provision of subnational services (such as water, electricity, sanitation,
transport) (Bergh 2009). The privatization of decentralized competences,
such as waste collection, also reinforces the ties between the makhzen and
local cronies in the form of public-private partnerships. Lucrative contracts
often end up in the hands of economic elites close to the palace (Mekouar
2018, 3).
One the one hand, this disperses the responsibilities of the elected actors
among elected other elites. On the other hand, national funds and initia-
tives that support NGOs condition their funding on regime-friendly or
neutral behavior. Subnational councilors are involved in their funding,
e.g. through the INDH. This also led councilors to initiate civil society or-
ganizations. In the INDH, however, subnational elites are dominated by
ministerial representatives and agents of administrative oversight like walis
and governors (Clark 2018; Bergh 2017; 2012; Vollmann et al. 2020).
The current state of decentralization in Morocco disperses power and re-
sponsibilities between a plurality of political and non-political elites. It
both enlarges the circle profiting from state funding (i.e. co-optation),
which widens the regime’s neopatrimonial networks and increases the ob-
stacles for effective coordination amongst individual actors who could co-
operate and potentially pose a threat to the regime.
Elites and decentralization in Jordan
Center-periphery relations: Highly interwoven, strictly selective
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a unitary state with a highly central-
ized structure that revolves around King Abdullah II, who has headed the
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country since 1999. He rules over Jordan with an extensive repertoire of de
jure and de facto power, supported by a sprawling web of patron-client re-
lations that reach into both major population groups in Jordan, the Tran-
sjordanian and Palestinian communities – not least due to his wife Queen
Rania, who is of Palestinian origin. These two groups constitute a major
division line in Jordan’s political landscape. Transjordanian tribes – or East
Bankers – are the original inhabitants of the area and are regarded as the
backbone of the monarchy. Accordingly, they occupy a majority of pos-
itions in public state institutions and the military. The Palestinian popula-
tion came to Jordan as refugees after 1948 and 1967. Some individuals, es-
pecially from among the Palestinian business elite, became influential
players in Jordanian politics over time, but most Palestinians work in the
private sector rather than in state institutions. Though they form the ma-
jority of the Jordanian population today, Palestinian communities are sys-
tematically marginalized by the regime in terms of socio-economic and po-
litical participation and development vis-à-vis the Transjordanian popula-
tion.
Though it is a highly centralized state, Jordan paradoxically is also char-
acterized by the dense personal ties between the center and the periphery,
which result from the strong emphasis on tribal and family structures. All
decisions of national importance are de facto taken by the king, under con-
sultation of his advisors and the Royal Court, whereupon the Prime Minis-
ter and the cabinet execute these decisions. Central elites, including minis-
ters and even the Prime Minister, undergo frequent rotation. The cabinet
is typically dissolved whenever it is under fire. Central elites usually repre-
sent a certain tribe, family, and locality. Each of Jordan’s 12 governorates
has a distinct historical background, social and economic features, and a
different degree of political influence. The spectrum reaches from gover-
norates with highly heterogenous populations and urban centers like Irbid
and Zarqa, to Amman as the majority-Palestinian capital and economic
center of the country, to southern rural and majority-Transjordanian gov-
ernorates such as Karak, Ma’an, and Tafilah. Majority-Transjordanian re-
gions do not, however, guarantee blind loyalty vis-à-vis the regime. Tran-
sjordanian populations are amongst the sharpest critics of the center, such
as the rural governorates Ma’an and Tafilah who have a history of strong
oppositional activities, or Karak with its well-educated, politically influen-
tial tribal population.
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Decentralized power structures: From relative autonomy to high central control
Under the supervision of British colonial power, Abdullah ibn Husain I,
Emir of the Emirate of Transjordan, integrated the Transjordanian tribes
that originally inhabited the area into the state apparatus, in order to en-
sure their compliance with the newly founded Emirate in 1921. The estab-
lishment of municipalities thereby played a significant role, as powerful
tribes were granted to rule over them autonomously. Gradually, the sheikhs
became key mediators between the new regime and the populace (Alon
2009). This early municipal system marks the origin of modern Jordan’s
subnational governance system, with far-reaching consequences: The Tran-
sjordanian tribes became the traditional support network and main politi-
cal ally of the monarchy. Ever since, the Hashemites play a sensitive bal-
ancing game between the Transjordanian tribes and the majority of the
population, which arrived in several refugee waves from Palestine, Iraq,
and later Syria (Alon 2009; Clark 2018). Until independence in 1946 and
the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the municipalities had
already lost most of their autonomy and political power to the center, but
the tribes retained significant influence in the socio-political structure of
the country. However, when Jordan slipped into a financial crisis in the
1990s, the following reform course revealed the high socio-political impact
of decentralization. Jordan’s deeply indebted municipal system was a di-
rect result of low subnational state expenditures in combination with a
costly patron-client system that had served the tribal elite for decades (see
chapter 5). Neoliberal local governance reforms supported by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund helped to rearrange Jordan’s subnational gover-
nance system and to push its efficiency, but they displeased the rural Trans-
jordanian tribes that saw their neopatrimonial networks erode. Mean-
while, the business-oriented Palestinian population in the city centers prof-
ited from the measures.
Until today, central state institutions exclusively coordinate all major
public service sectors, including education and health. The governorate
(regional) level consists of 12 governorates under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Interior (MoI). The institutions function as the extended arm
of the MoI in the periphery and are thus mainly concerned with security
issues. At their center is the governor, usually from a military background.
He coordinates all state institutions within the governorate, including se-
curity forces. All major positions on the governorate level are subject to
frequent elite rotation. Governors are replaced every one to two years to
keep them from gaining too much power in one location. Individuals with
a prestigious position on the governorate level, e.g. the governor or the dis-
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trict manager (mutasarrif), have good chances to reach higher positions in
the governorate or the central level in their future careers. Jordan’s twelve
governorates are further divided into 103 municipalities, which are super-
vised by the Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA). Only the two eco-
nomic heavyweights, the Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) and Aqaba
Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA), are directly supervised by the
Prime Minister. Traditionally, municipalities elect a mayor and a munici-
pal council who are responsible for tasks of minor importance, such as ur-
ban planning and waste management.10 Even if limited, a position in the
municipality still comes with a certain degree of prestige and power within
the community.
The decentralization reform of 2015, implemented in 2017, barely
touched the municipalities, but it established a partly-elected governorate
council within each of the 12 governorates (15% of the governorate coun-
cil’s members are appointed by the council of ministers at the recommen-
dation of the Minister of the Interior). An institution with elected mem-
bers at Jordan’s governorate level was unprecedented. The governorate
councils are involved in the decision-making processes regarding major de-
velopment and infrastructure projects within their territory. Members get
to express their preferences and needs. Its executive functions, however, are
strictly limited since all measures concerning the implementation or the fi-
nancing of the projects are exclusively coordinated by central state institu-
tions and their directories in the governorate. Nevertheless, the presence of
a new subnational council immediately affected existing elite configura-
tions with repercussions for the outcome of the reform.
Neopatrimonial networks and decentralization: A theatre of reform to uphold
the status quo
While municipalities mostly serve the regime to establish patron-client re-
lations between the center and the local level, and as a platform to repre-
sent influential local tribes and families, the governorate institutions tradi-
tionally function as central control mechanism in the periphery. The intro-
duction of elected governorate councils by the 2015 decentralization law
threw this prevailing local governance system out of balance. According to
10 The exception is the GAM, whose mayor as well as 25% of the municipal council
members are appointed by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of
the Minister of Local Administration (Art. 3, Law on Municipalities 2015).
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official regime statements, the reform had three major goals: (1) organiz-
ing capital investments to the governorates more equally, (2) reducing the
members of parliaments’ (MPs) status as local service providers (this role is
common in MENA regimes), and (3) increasing the diversity of members
that occupy subnational institutions to better represent the broad popula-
tion by introducing governorate-wide elections. All three goals inevitably
touch existing neopatrimonial relationships between the center and the lo-
cal level. Capital projects for the governorates were in the past decided be-
hind closed doors in the central ministries, often based on patron-client re-
lations of ministerial staff and without the involvement of the local com-
munities. Hence, the projects often did not serve the broad public, but in-
fluential tribes or communities with good ties to central elites profited in-
stead. When decentralization was finally implemented in 2017, local elites
rushed to apply as candidates for the governorate council election.11 Many
hoped to obtain a position of prestige through the membership in the new
institution – at least the reform promised to provide each governorate
council with a significant amount of funds (an average of 25.8 million
USD per governorate in 2018, see chapter 5). After their election however,
council members were disappointed to learn about their limited power
due to the formal institutional layout on the one hand, but also because of
informal practices that further marginalized their position. Municipalities,
ministries as well as MPs were to a large degree not supportive of the new
institution, as they feared competition by new elites and a loss of their own
(informal) power to provide benefits for their clients vis-à-vis the gover-
norate council. Interviews in different locations indicate that ministries
frequently refuse to implement the governorate councils’ projects, or stop
contractors’ payments without pre-warning. MPs are rejecting collabora-
tion with the councils that share the same constituencies and, in many lo-
cations, municipalities and governorate councils are engaged in an ongo-
ing argument about superiority. As a result, the efficiency of the gover-
norate councils suffers dramatically. In some governorates, the allocated
budget for the governorate councils benefits powerful central elites rather
than the local communities. For instance, interviews in Karak (Feb 2020)
revealed that a majority of the projects in Karak were implemented by
companies with ties to the Tarawneh brothers, a highly influential Tran-
sjordanian family from Karak. Atef Tarawneh, one of the three brothers
and the speaker of parliament between 2013 and 2020, has already been
under fire for securing government tenders worth millions for his broth-
11 Municipal and governorate council elections took place on the same day.
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ers’ companies during his time in parliament (Al-Shawabkeh and Ghbari
2016). However, in 2020 the Tarawneh brothers were targeted by the latest
anti-corruption and tax evasion crackdown of the government, temporarily
freezing their assets until the investigation closes (OCCRP 2020). Due to
the high amount of pressure upon him, Tarawneh decided not to run for
parliamentary elections in November 2020. The incident is a blueprint for
how central elites can benefit from decentralization using informal chan-
nels including corrupt measures, leaving behind demotivated council
members with no intention to run for election again. Depending on the
governorate, however, the experiences of the council members differ
significantly. To cite a member of the governorate council in Tafilah, a ru-
ral, majority-Transjordanian governorate: “Now we are Jordanians”. In
contrast to other governorates, he enthusiastically reported about the
difference the decentralization reform makes for Tafilah, as they now have
significantly more central financial support at hand for the development of
the governorate. In their opinion, decentralization opened new doors to
stretch out their arms to the center.
Reinforced by the practice of competitive clientelism, the lack of a func-
tioning party system, as well as practices such as gerrymandering, elections
in Jordan commonly benefit firmly established neopatrimonial elite net-
works, overwhelmingly based on tribal and family structures. Prior to each
parliamentary election between 1989 and 201612, a new election law made
sure to divide Palestinian and oppositional communities, so that their can-
didates would have less chances to win mandates. For this purpose, the dis-
trict managers (mutasarrif)13 of each governorate were instructed to draw
the constituency borders accordingly. The 2017 municipal and gover-
norate elections did not significantly contribute to more diversity within
subnational state institutions either. Independent tribal candidates won
over 80% of the mayoral positions as well as municipal and governorate
council seats. There were a few exceptions. For instance, Islamists were
very successful in the elections. One prominent example is the Zarqa mu-
nicipality, that elected Ali Abu al-Sukkar, a former deputy secretary gener-
al of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) party as mayor, and seven other mem-
bers of the IAF into the governorate council (the council has a total of 30
elected members, 8 are appointed). The IAF is the political wing of the
12 The 2020 parliamentary elections took place under the electoral law of 2016.
13 Each governorate is further divided into districts, with a responsible district man-
ager (mutasarrif) each. He is monitoring developments within his territory and re-
ports to the governor.
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Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the strongest party behind the Pales-
tinian cause. Although the Jordanian regime tolerates Islamist political
representation to some extent, this turnout was not popular within regime
circles. Zarqa is the second largest governorate in Jordan, majority-Pales-
tinian and a well-known Islamist stronghold. The governorate has thus tra-
ditionally suffered from central financial neglection (for more details see
chapter 5). In the end, al-Sukkar’s time as mayor of Zarqa was not going to
last for long. Several interviews in Zarqa (Jan/Feb 2020) confirmed that the
Cities and Villages Development Bank (CVDB) – an institution tied to the
Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA) that manages the municipali-
ties’ budget and is also in charge of granting loans to them – long denied
the Islamist mayor any loans he applied for. Zarqa municipality suffers
from high debts and thus, any mayor is practically powerless without addi-
tional loans from the center. Furthermore, central ministries prevented al-
Sukkar from attracting a large financial package from Turkey in order to
compensate for the absence of central transfers. In May 2019, he resigned
due to health issues. The former mayor Emad Momani, who comes from
an influential Transjordanian family, took over and was immediately
granted loans by the CVDB and allowed to pull other sources of financial
support by the ministries. The events around al-Sukkar exemplify the pow-
er struggles between central and subnational elites and their impact on the
outcome of decentralization. Overall, the Jordanian case points out to the
double-edged character of decentralization reforms under neopatrimonial-
ism.
Elites and decentralization in Tunisia
Center-periphery relations: The shadow of the ancien régime
Tunisia’s decentralization project is the only reform of our case selection
that is taking place in an environment of a transition to democracy. After
the country’s independence in 1956 and the abolishment of the Tunisian
monarchy in 1957, Tunisia’s leading political figure Habib Bourguiba tried
to create a strong national state with a predominantly national identity. An
active abolishment of tribal structures as well as strict political centraliza-
tion was the result. Zinedine Ben Ali’s authoritarian rule followed this tra-
jectory and established one of the most centralized regimes in the region.
Decentralization reforms and subnational governments existed under the
strict rule of the center and the ruling party (Neo Destour, later Democrat-
ic Constitutional Rally – RCD). Local politics were a means to enforce cen-
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tral party rule and national security. Strong regional discrepancies or even
discrimination characterizes the political and economic power distribution
in Tunisia. Since Bourguiba’s rule, most elites originated from the capital
Tunis and the northern coastal regions (Sahel). Their politics let Tunis and
the Sahel flourish, while the southern and interior regions are still disfa-
vored peripheries. Though “positive discrimination” is a principle of the
post-2011 decentralization reforms to reduce the imbalances between cen-
ter and periphery, the process is still dominated by central elites and interi-
or and southern regions have not been able to achieve a meaningful redis-
tribution of decentralization funds (see chapter 5).
While Ben Ali was ousted in 2011, regime ties of elites were not brought
to an immediate end. Former alliances remained mostly in place and un-
challenged (Kchouk and Mamuji 2019). As transitional justice remains a
sensitive topic and many civil society activists condemn the widespread
amnesties for former regime elites below the highest level of government,
old networks still play a role in national and local politics. Central econo-
mic elites and most cadres of the old regime’s party remained relatively un-
scathed after the regime change (Kchouk 2017; Günay 2019; Heurtaux
2018; Oubenal and Ben Hamouda 2018).
The old regime had coopted business elites by giving them leeway and
preferred access to the otherwise grindingly slow bureaucracy. Elite loyalty
under Ben Ali was also ensured by the threat of using arbitrary persecution
against them in the case of defections (Günay 2019; Meddeb 2020). Until
today, Tunisia’s penal code and legislation are a tangled web of obscure,
overlapping or even contradictory regulations, which result in an arbitrary
application of the law by the authorities. Despite the de facto ties of econo-
mic elites to the old regime, with regard to political office, the old regime
kept the economic sphere and the setup of political actors separate. During
the transition period, economic elites used the opportunity to gain politi-
cal influence by co-financing political parties or by striving for the immu-
nity that comes with the status of MP (Kchouk 2017; Kchouk and Mamuji
2019; Oubenal and Ben Hamouda 2018). The economic elite networks that
survived also affected the fate of regional disparities. The predominantly
Northern elites used their contacts to the center to discriminate against
contestants from the interior regions (see below). The ministerial services
and local administration remained largely unreformed and old contacts re-
mained in place.
Many former regime elites consider themselves apolitical or claim they
have been working in the interest of their country not the authoritarian
regime (interviews Sousse Oct 2019; Tunis Nov 2019 / Feb 2020). While
the constitutional assembly (2011-2014) did restrict the access of members
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of the former ruling party, these provisions were not continued for later
elections to keep the political peace during the transition. Estimates sug-
gest, that 80% of the candidates for local council positions in the first local
elections of 2018 had been members of the old regime’s ruling party (Ya-
sun 2020).
Decentralized power structures: Strong local governance turnaround halted by
central state resistance
Tunisia has a history of centralized administration with a subnational ad-
ministrative oversight system (tutelle) that it inherited, as in Morocco, from
French colonialism. Administrative oversight developed into a subnational
instrument to enforce the rule of the Ministry of Interior and the presi-
dential palace. The tutelle connected a net of central state representatives
with a complex layer of administrative tiers. Governors head the gover-
norates and have always been the focal players and connecting agents of
the central state, local and regional politics in the country. Though all
tutelle administrators are appointed by the Ministry of Interior, Ben Ali
oversaw the selection of governors. Under the governors’ command are the
delegates (mu‘tamad) who control the delegations and the ‘umda as head of
one of the many districts (neighborhood or rural districts). Elected institu-
tions had a far less sophisticated role under the old regime. Regional coun-
cils existed in theory, but they were quasi-monopolized by the governor.
Only the municipal councils were elected and entitled to choose a mayor
amongst the councilors. In practice, the amalgamation of state power and
the ruling party led to a dominant position of the RCD in the municipali-
ties (around 80% of councilors) and the control of all mayors by Ben Ali’s
party. The district chiefs and delegates were the de facto faces of the regime
party on the ground, because they would facilitate contacts to the min-
istries and disperse party funds to “deserving” citizens (Volpi, Merone, and
Loschi 2016; Clark, Dalmasso, and Lust 2019). Moreover, the local heads
of administration (secretary generals) were placed under the command of
the MoI and were mainly responsible for the formulation of the local bud-
gets. Municipal councils had no financial autonomy between the com-
bined interests of tutelle, the MoI, and party rule (Clark, Dalmasso, and
Lust 2019). As the old regime used subnational institutions primarily as a
mechanism of control, citizens often perceive municipal politics as a di-
mension of state security. Mistrust of the state is still widespread, and mu-
nicipalities are perceived as part of it. The latter fight this “heritage” of the
old regime and declare themselves as being separate from the state. Minis-
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terial actors also consider municipalities to be “different” and set apart
from the state (interviews Tunis Dec 2019, Feb 2020). This process of alien-
ation leads to conflicts between central state institutions and local coun-
cils.
After ousting Ben Ali in the 2010 and 2011 uprisings that sparked in
Tunisia’s periphery in Sidi Bouzid, the “new” Tunisia opted for a radical
change. While the former constitution of 1959 included a taciturn recogni-
tion of municipalities and regions (governorates), the 2014 constitution
lays special emphasis on decentralization with a whole chapter on the sub-
ject. It was drafted under the influence of Tunisian regime outsiders as the
electoral rules to the constitutional assembly restricted candidacies of for-
mer ruling party members, while opposition parties, especially the Ennah-
da party whose leaders had partly been exiled under Ben Ali, won a plurali-
ty of mandates. The strong emphasis on decentralization in the constitu-
tion is thus a clear signal of change from the old system. It also spurned
the infamous Ministry of Interior as the symbol for popular suppression
both in the capital and through its oversight over governors subnationally
(Kherigi 2020b). The newly founded Ministry of Local Affairs and Envi-
ronment today presides over decentralization. The institutional landscape
now formally comprises 350 municipalities, 24 regional councils and dis-
tricts. However, regional elections have not yet been held. The hyper-cen-
tralization of the regime in Tunisia left the new transitional democracy
with an especially large burden: Prior to 2014, 70% of the country’s area
was not municipalized (Tarchouna 2019). Of the now existing 350 munici-
palities, 86 were newly created after 2014. The center opted for a slow and
long-term implementation of the decentralization law (Local Collectivities
Code) of 2018 over the course of 27 years. Though the extensive legal text
(400 articles) introduces relatively strong democratic institutions on levels
between the local and national governments with quasi-regional and gov-
ernorate councils, these have not yet been established.
The administrational oversight in the bicephalic system (a legacy of
French rule as in Morocco) remains the responsibility of the MoI. While
the creation of the Ministry for Local Affairs was a clear break with the
strong institutional legacy of the MoI control over local affairs, the devel-
opment of local governance still relies on the MoI and other ministries.
Unfortunately, the inter-ministerial cooperation in Tunisia is traditionally
weak, and coalition governments of antagonistic partners have not resulted
in clear-cut political agendas (Kherigi 2020b). The enduring statist and cen-
tralist political culture in the dealings of state ministries further hinders a
meaningful implementation of decentralization in Tunisia (Tarchouna
2019).
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Neopatrimonial networks and decentralization: Old ties, new actors, and
cautious central governments
After drafting the constitution, interests and priorities of political elites
shifted to the national level. The constant infighting in the Tunisian gov-
ernment prevented a consensual vision of the Tunisian decentralization
process. The future of the ambitious decentralization project in the young
democracy remains unknown as severe government crises14 channel all re-
sources and efforts to the national level. But most actors remain verbally
committed to the constitution and its emphasis on subnational gover-
nance. (Kherigi 2020b; Bel Haj Amor 2020; interviews Tunis Oct / Nov
2019) A further development of decentralization as well as subnational
elections were delayed until 2018, and local governments were appointed
by the center far into the transition period. The long delay between draft-
ing the constitution and the first actual decentralization law or the orga-
nizing of subnational elections kept the control over subnational politics
wholly in the hands of coalition governments, who feared political defeats
in the subnational arena (Clark, Dalmasso, and Lust 2019; Belhadj 2016).
Local councils associated with the old regime were replaced by special del-
egations put together by the central state actors in the transition period af-
ter 2011. Although they could experiment with new problem-solving
strategies and modes of institutional interaction, the delegations were also
politicized by the government and used as a tool to uphold central state
dominance and power concentration in the hands of the central govern-
ment (interviews Tunis Oct 2019, Feb 2020). Their chances to withstand
national politicization were also conditioned by the support they received
from local networks. This reinforces the importance of local level ties. The
long-promised local elections were delayed repeatedly, but were finally
held in 2018 (Kherigi 2017; Demmelhuber 2018).
The often-delayed decentralization law only passed through parliament
shortly before the elections. This made it impossible for candidates to thor-
oughly familiarize themselves with its content. As the law itself opted for a
sequenced implementation and contradicts a plethora of other existing
14 Tunisian governments reshuffled almost every year since 2011. The economic sit-
uation remains dire after terrorist attacks brought the vital sector of tourism
down in 2015, and the state and politics are met with major distrust by the popu-
lation. The Tunisian budget is heavily dependent on international loans and the
government is encouraged to pursue a course of strict austerity. The consolidation
of the Tunisian institutional democracy thus has not been able to grant socioeco-
nomic benefits to the wider public.
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laws, the de facto relationships between local councils, governors, and the
central state remain unclear and subject to political power struggles (inter-
views Tunis, Sousse Oct 2019). The decentralization law grants compe-
tences formerly de jure and de facto held by the governors to directly elect-
ed regional councils. But since the first direct elections of regional institu-
tions have not yet taken place, in their absence governors as representatives
of the MoI try to keep the regional prerogatives “in trust”. At the same
time, mayors feel that they should inherit regional powers until the coun-
cils on these levels are elected since they represent the will of the people
locally. This heightens the existing conflicts between these two institutions
(Kherigi 2020a; b; interviews Tunis Oct / Nov 2019). The current role of
tutelle actors below the governor is relatively unclear (even to some dele-
gates) and likely to diminish considerably when the decentralization law is
fully implemented (interviews Tunis, Sousse Dec 2019). A large part of
their influence made up the access to the ruling party elites and their fund-
ing, a network that broke down after the party’s dismantlement. The de-
ployment of special delegations instead of newly elected local representa-
tives, repeated delays in holding local elections and fights regarding the
wording of the decentralization’s legal code also reflect different political
agendas of the then dominating Ennahda and Nidaa Tounis parties. The
moderate Islamist Ennahda was forbidden under Ben Ali’s regime and
many of its prominent figures, including its leader Rached Ghannouchi,
came back from exile after 2011. Ennahda became part of the transitional
government (Troika, 2011-14), remained a major political power in the
governments after the first regular elections (2014-2019), and came first in
the fragmented parliament after the 2019 elections. Nidaa positioned itself
as the secular counterpart to Ennahda. It also became the new political
home to many elites of Ben Ali’s regime and was a major coalition partner
in the governments between 2014 and 2019, as well as the party of the
Tunisian president at the time. The party has since split into several
branches.
Political affiliations matter not only nationally but also on the local lev-
el. Signs of favor-trading and cooperation are more common when mayors
and governors are members of the same political party (Yasun 2020).
Moreover, the Ennahda, the only remaining stable party after the elections
of 2019, organizes internal trainings, data collection, and inter-level prob-
lem solving mechanisms for their own mayors (interviews Tunis Feb
2020). Ennahda also won the race for mayoral positions in Tunisia (131 of
350). However, what was feared by the top-heavy and centralized political
parties became reality: Independent candidates were largely successful and
gained 127 mayorships. Political parties on the national level are in crisis,
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with the multiple secessions from the Nidaa Tounis party, culminating in
the election of the non-affiliated law professor Kais Saied as President
(Wolf 2019). Many fear that most parties (besides Ennahda) will not be
able to provide party list coverage for subnational elections in the future.
This may raise tensions between central and local political actors that are
not politically aligned.
While party politics seem to matter for the relationship between coun-
cils and tutelle agents, in general governors of all parties are cautious when
it comes to rapid change in decentralization and warn against instabilities
from below. Their legal role has been substantially downgraded by the de-
centralization law of 2018, but since they are under the auspices of the MoI
and appointed by the Prime Minister (after political negotiations between
the ruling parties), they do not always feel bound by the code (interviews
Sousse, Tunis, Oct 2019, Tunis Nov 2019, Feb 2020). Some old regime gov-
ernors still are in office, though “new era” governors including those be-
longing to the moderate Islamist party Ennahda are in place. Many retain
good networks and connections (which some new mayors do not possess)
and they control the access to the local police, subnational offices of min-
istries, and have some influence on the local allocation of funding. There-
fore, many mayors are dependent on cooperating with the governors. The
local council presidents feel empowered by their democratic legitimacy,
whereas the governors can be subject to frequent reshuffling after the nu-
merous government changes in Tunisia. Regional agents of the tutelle
(such as the governors) still mainly control governorates from which they
do not originate. What used to be a mechanism under the ancien régime to
keep local ties of the MoI agents in check has now allowed incidents where
governors block development initiatives for the municipalities in the gov-
ernorate they oversee in order to increase the chances of their own birth
places (ICG 2017; Meddeb 2020). Regional reconciliation by decentraliza-
tion and developmental reallocation is still widely perceived as a zero-sum
game.
Struggles for influence also take place inside the local councils. Mayors
are the only paid councilor position and they are responsible for the execu-
tion of municipal politics. Local councils and mayors also are dependent
on their staff (see chapter 5) and their Secretary General (SG), the head of
administration. The administration and many SG positions have largely
been unaffected by the regime change of 2011. Most Secretary Generals
have more experience with local governance than local politicians, and lo-
cal councils need to rely on their legal and practical knowledge. At times,
this leads to power asymmetries between democratically elected represen-
tatives and their administration. Mayors with prior experience in the pub-
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lic or local administration tend to fare better in their control over their ad-
ministration (interviews Sousse, Tunis, Oct 2019). As local elected elites
are dependent on the cooperation of the regional governors, ministerial
support, and in many cases even their own heads of administration, their
position in the unfinished legal environment of decentralization is precari-
ous. This is one factor that contributes to the widespread resignations of
individual councilors, local councils as a whole, and mayors in Tunisia.15
The peak of local governments’ demission in 2019 can be interpreted as an
upheaval of the political landscape prior to the parliamentary and presi-
dential elections. This ongoing phenomenon is, however, also an indica-
tion for the local governments’ sense of impotence in the country’s current
political system. Local government members and mayors often loose local
support if they try to change the longstanding distribution of local funds,
or if they try to enforce the law against influential business owners or asso-
ciations (interviews Tunis Oct 2020, Feb 2020). The relative stability of the
relations between old economic elites (located in Grand Tunis and the Sa-
hel), ministries and governors, as well as the reintegration of old regime
elites into the political sphere after 2014, has major implications for the
new decentralization reforms. Old ties between tutelle agents, economic ac-
tors, and ministerial elites remain salient and lead to “unbureaucratic” de-
cisions and project allocations. The old center-periphery conflict remains
in place. The northern business elites use their connections with the na-
tional administration as well as with the governors to threaten competing
new entrepreneurs from the interior regions, or to deny them access to li-
censes and the national market if they do not cooperate with a business
partner from the north (ICG 2017).
15 As mayors are forbidden by law from having other income sources, many former
businesspersons, lawyers, or physicians found themselves downgraded in their
standards of living after taking up office. Moreover, mass defections of councilors
were a strategy to bring down mayors that dominated over their councilors and a
means to produce political scandals in advance to the national and presidential
elections.
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Elites and decentralization in Egypt16
Center-periphery networks: Turbulent times, yet surprising consistency
The Egyptian case differs from the other three countries through two ma-
jor power transitions since 2011. First, long-term President Husni
Mubarak was ousted following the protests of 2011 that also terminated
the rule of the National Democratic Party (NDP) and its broad national
outreach to the local level. In 2013, the military removed democratically
elected President Muhammad Mursi from power in a coup. Despite two
regime changes within roughly three years, pre-existing patron-client net-
works between the center and the local levels have remained remarkably
stable.
Mubarak’s long-term rule was de facto a single-party regime under presi-
dential rule. Thus, central and subnational institutions were filled with
NDP members or allies as part of the regime’s strategy to handle the pe-
riphery and to manage its elites (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 2011).
During this period, the decisive intermediary agent between the center and
the local levels developed to be what Menza refers to as “lesser notables”.
People from diverse sociopolitical and economic backgrounds, often of on-
ly moderate social origins but extensive networks within their communi-
ties, became essential players as middlemen between state institutions and
the local populations (Menza 2019). For instance, Hajj Gad Megahed, a
merchant and influential member of the Megahed family, which is based
in Upper Egypt and deeply involved in Egyptian business and politics, is a
well-known figure in the Misr al-Qadimah district in Cairo. He can be con-
sidered a lesser notable. Personalities such as him have developed solid pa-
tron-client relations with central and regional state officials and are thus
commonly consulted in disputes within their community, because they
maintain good ties to local police officers and other security agencies
(Menza 2013a). In many cases, their ties to the security apparatus and other
state authorities are based on bribery and corruption. Oftentimes it is also
a sign of the notables’ high standing within their families. But their power
can reach up to even higher levels: Lesser notables carry a significant role
in elections. Not only do they frequently run for municipal or parliamen-
16 The Egyptian case is only based on desk research. Due to the political situation in
Egypt and the deteriorating academic freedom, we decided not to conduct field-
work. Instead, we relied on an evaluation of existing literature, official state chan-
nels, media reports and country experts.
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tary elections themselves, but they are also a popular address for MP candi-
dates who aim to win over certain constituencies. In return for services or
money, the notables can push candidates by using their influence to secure
the votes of a certain district. Through patronage networks like these, the
notables contributed to consolidating the NDP’s rule in the periphery
(Menza 2013b). However, their political affiliation can vary: Under
Mubarak, lesser notables were not only affiliated with the NDP, but also
with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that gained increasing local support
during Mubarak’s presidency (al-Awadi 2009). Yet, as soon as they became
fierce competitors for NDP candidates in the electoral districts, or chal-
lenged the fiefdoms of the lesser notables associated to the NDP, the
regime reacted with more penetration via the state security apparatus (see
e.g. for the district of Imbaba: Abdo 2000). Quite commonly, lesser nota-
bles took a rather opportunistic stance and frequently changed their pa-
trons from the NDP to the MB and vice versa, depending on their personal
agenda (Menza 2013a). In contrast to more prominent political figures
around Mubarak and the NDP, for the most part the lesser notables were
able to keep their influence after 2011 due to their respective political inde-
pendence. Notably, the aftermath of 2011 initiated a race for alliances with
lesser notables amongst major political forces (Menza 2019).
After the military coup of 2013 abruptly ended the short rule of Mursi
and the MB, which has been labeled a terrorist organization since 2013,
the Egyptian state is on a path back to a hyper-centralized system. A short
interim period of community activism of so-called popular committees
who were – for example in Greater Cairo – filling the void of dissolved
NDP networks was rather abruptly ended by massive repression (under the
legal umbrella of the state of emergency, Demmelhuber 2019). The mili-
tary has always played a significant role in Egyptian politics and the ad-
ministrative state order. However, its influence is likely to increase under
as-Sisi’s regime and in the absence of a state party with similar tremendous
local outreach as the former NDP. Although the 2020 election results indi-
cate a rise of the Mustaqbal Watan Party (Future of the Nation Party),
which is affiliated with as-Sisi, it has less implications for local politics.
Decentralized power structures: An ever-failing public service sector, yet no
improvement in sight
The roots of modern Egypt’s decentralized governance system reach back
to the founding of the republic under Gamal Abd an-Nasser after the revo-
lution of the free officers in 1952. Despite several revisions of the local ad-
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ministrative system, Nasser consolidated a centralized state order in which
political decision-making over local issues and subnational fiscal policy is
predominantly coordinated by central authorities. Under President Anwar
as-Sadat (1970-1980), the new constitution of 1971 and a by-law in 1979
(law 43/1979) brought a division of Egypt into 26 governorates that are fur-
ther subdivided in urban and rural governorates. Essentially, the basic
principles of this structure have remained intact until today. The recent
constitution of 2014 divides the state into three local administrative units:
governorates, cities, and villages – with “legal personality” (Art. 175). The
presently existing 27 governorates separate into urban and rural gover-
norates with different administrative subdivisions17. The head of each gov-
ernorate is the governor, who is appointed by the President and provided
with a broad spectrum of executive competences. Egyptian governors have
extensive de jure and de facto powers. Under Mubarak, the Minister for
Local Development (operating under the High Council for Local Adminis-
tration) was de jure tasked with coordinating all local administrative mat-
ters. De facto he was replaced by the Council of Governors, illustrating the
governors’ power (UNDP and The Institute of National Planning Egypt
2004). Each of the local administrative units further comprises a local ex-
ecutive council filled with appointed staff representing central ministries,
and one elected local popular council (LPC) to monitor the work of the
executive institutions. The heads of all local units, however, are appointed.
By law, the LPCs are entrusted with a supervising function vis-à-vis the
heads and executive councils of the local units, but their power is de facto
limited to an advisory role (Tadamun 2015). Overlapping responsibilities
and a hierarchical order of the subnational levels further diminish the in-
fluence of local entities. Consequently, not only does the regime control
local entities, but the local entities also monitor other local institutions’
performance: Executive councils and LPCs oversee each other’s work as
well as that of the entities on the lower administrative tiers. The center fur-
thermore administers and closely monitors major public service sectors
and subnational fiscal policy. Under Mubarak’s rule, the failings of the
Egyptian regime to provide a broad range of public services via the state’s
local administrative units became evident by the fact that civil society orga-
nizations began to step in for the regime to support poor and vulnerable
populations in many locations across the country. Particularly religious
17 Fully urban governorates (muhafaza) are divided into districts (e.g. Cairo and
Alexandria), rural governorates (muhafaza) into regions (markaz), cities (madina),
and villages (qariya).
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charity organizations were involved. It was primarily the MB who compen-
sated for lacking government services, but other Islamic or Coptic organi-
zations equally provided aid to marginalized communities. Their freedom
to act, however, changed dramatically under as-Sisi’s rule (Brechenmacher
2017).
Until the time of writing, the 2014 constitution’s provisions still await
clarification and implementation through a local administration law. A re-
spective draft law finally made it into parliament in 2018, but has not been
ratified yet. To date, ministries have refrained from implementing several
aspects of the constitution. Most significant is the absence of local elec-
tions since 2008 and thus, of any elected institution on the subnational lev-
el. After the LPCs were dissolved in 2011 to dispose of National Democrat-
ic Party (NDP) affiliated elites, they were staffed with appointed personnel.
Neopatrimonial networks and decentralization: Strong bottom-up dynamics and
frightened central elites
During Mubarak’s rule, the primary opposition of the regime was the Mus-
lim Brotherhood. Over the decades, the Brotherhood had established a
strong support base on the local level, not least as a result of its social work
in major public service sectors such as health. It was common for the
Brotherhood to take over public institutions or professional associations
and to convert them into successful entities that eventually served their
cause. Hence, when Mubarak announced the advancement of a decentral-
ized state structure in his presidential manifesto of 2005, opinions towards
the project were divided in the NDP. Until then, all major positions had
been carefully appointed by the center. Most governors were former mili-
tary generals who demonstrated little interest in serving anyone except
their personal clientelist networks (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 2011).
The national legislative elections of 2005, in which the Brotherhood won
88 of 444 seats (around 20%), were an initial indication of how threatening
the Muslim Brotherhood’s grass-root initiatives could become. As a conse-
quence, the 2006 local elections were postponed until 2008 to avoid the
risk of establishing too many Muslim Brothers in elected subnational state
institutions. Ahead of the 2008 elections, the Egyptian opposition had to
face enormous formal hurdles, because of a series of amendments to 34 ar-
ticles of the constitution in 2007. This led to widespread social unrest in
the 27 governorates (Herzallah and Hamzawy 2008). The amendments
were clearly designed to contain the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood,
as they banned all political parties with religious frameworks, leaving the
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organization – once again – with no other option than to register their
members as independent candidates to run for elections (Brown et al.
2007)18. Given the strong support the organization could mobilize on the
local level, the Mubarak regime further strove to minimize the impact of
the Brotherhood’s independent candidates. Facing too many formal hur-
dles to register their candidates prior to the 2008 local elections, the Broth-
erhood ended up boycotting the elections at the last minute. Clearly, the
regime feared that its neopatrimonial networks at the local level would not
be strong enough to control the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in an
election. With a dramatically low voter turnout of only 5%, the NDP won
the elections by a landslide, occupying over 95% of the seats (Herzallah
and Hamzawy 2008). In the end, formal-legal measures helped to contain
the regime-threatening dynamics of local politics and to uphold pro-
regime majorities within subnational institutions. The 2008 local elections
would become the last ones held in Egypt up to this day.
When the Arab uprisings spilled over to Egypt in 2011, the country was
about to enter a period of extraordinary uncertainty. With a history of
grass-roots organizations assuming state tasks, the population became ac-
tive again. In Cairo and Gizeh for instance, neighborhoods formed local
popular committees that helped organize everyday life and needs in the ab-
sence of a functioning state. Throughout 2011 and 2012, these committees
were successful in forcing local state agents and institutions to comply
with the communities’ demands. Before that, local state institutions would
often be unresponsive to any incoming directives or requests. But circum-
stances changed since they were no longer protected by the central state
and the NDP. Increasing repression by the as-Sisi regime since 2013 gradu-
ally marginalized their freedom to act and diminished their influence at
the local level. Simultaneously, old local elites from the Mubarak regime
often coopted the new local political actors, which further limited the au-
tonomy of this local activism (Harders and Wahba 2017). In other loca-
tions, local committees had been established by old local NDP affiliates
and their patron-client networks (Meehy 2017). The Egyptian population
proved its ability to compete with state institutions in terms of public ser-
18 In addition, while the amendments facilitated the legal framework for political
parties to nominate a candidate to run for presidential elections, they also set out
conditions for independent candidates that were almost impossible to fulfil. Inter
alia, independent presidential candidates were now obliged to register the sup-
port of a minimum of 230 members of parliament and local councils, a provision
which raised the political significance of elected local councils (Brown et al.
2007).
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vice provision on several occasions. But as-Sisi’s harsh crackdown on civil
society activism has led to an end of almost all of these activities (Meehy
2017). Since the crackdown also targets religious charity organizations that
played an important role in public service delivery under Mubarak, the sit-
uation of peripheral populations may have worsened (Ismail 2019;
Brechenmacher 2017).
Seven years after the coup, as-Sisi is still in the process of consolidating
his power (Noll 2019). He has upheld the state of emergency since 2016.
The regime remains hesitant to implement a local governance law that
could destabilize the current situation. The ratification of a new law would
urge the regime to hold local elections. This constitutes a risk to the as-Sisi
regime, due of the absence of a party that keeps strong ties to the periphery
as Mubarak’s NDP had done. The 2014 constitution formally limits the
LPC’s power by stipulating that elected local councils’ decisions should be
final, but executive authorities may interfere “to prevent the council from
overstepping these limits, or causing damage to the public interest or the
interests of other local councils” (Art. 181). For now, committing to mean-
ingful decentralization poses too much of a threat to central elites and
their power to control the periphery. According to several sources, as-Sisi
continues to hinder a new local administration law due to an internal
struggle between several intelligence agencies (Mada Masr 2020).
So far, as-Sisi relies on his military networks to govern the periphery. In
strategically important governorates including Red Sea, al-Ismailia, Port
Said, Suez as well as North and South Sinai, almost all governors since the
mid-1990s came from military backgrounds. In other governorates the gov-
ernors’ backgrounds varied between the military and other non-security-re-
lated professions. In some governorates including Cairo, al-Sharqiya and
Asyut, governors rarely had ties to the military. During the first governor
reshuffle since as-Sisi’s inauguration in 2015, only three out of 17 new gov-
ernors had a background as military generals. The other 14 governors in-
cluded several university professors, judges, or government officials. No
women or Copts were among them (Atlantic Council 2015), nevertheless
this may be interpreted as a good will message to the international com-
munity, because a few years later the situation changed. The number of
military generals appointed as governors increased considerably after
2017/2018, even in governorates such as Cairo, al-Sharqiya and Asyut, who
are used to non-military governors. In November 2019, 11 out of 16 new
governors had held senior positions in the security sector or the army. For
instance, General Muhammad El-Sherif, who had formerly served as secu-
rity chief of Giza and Alexandria (Al Tawy 2019), replaced the governor of
Alexandria (a professor of engineering). Simultaneously, for the first time
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in Egyptian history, as-Sisi named Nadia Ahmed Abdou Saleh, a Muslim
woman, as governor of Baheira in 2017. In 2018, he took one-step further
by appointing Manal Awad Mikhael, a Coptic woman, as governor of
Damietta (Shaban 2018). This may have been an attempt to appease inter-
national donors as well as to coopt Coptic communities. In July 2020, as-
Sisi announced a new law (Law No. 165 of 2020) that allows for the ap-
pointment of a military advisor and a number of assistants to each gover-
norate nominated by the Minister of Defense. The new advisors shall re-
port to the Ministry of Defense and are instructed to handle security affairs
and problems within the communities, thereby coordinating with the re-
spective subnational authorities. They are also allowed to attend meetings
of the executive councils if they wish. Critical voices rate this as an attempt
to gain control over the periphery by further militarizing subnational insti-
tutions (Al-Monitor 2020; Anadolu Agency 2020). However, the new law
may not only be the result of security questions, but also of economic con-
siderations. The presence of a military advisor in each governorate will
open up new possibilities for companies affiliated with the military to land
large-scale projects (Al-Monitor 2020). The Egyptian military has been in-
volved in the private business sector for decades, but recent legal changes
under as-Sisi’s rule have made it easier for military companies or private
companies owned by former military officers to obtain government con-
tracts (Adly 2014). According to a source from the Ministry of Military
Production, the revenues of 20 military companies reached around 840
million USD in 2018/2019, which is a five times higher amount than in
2013/2014 (Dunne 2018).
Government corruption at the local level has taken over new dimen-
sions ever since the local administrative institutions are exclusively filled
with appointed staff and no elected council monitors their work (Rabie
2019). Meanwhile, as-Sisi created his own administrative capital city, Wedi-
an, a gated zone from where he rules the country and is surrounded by
hand-picked military officers and state servants. Wedian is located far from
Cairo and possible threats of popular movements (Dunne 2018). The large-
scale protests of 2019 prove that the Egyptian population is growing in-
creasingly impatient and is now ready to openly express socioeconomic
grievances, despite the power of as-Sisi’s extensive repression apparatus.
These developments indicate that as-Sisi’s plan to rely on repression to con-
solidate his rule is beginning to erode and will need some reconsiderations
in order to uphold legitimacy in the long term (Demmelhuber 2019).
Overall, the case of Egypt demonstrates the power of bottom-up dynamics
and grass-roots organizations vis-à-vis the regime when it comes to local
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public service provision and highlights the sensitivity of decentralization
under neopatrimonialism.
Conclusion: Smart vs. old-fashioned autocrats and the shadows of the past
Our analysis of Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt reveals how different
strata of elites – reaching from the center down to the local level – use for-
mal and informal institutions that make up a decentralized state structure
to maintain or widen their influence, resources, and power. The empirical
analysis also clearly illustrates the fine line between the opportunities and
threats of decentralization under neopatrimonialism. In all cases, the de-
sign of decentralization formally and informally benefits the regime. How-
ever, under certain circumstances regimes are hesitant to commit fully to
the legal framework as it holds potential to backfire. Over the past decades,
the monarchies Morocco and Jordan, who survived the Arab protests rela-
tively unharmed compared to Tunisia and Egypt, have spanned a solid net-
work of patron-client relations between the center and the periphery via
subnational state institutions. The Jordanian regime thereby pays close at-
tention to the sensitive management of Transjordanian and Palestinian
communities – overwhelmingly to the benefit of Transjordanian tribes.
Subnational actors in Morocco are also carefully divided and controlled by
a net of state agents whose dominance over subnational councils is unbro-
ken. While party elites engage actively in elections and political struggles,
they are dependent on alliances with local notables, party coalitions and
deference to the monarchy and its national and subnational representa-
tives. The codified inclusion of NGOs and the dominance of the central
state and its development initiatives has broadened the strata of elites that
get access to state resources. Both kingdoms furthermore established for-
mal structures that regulate the interplay between elected and appointed
subnational institutions in favor of the appointed tiers. These respond to
the instructions of the central ministries. Opportunities for the promotion
to higher levels in the public state apparatus function as incentives that
draw ambitious elites into the subnational state institutions. Though both
countries grant some minor autonomy to subnational institutions, under-
lying formal and informal practices can be activated at any time to limit
the power of lesser institutions if necessary. Elite rotation between major
subnational positions to contain the influence of certain individuals is a
common practice in all four countries, especially concerning the governors
with their extensive powers.
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Even after major power transitions in Tunisia and Egypt, central elites
still use decentralization for their own political purpose. While Mubarak
used the NDP and its clientelist networks to control the periphery in
Egypt, as-Sisi increasingly consolidates his power over the periphery by
militarizing subnational institutions in the absence of a state party. The
case also illustrates how grass-root organizations and civil society activism
can benefit from decentralization if the central state shows weaknesses in
terms of public service provision. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to ex-
pand its influence at the local level and eventually posed a serious chal-
lenge to the regime. To this day, the as-Sisi regime suffers from the conse-
quences. For this reason, repression of subnational activism has grown
significantly and local elections still have not taken place after almost sev-
en years of rule. While Egypt’s plans to decentralize the state may never
have been entirely legitimate in the Western understanding of this policy,
under as-Sisi the project is likely to have reached a dead end. Tunisia is re-
ceiving much international attention for its transition to democracy, but
the new decentralization project enshrined in the 2014 constitution still
has a long way to go. Competition and diverging views of old and new
elites have been a burden on the new state from the beginning. The same
is true for the decentralization project. The sudden move from Ben Ali’s
hyper-centralized state order towards decentralization is taking time to un-
fold. Like Egypt, Tunisia is hesitant to fully commit to subnational elec-
tions and still stalls those for the regional councils. Though highly ambi-
tious, the Tunisian decentralization project lacks the support of ministerial
elites in the center and a clear government vision. The central government
parties were hesitant to move forward with decentralization laws as well as
local elections. They were threatened by the possibility that unaligned can-
didates would succeed. Indeed, independent candidates were very success-
ful, and their rise was an overture to the implosion of the national party
system. Local elected elites are dependent on the cooperation with region-
al governors, ministerial support, and in many cases even their own heads
of administration. Their current position in the unfinished legal outline of
decentralization is precarious. The new ministry in charge of decentraliza-
tion lacks the power to implement the reform on its own. The success of
the process would depend on the cooperation of large ministries, especially
the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance and their agents. As
inter-ministerial coordination is deficient, local political elites are left
hanging in a web of conflicting laws and provisions.
In all four cases, the structure of elite networks and their respective be-
havior also affects the de facto outcome of decentralization vis-à-vis its legal
outline. Jordan and Morocco are playing a sensitive balancing game be-
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tween the wish to appease the international community as reformers and
to successfully manage socio-political and economic cleavages on the
ground. A decentralization reform deeply interferes with a country’s pa-
tron-client structure and its outcome depends on central and subnational
elites’ reaction. Competitive clientelism and gerrymandering that accom-
pany subnational elections, as well as elite capture, easily twist the logic of
decentralization reform. With this background, the result of Jordan’s 2017
decentralization elections was less than surprising: The majority of seats
mirrored the same tribal structures as those at the central level. Over the
past decades, the neopatrimonial structures of the country had already con-
solidated an unequal distribution of public state resources amongst the
governorates (see chapter 5). Elite capture and the ministerial employees’
lack of willingness to cooperate (for fear of losing their clientelist networks
vis-à-vis the new governorate councils) further limits the effectiveness of
the entire process. The same can be witnessed in the Moroccan case. The
kingdom excels in the creation of participative subnational institutions
that carry democratic legitimation, a net of development programs, liberal-
ized institutions, and means to promote the work of NGOs, while careful-
ly pitting them against each other so that no single actor is able to gain too
much influence. Decentralization in Morocco provides additional access to
state resources and offices. Both national political elites and the new strata
of elites (e.g. NGOs) partake in them. They compete for influence, but all
remain dependent on the central regime and its oversight. Tunisia’s decen-
tralization process began as a powerful and conscious turn away from old
centralist structures, edging toward a democratic transition. However, the
process soon fell victim to central power relations. Instead of moving the
legal and electoral reform process forward, the (democratic) governments
used appointed special delegations to govern the local body politic. The
delegations were subject to political infights and contentions, both at the
national and the local level. The central governments’ attention shifted to
more pressing national problems and ongoing economic difficulties. If the
vast national ministries are not profoundly restructured in the future, the
success of decentralization is doubtful. Ministerial elites and governors are
still more powerful and better connected. They thus are the primary deter-
minants of the success of local political elites in their cooperation with the
center. In this point, as-Sisi’s rule differs significantly from the other three
cases. Due to security concerns and a re-centralization process since 2014,
the regime is actively holding back the execution of certain formal features
of decentralization as laid down in the constitution of 2014. First and fore-
most, the regime has hindered holding subnational elections, and refused
to allow a new local administration law to pass through parliament. As a
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consequence of neopatrimonialism and the absence of elected institutions
to monitor the executive tiers, arbitrary procedures and corruption on the
subnational levels are increasing, while local public service provision is de-
teriorating.
Our comparison of Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt illustrates that
a genuine decentralization process cannot simply rely on technicalities or
an apolitical delegation of tasks. A successful implementation requires so-
phisticated modifications of a country’s institutional landscape as much as
it requires a fundamental change in the structure and the mentality of cen-
tral state elites and their patron-client networks. If neopatrimonial struc-
tures are too dominant, they twist the logic of a decentralized state struc-
ture and reduce its effectiveness dramatically.
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Fiscal Decentralization in the Middle East and North
Africa: Deciphering Motives and Outcomes1
Erik Vollmann and Miriam Bohn
The delegation of state tasks and responsibilities from the central govern-
ment level to regional and local levels, also known as decentralization, is a
ubiquitous phenomenon. Elected subnational governments seem om-
nipresent in democracies. OECD governments spend a significant portion
(40.4% in 2016) of their government expenditure at the subnational levels
(OECD and UCLG 2019). Because decentralization is associated with good
governance, development, and democracy, the international community
promotes and supports decentralization reforms in the Middle East and
North Africa (for an overview of the arguments see Demmelhuber et al.
2020; Harb and Atallah 2015b; see also chapter 2). MENA states are among
the most centralized in the world. But even these regimes have opted for
some form of subnational government and most of them include elected
subnational councils (see Figure 1).
5.
1 We are indebted to Ibrahim Bebars, Jennifer Hecht, Katharina Nicolai, and Julia
Zimmermann for their invaluable research assistance.
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Local governments elected
V-Dem (2021), coding: 0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected. 1:
Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly. 2: Generally, the local
assembly is elected but not the executive. 3: Generally, the local executive is elected
and there is no assembly. 4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no
executive. 5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.
Despite an upward trend in recent years, particularly during the last
decade, the effective power and autonomy of elected subnational govern-
ments in the MENA is more limited than in other world regions. The local
and peripheral origins of the 2010/2011 uprisings were clear expressions of
societal discontent with central power and regional socioeconomic imbal-
ances. Hence, the protests brought back to life the discourse on decentral-
ization in many MENA countries. Decentralization laws followed, most
prominently in Morocco (new constitution, major decentralization laws in
2015, with regional and local elections in 2015); Jordan (new decentraliza-
tion law in 2015, with local and regional elections in 2017); and Tunisia
(new constitution, extensive decentralization laws and local elections in
2018). All of these reform projects focus on the establishment or advance-
ment of local and regional subnational governments (though the regional
councils in Tunisia have not yet been elected) (Vollmann 2020). Signifi-
cantly, these decentralization processes have one factor in common: They
are regime-controlled, top-down initiatives. The reforms are pushed by the
monarchies in Morocco and Jordan, while the Tunisian decision to in-
Figure 1:
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clude decentralization in its new constitution originated from a transition-
al and pro-democratic impulse in a countermove to the heavy centralism
of the old regime (Kherigi 2017). Despite a strong centralist state order in
Egypt, nominal decentralization was long necessary to implement state
policies in order to reduce social and regional disparities (Demmelhuber
and Roll 2009). Today, decentralization is stifled by the ultra-centralism of
as-Sisi’s regime that took over power later in 2013.
We argue that the present decentralization processes in the MENA post
2011 are central state reactions to protests against long-standing local gov-
ernment malfunction and economic deprivation of the peripheries. The
decentralization discourses and reforms in all four cases use a language of
“positive discrimination” and promise a reformed relationship of the cen-
ter and the periphery. In theory, this should lead to an improvement of
subnational administrative efficiency and an empowerment of the long-ne-
glected periphery.
Under the conditions of ambiguous legal outlines with vague or contra-
dictory wording and long-standing centripetal patron-client relationships,
the outcome of decentralization reforms is not always the participative,
democracy-enhancing and reconciliating model that governments and in-
ternational donors advertise. To provide subnational institutions with suf-
ficient and independent funds so that they can freely execute their tasks
and rights is a necessary precondition of meaningful decentralization. The
fiscal dimension is one of the focal points for the political economic analy-
sis of decentralization effects alongside the clear-cut separation of compe-
tences. Fiscal decentralization sheds light on the will of political rulers to
commit to decentralization and on the deficits of current local governance
arrangements in the region.
We chose Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia as the three MENA regimes
with the most ambitious decentralization reforms after the Arab uprisings,
as well as Egypt, whose decentralization process is suppressed by as-Sisi’s
autocratic rule as a contrasting case for our analysis. Since 2011, decentral-
ization has led to an expansion of subnational governments’ power in Jor-
dan, Tunisia, and Morocco, but not in Egypt (see Figure 2). Are these de-
velopments reflected in the degree of fiscal decentralization?
5. Fiscal decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa
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Strength of local governments in comparison
V-Dem (2021), combination of elected local governments and their relative
strength vis-à-vis unelected bodies on the same level; high values indicate high
power of elected local governments.
Building on this volume’s theoretical framework (see chapter 2), we assess
the degree of the regime’s commitment and meaningful implementation
of decentralization measures in all four countries. We analyze the evolu-
tion of fiscal decentralization and thereby focus on the role of regional dis-
parities as well as on the connection between fiscal decentralization and
neopatrimonialism. Decentralization projects are no one-size-fits-all ap-
proach. We argue that the strong neopatrimonial character of politics in
our region of analysis changes the trajectory of decentralization reforms.
We combine an in-case comparison with a between-case comparison to
identify common trajectories and country-specific outputs. Reliable data
on public finance, let alone subnational finance, are very scarce in the
MENA region. Most quantitative studies on (fiscal) decentralization thus
exclude the Arab world from their analyses. With a combination of quanti-
tative data on fiscal decentralization and local finance, and qualitative ma-
terial from original fieldwork research and secondary literature, we aim to
Figure 2:
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narrow this gap by shedding light on the dynamics of fiscal decentraliza-
tion in the MENA.2
Fiscal decentralization, effective local governance and neopatrimonialism in the
MENA
Proper funding is necessary for subnational governance reforms. A basic
assumption of effective decentralization is that a transfer of powers and re-
sponsibilities to subnational institutions must be accompanied by a trans-
fer of proper funding (Vollmann 2020; Bergh 2021). Transformation litera-
ture, as well as the proponents of decentralization policies, claim that the
reforms aim at boosting economic development when the fiscal relation-
ship between the center and its territories is improved (Demmelhuber et
al. 2020).
We argue that most large-n-studies neglect the case-sensitive processes of
decentralization reforms, though we agree with the literature that the level
of fiscal decentralization is of utmost importance to assess the potential
and success of state-led subnational governance reforms in the MENA re-
gion. Underfunding and insufficient competencies to raise own revenues
decreases the potential for subnational governments to work independent-
ly or even effectively.
The ideal degree of fiscal decentralization is of course dependent on the
actual form of decentralization (World Bank 2001)3: Purely administrative
forms of decentralization (e.g., regional ministerial branches) may func-
tion with limited expenditure autonomy. They can cope with strict guide-
lines from the center on how to spend their budget. Subnational autonomy
2 Our analysis draws on original fieldwork in Morocco (April 2018 – May 2018 and
October 2018 – December 2018), Jordan (April 2018 – May 2018, October 2018 –
November 2018 and January 2020 – February 2020), and Tunisia (October 2019 –
November 2019 and January 2020 – February 2020) where we conducted semi-
structured interviews (n = 162) with politicians and state employees, civil society
actors, researchers, journalists, and foreign observer organizations on the central,
regional, and local government levels. One thematic section of our interviews fo-
cused on financial organization and assessments of the state and shortcomings of
central-subnational fiscal relations. We also need to stress the problems of fiscal da-
ta availability and quality in the MENA region, whose statistical capacity lags be-
hind other world regions. For an extensive discussion of both matters, see chapter
3.
3 For a more extensive discussion of different forms and models of decentralization,
see also chapter 2.
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over revenues or the power to generate own income, e.g. by subnational tax-
es or fees, is also not strictly necessary for some types of administrative de-
centralization. Since government agencies or subnational ministerial
branches are part of the executive, their funding is often directly controlled
by the central state. Forms of political decentralization, i.e. (quasi-)au-
tonomous bodies or elected institutions often imply higher degrees of ex-
penditure and revenue autonomy. The actual structure of intra-state fiscal
relations is, however, extremely intricate and dependent on a plethora of
political rationales.
Throughout the MENA region, governments have imparted elected
councils with budgetary power and most of them are theoretically empow-
ered to collect fees for subnational service provision or even local taxes
(Harb and Atallah 2015a; Kherigi 2017). However, the extractive capacity
of decentralized institutions in the Arab world is extremely low and the de-
pendency on centralized allocation of funds remains high (Vollmann
2020; Harb and Atallah 2015a). Social institutions (e.g., funds for commu-
nal projects gathered by traditional village notables, religious leaders or
even just neighbors) often fill the void left by weak central public service
provision (Lust and Rakner 2018). However, the compliance or non-com-
pliance between reforms’ layouts and actual changes of fiscal relations be-
tween the central and subnational levels is an important indicator for the
political will and the strategies of political regimes. Decentralization is in-
efficient if local and regional actors lack the financial means and capacities
to fulfill their competences as laid down in the legal framework (Altunbaş
and Thornton 2012; Demmelhuber et al. 2020; Houdret and Harnisch
2018). Amendments to the regulation of subnational budget allocation
and spending, as well as changes to the amount of central transfers to the
periphery, may either lead to an extension or a decline of subnational au-
tonomy. The more a central regime engages with fiscal decentralization
and withdraws from subnational financial affairs, the larger the political
will to decentralize. The implementation of such changes may appease do-
mestic and international stakeholders and organizations (Vollmann et al.
2020).
Fiscal control is an important factor in a central regimes’ monitoring
and controlling of their territories. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of fiscal
decentralization helps to identify cases of partial decentralization and the
manipulation of reforms hijacked to stabilize the regime in authoritarian
contexts as a form of authoritarian upgrading (Vollmann et al. 2020; Bergh
2021; Harb and Atallah 2015a; Aalen and Murias 2018). Even if subnation-
al institutions are formally declared to be financially independent bodies,
they may de facto have no real fiscal autonomy. The authority over budget
Erik Vollmann and Miriam Bohn
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distribution and spending may remain with central institutions despite the
reforms, because it is in the interest of an authoritarian regime to keep sub-
national institutions financially dependent as an additional control mecha-
nism.
The most commonly used indicator for fiscal decentralization is the
share of subnational government spending of total spending or tax rev-
enues. However, we need to broaden our analysis to also capture elements
of dependency or independence of subnational institutions from the cen-
tral state (for an extensive discussion on measurements of decentralization
see Dardanelli et al. 2018; Blöchliger 2013). Since local governance is also
closely related to regional disparities, we also need to check for subnation-
al variances of fiscal decentralization. Decentralization reforms often for-
mally answer the calls for redistribution of resource imbalances between
the center and neglected peripheries. But strategic redistributions of state
resources via subnational governments can also lead to fiscal imbalances or
even to a form of “subnational rentierism” that creates dependencies on
the central state and incentives to align with (authoritarian) regimes, espe-
cially if the share of self-generated resources is low and existing transfers
favor of economically smaller territories (Gervasoni 2010, 305, 310).
In our research, we moreover take into consideration the relationship of
fiscal decentralization and the neopatrimonial character of politics. In the
context of neopatrimonialism, subnational resources might be used to up-
hold and widen networks of cooptation that rely on the access to and dis-
tribution of state resources (Demmelhuber et al. 2020; Hibou 2004).
While financial resources are a vital aspect of subnational capacity, the
size, experience and quality of subnational human resources are also im-
portant for our argument: High staff costs for subnational governments
can hamper their ability to implement non-consumptive projects (Voll-
mann et al. 2020). The (mis-)use of public staffing for purposes of patron-
age is an important feature of neopatrimonial politics that we must keep in
mind when analyzing subnational spending in the MENA region. On the
other hand, insufficient staffing and low-qualified personal can obstruct
subnational councils’ abilities to efficiently put their funds to use (Shalaby
et al. 2020). Based on these insights from the literature, our empirical ana-
lysis will focus on the following aspects:
(1) Our analysis evaluates the development of subnational expenditure
and revenues to assess whether meaningful change has been imple-
mented after the 2011 uprisings.
(2) We elaborate on the regional distribution of decentralization funds to
check for the development of center-periphery disparities.
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(3) Funds available are not always funds used. We point out possible prob-
lems and shortcomings of subnational governments in their manage-
ment and spending of money formally at their disposal. This hints to
problems regarding the capacities of subnational councils and admin-
istrations, relationships between local actors, and enduring political
cultures of deference to the center.
(4) To assess the role of decentralized governments, we need to observe
the central state influence and mechanisms of neopatrimonial rule.
Monetary dependencies, dominance of central state administration
over development programs and subnational actors as well as neopatri-
monial staffing policies are important indicators for the degree of au-
tonomy of subnational councils.
Fiscal decentralization in Morocco
Development of subnational finances: MENA forerunner, international
latecomer
Morocco is a forerunner of top-down controlled decentralization reforms
in the MENA region. This includes fiscal decentralization. The kingdom
possesses decentralized councils on three subnational levels: 12 regions, 63
provincial (rural) and 12 prefectural (urban) councils (the equivalent of
governorates in our other cases), and 1503 municipalities. They are the
Ministry of Interior’s administrative portfolio as are the appointed and hi-
erarchically organized overseers of decentralization (regions: wali, interme-
diate and local level: governor, local: caid, pasha). The state appointees’ de
jure and de facto power is strong, despite the legal changes and formal end
of the tutelle through the 2015 reform (see chapter 4). The extensive re-
gionalization reforms that were implemented in the constitution of 2011
and the three organic decentralization laws of 2015 gave new powers and
responsibilities to subnational institutions. Morocco is the only case
among our four cases where earnest attempts to establish a form of region-
alism were made. Our fiscal analysis shows that municipalities still are the
backbone of subnational expenditure (and revenue), but the reforms have
indeed increased the regions’ financial influence after 2016 (see Figure 3).
The absolute amount of subnational expenditure surged in 2011, as a result
of major uprisings and the new constitution, but remained relatively con-
stant until 2016. Recent data implies a clear upward trend since 2017 –
mostly attributable to the regional level.
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When contrasted with general public expenditure, the subnational share decreased between the 
uprisings in 2011 and 2014, because the subnational surge in absolute terms coincided with a 
general spike in government spending. At least part of this development may be seen as an 
effort to appease the populace. Measured by the percentage of government spending, Morocco 
is a big spender at the subnational level in comparison to other MENA countries. However, 
spending levels remained relatively consistent over the years (see Figure 4). The financial focus 
of state expenditures has not shifted despite the extensive reforms and the discursive focus on 
regionalism. Although subnational expenditure as a share of state expenditure clearly increased 
in the long run (in 2002 it accounted for 8.5% of government spending), it is still far below 
OECD spending averages (40.4% average, 28.75 average for unitary countries in 2016) 
(Vollmann 2020, OECD and UCLG 2019). 
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Regional disparities: Urban-concentrated spending and advancement of strategic
regions
Regional disparities were – as in our other cases – at the heart of the latest
decentralization reforms. But rural areas are still disadvantaged in Moroc-
co. The Moroccan state stopped reporting comparative data on rural and
urban municipalities after 2015, but the available data from before show a
clear dominance of urban spending (and revenues for that matter). Urban
municipalities consistently received about 70% of local expenditures (see
Figure 5), even though Morocco is not as urbanized as Jordan or Tunisia.
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The data show a clear-cut urban-rural divide, but the central-peripheral
division of Moroccan fiscal expenditure is more complex. The central
north is responsible for the largest share of subnational expenditures
(Casablanca-Setta 18%, Rabat-Salé-Kénitra 14.1%, Tanger-Tétouan-Al Ho-
ceima 10%), but it is also densely populated. Per capita data (see Table 1)
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of the Western Sahara with over 840 USD per capita in Laâyoune-Sakia El
Hamra, nd round 700 SD per capita in Dakhla-Oued Ed Dahab.
Guelmim-Oued Nou (partly in the Western Sahara, about 250 USD per
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been neglected and a driver of social unrest, are also overrepresented.
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opment. It does not tip th  scales to a degree g at enough to overcome the
decade-long concentration of prestigious infrastructure projects in Moroc-
co’s north.
Figure 5:
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Casablanca-Settat 6,861,739 794.7 115.82
Rabat-Salé-Kenitra 4,580,866 626.4 136.74
Marrakesh-Safi 4,520,569 439.3 97.18




Souss-Massa 2,676,847 325.1 121.43
Beni Mellal-Khenifra 2,520,776 297.4 117.98
Oriental 2,314,346 394.4 170.42
Draa-Tafilalet 1,635,008 162.0 99.09
Guelmim-Oued Noun 433,757 109.5 252.43
Laayoune-Sakia El Hamra 367,758 311.0 845.70
Eddahkla Oued Eddahab 142,955 99.7 697.56
Overall 33,848,242 4,427.2 130.79
Own calculation based on data of the Moroccan treasury and the Haut-Commis-
sariat au Plan du Maroc.
Subnational finance and the central state: Underfinanced, overcontrolled and
highly dependent on the center
Decentralization in Morocco can only by successful when it has a sound
financial base. The fiscal base of the regionalization project has indeed
been broadened (also in comparison to the MENA region) but ends still
do not meet for subnational councils. An additional element of fiscal de-
centralization in Morocco is the phenomenon of underspending. Even
where funding exists, the implementation of the planned budget is often
insufficient. In 2019, 82% of subnational expenditures on consumption
were realized, but only 44% of planned investments were implemented
(TGR 2019). Subnational funds remain underused in the kingdom. There
are several reasons for this phenomenon: (1) There exists a conservative
spending-mentality of many local leaders, as well as uncertainty regarding
the size of central state transfers and the amount of incoming taxes. This
contributes to cautious or delayed action (Bergh 2017; Mhammedi 2019).
Table 1:
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(2) Poor management and the employment of untrained councilors, in
combination with weak technical infrastructures and legal ambiguities also
play a role. (3) Council actions are delayed or inhibited by political infight-
ing. (4) Many council presidents are reluctant to take action without the
approval of the central state administration, despite the formal end of the
administrative tutelle, i.e. the strong ex-ante oversight of decentralization
by the Ministry of Interior. (5) The ex-post oversight that controls the le-
gality of council decisions is time intensive and hampers subnational gov-
ernment action. (Bergh 2020; 2021; Vollmann et al. 2020; Mhammedi
2019) We observe a close connection between the curbed potential of sub-
national governments’ decision-making and central state influence,
neopatrimonialism in the form of prevailing legacies of national oversight,
as well as continued central state dominance in staffing, planning and even
the distribution of funds.
Staffing costs make up a sizable portion of municipal expenditure and
may thereby even threaten the ability of councils to decide freely on how
to spend their funds. Reports on “shadow employees”, i.e. clients of coun-
cil elites that are on the cities’ payroll but do not actually work, have been
circulating after the recent reforms (interviews Casablanca, Dec 2018). We
witness the opposite situation at the regional level, where staffing is so low
that it is unclear whether the regional governments have the capacity to
implement their projects adequately (see Figure 6 for the distribution of
expenditures). Also, staff quality is relatively poor and many positions are
unattractive in comparison to the ones in central state institutions (Bergh
2020). Overall, subnational governments accounted for only 9.7% of pub-
lic staff expenditure in Morocco in 2016 (OECD and UCLG 2019).
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The strong administrative oversight of subnational politics constrains the
autonomy of subnational governments in Morocco (see also chapter 4). In
addition, subnational councils are highly dependent on central state trans-
fers. In 2016, 61.3% of h  Moroccan local budge s consisted f central
state transfers (OECD and UCLG 2019), while the regional level received
over 90% of its funding from transfers (91.3% in 2018) (Vollmann et al.
2020). Though municipalities seem to be more independent, only the
largest urban centers (especially Casablanca) generate significant portions
of their budgets from their own income. Rural local councils receive
around 70% of their budgets from the central state (Vollmann et al. 2020).
The overall institutional landscape limits the autonomy of democratical-
ly backed subnational council action and upholds the neopatrimonial
power concentration of the regime: The budget plans still need the ex-post
approval by representatives of the Ministry of Interior. Moreover, subna-
tional council politics compete with central state sectoral initiatives that
also target subnational politics. Palace-led development initiatives (e.g. Na-
tional Initative for Human Development (INDH) or the National Program
on Social and Territorial Disparities) are often more visible. Subnational
governments are even part of the INDH and contribute funds to the pro-
gram, although it is nonetheless dominated by the Ministry of Interior.
Another example are development initiatives under the auspices of the
wali who act as agents of the MoI in the regions (Agences de Développe-
ment Régional). There furthermore exists a myriad of de jure market ori-
Figure 6:
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ented public national and regional agencies and state-owned companies
that obscure the division of responsibilities between political actors, or en-
courage subnational governments to cooperate with the center (Vollmann
et al. 2020; Bergh 2021; 2012; Houdret and Harnisch 2018).
Fiscal decentralization in Jordan
Development of subnational finances: A sensitive balancing game
Jordan initially established its municipal system in 1921 and incorporated
it into the new constitution after the country’s independence in 1946. It
was not until 2015, however, that the kingdom initiated a decentralization
process based on the Law on Decentralization (Law no. 49 of 2015). Jor-
dan’s system of subnational governance is organized along two administra-
tive tiers: the governorate level comprising 12 governorates, and the mu-
nicipal level consisting of 103 municipalities. The governorate level mainly
functions as the extended arm of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in the pe-
riphery and has a focus on security matters. The municipal councils and
mayors are elected institutions carrying some minor responsibilities that
affect their communities’ everyday life, such as waste management and ur-
ban planning. Before the decentralization reform was finally implemented
in 2017 (two years after the passing of the law), municipalities were the
sole elected subnational institutions with the authority to create their own
revenues and to spend their budget autonomously, however within limits,
as budget generation and expenditure are under strong ministerial over-
sight.
The divide between Transjordanians and Palestinians is essential to the
analysis of subnational dynamics in Jordan. The Transjordanian elite is
considered the backbone of the Hashemite monarchy and traditionally
dominates most of the public state institutions that constitute Jordan’s
main employer. Jordan’s Palestinian population entered the country as
refugees after 1948 and makes up the majority of Jordan’s population to-
day. They are mainly engaged with the private sector and are less integrat-
ed into state institutions compared to Transjordanians. The majority of
Jordan’s 10.5 million population (Department of Statistics Jordan 2019)
lives in the three urban centers Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, which are also
the three governorates with the highest percentage of Palestinians. Over
the years, the bulk of public state expenditures either went to Amman –
the capital city, economic center of the country, and home to around 40%
of the population (OECD and UCLG 2019) – or to majority-Transjordani-
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an governorates of great socio-political influence, such as Karak or Ma’an,
in order to appease the Transjordanian elite. Heterogenous governorates
with a high percentage of Palestinians or a strong oppositional back-
ground, such as Zarqa and Irbid, received disproportionally fewer financial
resources over time.
In 2008, Jordan spent 3.5% of its GDP on subnational governance, 2.1%
in 2013, and 2.3% in 2016. This amounts to 9.6% of the general govern-
ment expenditures in 2008, 5.8% in 2013, and 8% in 2016 (UCLG 2010;
OECD and UCLG 2019; 2016a). In comparison, Jordan’s military expendi-
tures made up 4.6% of the GDP in 2016, one of the highest shares world-
wide (World Bank 2020). Jordan’s expenditures tend to fluctuate consider-
ably each year, nevertheless the numbers illustrate a slight decrease in sub-
national governance spending over time.
Regional disparities: A tiny country, yet highly unequal financial flows
Although the Jordanian regime is hesitant to publish numbers on munici-
pal revenues and expenditures, the Ministry of Local Administration (Mo-
LA) made available its data for the years 2017 to 2019 during our field-
work. The documents do not include the financial resources of the econo-
mic heavyweights Greater Amman Municipality, Aqaba Special Economic
Zone and Petra Regional Authority, as they fall directly under the jurisdic-
tion of the Prime Ministry. Thus, the governorates Amman, Aqaba and
Ma’an had to be excluded from this part of the analysis since no further
data is available. Nevertheless, the evaluation of per capita municipal ex-
penditures and revenues of 2018 and 2019 illustrate major differences be-
tween the financial resources of the remaining nine governorates (see Fig-
ure 7).
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Own calculation based on data of the MoLA and the Department of Statistics Jordan. 
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Municipalities within the heterogenous, urban governorates Zarqa and Ir-
bid, who have high percentages of Palestinians among their population,
have significantly lower pe  capita expenditures than the other gover-
norates. The same pattern applies for revenues, which include self-generat-
ed financial resources based on local fees, building permits and the tax on
property, but also the central state transfers that most municipalities are
dependent on (50% of the tax on oil derivates and 40% of vehicle license
fees according to the Law on Municipalities 2015, as well as money bor-
rowed from the Cities a d Villages Dev lopment Bank). To exemplify,
municipalities’ own revenues in 2016 o ly accounted for 32% of their bud-
get (OECD and UCLG 2019, 522). Especially the municipalities in Karak, a
governorate accommodating major parts of the Transjordanian political
elite, show high numbers in both cases. This supports the claim that the
distribution of decentralized funds favors the strongholds of the regime
elite and their clients. It thus contributes to upholding neopatrimonial net-
works.
Overall, the per capita financial resources of majority-Transjordanian
municipalities appear to be larger than those of the two majority-Palestini-
an urban governorates Irbid and Zarqa. Table 2 and 3 present data for the
Greater Amman unicipality (GAM) from 2013 to 2016, which acco mo-
dated around 20% of the national opulation in 2016. Th  revenu s as well
as the expenditures of GAM are higher in numbers than those of all other
municipalities combined (OECD and UCLG 2019). But when comparing
Figure 7:
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the per capita revenues and expenditures of GAM to those of the other mu-
nicipalities in 2018/2019 (see Figure 7), municipalities in majority-Tran-
sjordanian governorates either equal or surpass the per capita resources of
GAM.
GAM expenditures
Population Expenditures (in million USD) Per capita (in USD)
2014 3,598,600 406.5 112.97
2015 3,907,200 444.1 113.67
2016 4,004,800 447.8 111.82
Own calculation based on PEFA (2017) and Department of Statistics Jor-
dan for population size.
GAM revenues
Population Revenues (in million USD) Per capita (in USD)
2013 3,316,800 361.4 108.96
2014 3,907,200 407.9 104.41
2015 4,004,800 444.4 110.97
Own calculation based on PEFA (2017) and Department of Statistics Jordan for
population size.
Other than the municipalities, the governorate institutions manage all cen-
tral state affairs within their territory, including security and police, and
are thus closely supervised by the Ministry of Interior (MoI). Likewise, the
respective central ministries and their directorates within each governorate
control all fiscal matters of the governorate – including infrastructure and
development projects as well as security related issues. The governorate in-
stitutions cannot collect own revenues and their ability to spend money
autonomously is strictly limited. Thus, the task of compiling financial re-
sources and expenditures of Jordan’s governorate institutions resembles a
hurdle race. Official documents list all ministerial expenditures including
those on governorate affairs, but it is impossible to determine the exact
amounts that accurately add up to the governorate budget.
When the Jordanian parliament passed the law on decentralization in
2015, domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international
organizations had high hopes that the reform would increase fiscal decen-
tralization. While the reform barely touched municipal affairs, it estab-
lished a governorate council within each governorate – a partly elected in-
stitution (15% of the members are appointed) with an annual budget to
Table 2:
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spend on infrastructure and development projects. Before the reform, in-
vestments in the governorates were decided by the central ministries, e.g.
the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture. This procedure used to
be rather arbitrary, as most investment decisions were based on the person-
alist patron-client relations of the ministerial staff. An official document of
2013 lists central infrastructure projects in the governorates, illustrating
the unequal regional distribution of central investments (see Table 4). Al-
though the list does not include Amman and Aqaba, it shows that rural,
majority-Transjordanian governorates such as Ma’an and Tafilah received
up to ten times higher rates of investments per capita than the heteroge-
nous governorates Irbid and Zarqa.
Distribution of central state investments across governorates in Jordan
2013
Population Central state invest-
ments (in million USD)
Per capita (in USD)
Irbid 1,506,900 6.4 4.27
Mafraq 468,200 6.6 14.14
Jerash 201,800 6.4 31.95
Ajloun 149,900 6.6 43.76
Amman 3,411,200 n.a. n.a.
Balqa' 418,600 6.2 14.91
Zarqa 1,161,900 6.8 5.82
Ma'daba 161,100 6.4 39.45
Karak 269,500 6.3 23.52
Ma'an 122,700 6.4 52.23
Tafilah 82,000 6.4 78.27
Aqaba 160,200 n.a. n.a.
Own calculation based on data of the General Budget Department and the Depart-
ment of Statistics Jordan for population size.
Hence, one of the official reasons for Jordan’s decentralization reform of
2015 was to equalize the distribution of central state investments between
the governorates. The decentralization law ensures an annual budget calcu-
lation for development projects based on the socio-economic details of
each governorate (for details see Vollmann et al. 2020). Table 5 lists each
governorate council’s budget from the first fiscal year of 2018 until 2020.
Table 4:
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Irbid 1,911,600 32.4 16.93 42.3 22.10 34.0 17.80
Mafraq 593,900 26.7 44.95 35.9 60.47 28.8 48.51
Jerash 256,000 21.1 82.38 28.2 110.04 23.2 90.54
Ajloun 190,200 22.3 117.13 29.6 155.51 24.2 126.99
Amman 4,327,800 48.5 11.22 64.8 14.97 53.2 12.30
Balqa' 531,000 23.1 43.50 31.7 59.68 25.3 47.56
Zarqa 1,474,000 28.6 19.42 38.7 26.28 31.8 21.54
Ma'daba 204,300 19.3 94.39 28.2 137.88 22.3 109.08
Karak 341,900 20.2 59.16 30.9 90.63 21.3 62.23
Ma'an 171,100 26.9 157.40 36.6 214.03 28.7 167.91
Tafilah 104,000 19.4 186.69 28.9 277.63 22.3 214.61
Aqaba 203,200 21.3 104.88 26.8 131.70 22.9 113.18
Total 10,309,000 30.9  42.3  33.8  
Own calculation based on data derived of the General Budget Department 2018;
2019; 2020; Department of Statistics Jordan for population size.
Table 5 illustrates that Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid receive significantly few-
er financial resources per capita than the rest of the governorates. Thus, de-
spite the positive expectations connected with the decentralization law, the
financial gap between urban heterogenous governorates and rural Tran-
sjordanian governorates remains. Additionally, one major change immedi-
ately stands out when comparing the numbers to those of 2013: The
amount of central investments to the governorates has increased signifi-
cantly. Central institutions, including ministries, are still running other
large-scale projects, but the governorate councils are newly included in the
decision-making processes on large financial sums. While this appears to
be a decisive step towards sustainable economic and infrastructural devel-
opment of the governorates, the de facto situation is different. The data of
Table 5 are based on estimated budget numbers instead of the actual final
count. Although the official final account for 2018 suggests that the gover-
norate councils’ budget was spent entirely (General Budget Department
2018), interviews with governorate council members across Jordan as well
as domestic organizations indicate otherwise: According to various
sources, only small percentages of the budget actually went into the imple-
mentation of the projects. For instance, the Zarqa governorate council was
assigned 28.6 million USD (20.3 million JOD) for 2018, but only a total of
Table 5:
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around 2 million JOD were spent on the projects it has decided on during
the entire year (Karak Castle Center for Consultation and Training 2018).
A combination of formal and informal factors may explain this gap. First-
ly, subnational council funds that have not been spent until the end of the
fiscal year are not transferable to the next year’s budget. Secondly, a highly
inefficient procurement process makes it almost impossible to finish large
projects within the same fiscal year. Hence, the rest of the implementation
must be financed by the budget of the following year (for details see
Karmel and Bohn 2020). Thirdly, a lack of commitment on behalf of the
ministries as well as corruption frequently delay or halt the implementa-
tion. It is a common practice that ministries suddenly stop the implemen-
tation of projects or no longer transfer payments to the contractors. Lastly,
the allocated budget for governorate projects is so high that most organiza-
tions on the ground simply assume that central institutions cannot afford
to spend that much money on subnational development. Our interviews
indicate major regional differences regarding the de facto implementation
of projects, but since the regime does not provide the necessary data, there
is no further proof to support these claims.
Subnational finance and the central state: High levels of central control and
clientelism
The enormous influence of the central state on subnational fiscal affairs is
present on all levels. The majority of municipalities is chronically indebted
and highly dependent on central transfers. One of the main reasons for Jor-
danian municipalities’ debt is overstaffing. Several reform initiatives since
the early 2000s have helped to re-organize and reduce the bloated munici-
pal institutions, but the situation remains problematic. In 2016, 22.6% of
Jordan’s subnational budget went into staff expenditures, which clearly ex-
ceeds the OECD average (OECD and UCLG 2019, 521). Inter alia, Zarqa
municipality officially had 4,359 employees in 2019 (MoLA 2019), which
is by far the highest number of employees amongst Jordan’s municipalities
after GAM, the Aqaba Special Economic Zone, and the Petra Regional Au-
thority4. One of the city’s former mayors was a member of Bani Hasan, the
dominant Transjordanian tribe in Zarqa. He used his position to employ
thousands of Bani Hasan members who have remained on the payroll of
4 GAM, for instance, occupied more than 22.000 employees in 2015/2016 (PEFA
2017).
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the municipality until today, most of them as shadow employees who are
salaried without actually working. In an interview, a representative of the
MoLA classified this as an unsolvable situation. It would require the min-
istry to fire at least three-quarters of the employees, which, in turn, would
prompt the majority of Bani Hasan to gather in protests in Amman until
the ministry reverses the decision. Thus, Zarqa municipality has enormous
staff costs each year (e.g. 89% of the total revenues in 2019). According to
interviews, by February 2020 Zarqa municipality had already spent its en-
tire budget for the year on staff costs. This is a convenient example for the
impact of patron-client networks on fiscal decentralization. Municipalities
may apply for loans at the Cities and Villages Development Bank (CVDB),
which is the institution that manages the municipalities’ budget since
2010. The distribution of loans by the CVDB, however, is dependent on
the mayor’s personal relationship with the Minister of Local Administra-
tion, who is a member of the CVBD’s board. Again, neopatrimonial net-
works are decisive: Controversial mayors are frequently denied loans and
are consequentially unable to provide financial support for their territory.
On the governorate level, even after the decentralization reform fiscal
matters remain under the control of central ministries. To the disappoint-
ment of domestic and international organizations – and not least to the
council members themselves – the elected governorate councils do not
have any authority over the spending of their budget. Their role is limited
to the discussion of the development presented to them by the appointed
executive council within the governorate that consists of ministerial staff.
Even the implementation of the projects is the sole responsibility of the
central ministries and their directorates within the governorate.
Fiscal decentralization in Tunisia
Development of subnational finances: Governance turnaround underway?
Spending increases without clear vision
Tunisia’s decentralization project is the only reform in our case selection
that is taking place in a transition from authoritarianism to democracy.
Since the Tunisian independence in 1956, the country’s political regimes
have tried to establish a strong central state with a predominantly national
identity. Decentralization reforms and subnational governance were
means to enforce central party rule and state security. After ousting Ben
Ali in the 2010 and 2011 uprisings that originated in Tunisia’s periphery in
Sidi Bouzid, the “new” Tunisia opted for radical change. The constitution
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of 2014 emphasizes decentralization and dedicates a whole chapter to the
subject. It was drafted under the influence of Tunisian regime outsiders
and is a clear dissociation from the old system. To spurn the infamous
Ministry of Interior, the symbol of repression both in the capital and
through its oversight of the subnational levels, decentralization was made
the responsibility of a new ministry, the Ministry of Local Affairs and Envi-
ronment. The administrative oversight in the bicephalic system (a legacy
from French rule as in Morocco), however, remains the responsibility of
the MoI. Reforms and a decentralization law were delayed until 2018, local
governments in the transition period were appointed by the center. The fu-
ture of the ambitious decentralization project in the young democracy re-
mains unknown, as severe government crises bind resources and efforts on
the national level, but all political actors remain verbally committed to the
constitution and its emphasis on subnational governance. However, the
center opted for a slow and long-term implementation (27 years) of the Lo-
cal Collectivities Code of 2018.
Data on fiscal decentralization in Tunisia are relatively rare and ambigu-
ous with significant differences in numbers between various sources.
When comparing data published by the OECD and the organization Unit-
ed Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), we see a counterintuitive devel-
opment of subnational spending in Tunisia: In 2008, Tunisia spent a mea-
gre 1.9% of its GDP, but 9.6% of its general government expenditure on
local government (UCLG 2010, 336). The uprisings jump-started a decen-
tralization discourse, but Tunisia’s local government spending slightly de-
clined to 1.6% of its GDP before the new constitution codified decentral-
ization. The spending focus had shifted even more to the central state, as
only 4.3% of general government spending were local (OECD and UCLG
2016c). The latest available UCLG data suggest an increase in 2016 to 2.1%
of GDP and 7.8% of government expenditure (OECD and UCLG 2019,
144). We witness the same trend in the local revenue development, with
2.5% of GDP or 8.2% of government revenue in 2008, 2.1% or 6.5% re-
spectively in 2012 and 2.1% or 6.4% in 2016 (OECD and UCLG 2019;
2016c; UCLG 2010). Municipal data from the Ministry of Finance, how-
ever, record a rising trend after 2018 that can be expected to increase in the
future.
We have also included the officially reported data by the Ministry of Fi-
nance for 2019. However, they have been updated between our first extrac-
tion in the end of November 2019 and February 2020. While the first ex-
traction showed similar dimensions as 2018 and is still the data presented
at the Ministry of Local Affairs and Environment, the new values show an
increase by the factor 3.2 between the MoLAE data of 2018 and the new
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data of the MoF (see Figure 8). This would indicate a surge of municipality
expenditures from 1.7% of GDP or 5.6% of public expenditure in 2018 to
6% of GDP and 17.3% of government spending in 2019. But it is unclear
how local councils should have been able to spend thrice their original an-
nual budget within one month (December 2019). This reminds us of the
importance of the issue of availability and quality of financial data in the
MENA region.5




Own calculation based on data by the MoF and the MoLAE (for 2018), no data for 2017. 
Regional disparities: Ongoing central dominance and peripheral neglect  
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Regional disparities: Ongoing central dominance and peripheral neglect
The suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid sparked the so-called
Arab Spring and reminds us of the political, economic and social dispari-
ties in Tunisia. Tunisian authoritarianism was closely connected to the
dominance of the center and coastal Sahel elites over the interior regions.
Their neopatrimonial networks concentrated political and economic pow-
er in the center. Decentralization is meant to be part of the remedy for this
problem.
Figure 8:
5 Data provided by UCLG reports slightly deviates from the data extracted from the
Tunisian MoF. Data provided by the latter is generally slightly lower. One reason
might be that reports of financial data for some municipalities was missing in the
MoF data.
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Our data show that decentralization expenditure in Tunisia is still high-
est in Tunis. Since almost 20% of the Tunisian population lives in the capi-
tal and its surrounding governorates, a concentration of funding in the
center can be expected. However, a comparison of the subnational per
capita expenditures between the different regions demonstrate a prefer-
ence for Grand Tunis and the coastal areas, where the Tunisian regime
elite originates from. The cities of the governorate Tunis spent 102 USD
per person in 2018. The spending of the surrounding and coastal gover-
norates (e.g., Ariana, Ben Arous, Monastir, Sousse, Nabeul) is much higher
than the national average of 61 USD per capita. Yet large parts of the tradi-
tionally neglected periphery spent even less, with Le Kef taking the last
place (29.7 USD pc). Kairouan (32 USD pc) and Sidi Bouzid (35 USD pc)
did not spend considerably more (see Table 6). The economic, ministerial
and many other political elites’ networks survived the fall of Ben Ali’s
regime and Tunisia’s pacted transition. Despite the official credo of “posi-
tive discrimination” subnational spending seems to favor the traditional
center and origins of Tunisia’s old neopatrimonial elites. Fiscal decentral-
ization has not overcome the center-periphery dynamics. Since subnational
spending (as of now) still makes up only a very small portion of govern-
ment expenditures, the dominance of the capital Tunis (ministries, nation-
al agencies and enterprises) and the Sahel (tourism)6 is bound to remain.





Per capita (in USD)
Tunis 1,056,247 108.5 102.71
Ariana 576,088 54.0 93.64
Ben Arous 631,842 52.7 83.40
Monastir 548,828 44.2 80.60
Sousse 674,971 48.7 72.15
Nabeul 787,920 56.3 71.48
Zaghouan 176,945 11.8 66.89
Kasserine 439,243 28.0 63.65
Tozeur 107,912 6.7 62.21
Gafsa 337,331 20.5 60.90
Table 6:
6 Tourism is the wounded backbone of the Tunisian economy. After terrorist attacks
brought down the business in 2015, the Corona pandemic of 2020 dealt another
blow to this industry and the struggling Tunisian economy. The crisis will likely
deepen the existing regional disparities (see also Dridi 2020).
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Per capita (in USD)
Sfax 955,421 56.0 58.61
Siliana 223,087 12.7 57.01
Tatouine 149,453 7.6 50.77
Kebili 156,961 7.4 47.34
Bizerte 568,219 26.8 47.20
Medenine 479,520 20.5 42.83
Manouba 379,518 15.8 41.67
Gabès 374,300 15.3 40.77
Béja 303,032 11.8 38.88
Mehdia 410,812 15.9 38.68
Jendouba 401,477 14.6 36.37
Sizi Bouzid 429,912 15.0 34.82
Kairouan 570,559 18.2 31.97
Kef 401,477 11.9 29.65
Overall 11,141,075 681.0 61.12
Own calculation based on MoLAE and Institute National de la Statistique.
Subnational finance and the central state: Underequipped local governments,
infighting ministries, cautious governors
The allocation of subnational budgets is only the first step of implement-
ing decentralization. As in Jordan and Morocco, Tunisian municipalities
lack the capacity to autonomously spend local funds. Although data are
scarce, our findings indicate that local council spending on investments
and development does often not make use of existing funds. While the city
of Tunis did manage to spend 93.26% of its planned budget for consump-
tion (council administration, salaries, etc.), only 26.3% of the planned in-
vestments were spent by the end of the year 2015. The same is true for
most municipalities in Tunisia. Sidi Bouzid, for example, spent
around 85% of the funds that were planned for consumption, but only
33% of its investment plans (own compilation of 2015 data in MoF 2020).
The capacity to raise local taxes is extremely low – as is true for other
parts of the MENA (Tarchouna 2019). The Tunisian population is reluc-
tant to pay local fees and taxes because they argue that local governance
should first improve the life of citizens. Since this is only possible by over-
coming budget deficits, a vicious circle of local fiscal deprivation exists.
The central government has long shown little interest in improving the
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municipalities’ situation, and the MoLAE has opted for an amnesty of lo-
cal fees of 2016 and prior years in 2019 (Marzouk 2019). Local tax recovery
rates lie between 7% and 20% (Kherigi 2020b, 64).
Prior to the reforms, local authorities had no autonomous fiscal powers.
But even in the new era, they are not given the chance to exercise real au-
tonomy. The restricted ability of subnational councils to raise money leads
to their prolonged dependency on the central state. In 2016, 69% of the
Tunisian subnational governments’ budgets were central grants (OECD
and UCLG 2019; Vollmann 2020, 18). Municipalities have also inherited a
shortage of human resources because of their inferior role in the ancien
régime. The local administration accounted for less than 10% of public sec-
tor employees before the 2018 decentralization law was passed (Kherigi
2020b, 55). Only 3.4% of the public expenditure on staff was spent for lo-
cal governments in 2016 (OECD and UCLG 2019). The percentage of
skilled personal is also excessively low, between 4% and 10% between dif-
ferent municipalities (Kherigi 2020b; Turki and Gana 2015). Jobs in the lo-
cal administration are not as attractive as in their national counterparts
and municipal governance suffers from widespread vacancies (Tarchouna
2019). The situation is especially grave in the newly created municipalities,
where equipment, staffing and even the provision of the council headquar-
ters have to be built up without preexisting infrastructure.
Since the newly elected Tunisian mayors are largely unfamiliar with lo-
cal administration and the new legal documents, they depend on their
head of administration for a successful management of the territory. The
secretary generals often have long experience in the public administration,
which enables them to influence the politics of the elected councils. May-
ors with experience in (local) administration seem to fare considerably bet-
ter when dealing with their staff (see chapter 4).
The current legal framework’s application has also discouraged local
councilors’ engagement with local politics. Since the mayor is the only lo-
cal councilor who receives a salary (and he or she is not allowed to work in
a different job simultaneously), many local councilors lack the resources to
fully commit to their mandates or even participate in council meetings if
they have no means of transport. This contributes to the high number of
resigning mayors and the wave of mass defections from local councils in
2019 (see chapter 4). Elected councilors are thus badly equipped to act in-
dependently from the influence of appointed governors. The governor’s
powers of oversight (tutelle) and their omnipresence in the implementa-
tion of local politics have been reduced by the Local Government Law of
2018. However, the governors are better connected and have the power to
enforce local politics, which the councils do not possess (e.g., control over
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the municipal police and deconcentrated offices of central ministries)
(Kherigi 2020a). They also are reluctant or at least cautious to relinquish
their hold of their old powers and hand the reigns to mayors and their
councils (see chapter 4).
Obstacles to meaningful fiscal and political decentralization do not end
with the relationship between elected local governments and the central
state. Problems also lie in the regional offices of ministries that tend to
have significantly less prestige than the government bodies in the capital.
They, too, are largely understaffed. In some interior regions, more than
60% of jobs in deconcentrated central state institutions are vacant. This
contributes to very low implementation rates of subnational investment
and development programs (Kherigi 2020a).
Moreover, Tunisian ministries tend not to have a culture of inter-minis-
terial cooperation. The lack of a coherent political vision and the infight-
ing of coalition partners that are political enemies have not helped either.
The creation of the MoLAE did remove the subject of decentralization
from the centripetal political agenda of the MoI. The ministry is new, rela-
tively small and thus at a disadvantage in the negotiations with other gov-
ernment branches who are necessary to implement decentralization re-
forms, such as the MoI and the Ministry of Finance (Kherigi 2020b). The
latter consider the decentralization law as of little interest for their own
policymaking and feel bound to different administrative or financial laws.
This has brought the decentralization process to a halt.
Fiscal decentralization in Egypt7
Development of subnational finances: Inefficient public service provision and
rising military presence
The Egyptian case stands out with its two major power transitions during
the past ten years. Since the foundation of the republic in 1953, making
use of decentralization in order to equalize socio-economic imbalances be-
tween Egypt’s 27 governorates has existed as a reoccurring idea (Ibrahim
2004, 12-29). But even after a decentralization discourse flourished follow-
7 The Egyptian case is only based on desk research. Due to the political situation in
Egypt and the deteriorating academic freedom, we decided not to conduct field-
work. Instead, we relied on an evaluation of existing literature, official state chan-
nels, media reports and statements of country experts.
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ing the breakdown of Mubarak’s rule in 2011, the regime’s will to genuine-
ly decentralize remained questionable (Demmelhuber and Sturm 2016).
The basic principles of the country’s current subnational governance sys-
tem under as-Sisi’s rule are captured in the constitution of 2014. It stipu-
lates a decentralized state structure and determines that Egypt’s subnation-
al governance system subdivides into three tiers with “legal personality”,
namely governorates, cities, and villages (Art. 175). But the constitution re-
mains vague about further details that organize local governance, while the
announced by-law to regulate the procedures is overdue. Currently, the
regime sets its focus on expanding the role of the military and its associat-
ed branches – politically as well as economically (see chapter 4). By 2014,
the military’s contribution to Egypt’s economic performance had reached
around 40%, but due to a lack of transparency, no detailed data are avail-
able (Roll 2014). As observers argue in the case of Egypt’s general budget,
it is reasonable to assume that the government tries to artificially scale
down the official military budget by offshoring military-related spending
to other branches. As-Sisi officially claims that the military received only
2% of the state budget and rejects reports that the army’s expenditure is
higher (Mukhtar 2020), yet it is clear that there was a significant upward
trend and that for 2019/20 the “nominal military budget was 161 per cent
higher than in 2010/11” (Kuimova 2020, 4).
Egypt, too, is a prime example for the absence of reliable data on fiscal
decentralization in the MENA. Official data record subnational spending
in the form of “subnational administration”. It is unclear, which sectors
and public functions are included in these comparatively high numbers.
From 1990 to 2019, between 9% and 17% of Egypt’s public expenditures
went into local administration, reaching a peak in the fiscal year of
2014/2015 (see Figure 9). The calculation includes subnational expendi-
tures, but also all ministerial costs and those of other involved entities on
the central and the subnational levels, which explains the comparatively
high amounts. More than three quarters of the allocated subnational bud-
get are spent on salaries each year. Characteristically for neopatrimonial
rule, Egyptian local officials have no role in the employment process, be-
cause all staffing decisions are exclusively taken by central entities in Cairo.
A certain percentage of local budgets (6% in 2011) is allocated for central
state expenditures on the local level as determined by the central authori-
ties for specific sectors. Only a minor amount (around one fifth of the bud-
get in 2011) is left for expenditures of the local units (Boex 2011). Alto-
gether, this has often rendered the impact of local expenditures on subna-
tional service provision and development inefficient, as the allocation re-
sponds to the interests of central ministries rather than the needs of the
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citizens (Tobbala 2019, 17). Already prior to as-Sisi’s rule, Egypt’s public
sector was characterized by its inefficiency and high degrees of formal and
informal central control.
Development of Egyptian state expenditures and share of subnational
state expenditures 1990-2019, in billion USD
25 
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Own calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance Egypt.
Regional disparities: Economic hubs, mega projects and the rest of the country
Official documents further break down the financial balance sheets into
the shares of each of Egypt’s 27 governorates. In order to illustrate regional
imbalances, we calculated the per capita expenditures for each governorate
for the fiscal year of 2017/2018 (see Table 7). Overall, subnational expendi-
tures amounted to 7 billion USD in 2017/2018 for a population of 94.8
million, which accounts for 10.2% of Egypt’s total state expenditures for
that year. This percentage is higher than the shares of the other case stud-
ies, but has probably been artifically inflated. This is likely due to the fact
that Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia report financial data of subnational
councils, whereas Egypt reports an obscure amalgamation of data under
the label “local administration”.
ig re 9:
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Expenditures per governorate in Egypt in 2017/2018




Per capita (in USD)
Kalyobiya 5,627,420 328.7 58.42
Suez 728,180 76.0 104.38
Cairo 9,539,673 485.4 50.88
Alexandria 5,163,750 328.5 63.62
Sharqeia 7,163,824 560.7 78.27
Damietta 1,496,765 165.1 110.33
Kafr El Shiekh 3,362,185 274.5 81.63
The Red Sea 359,888 72.8 202.40
El-Beheira 6,171,613 433.8 70.30
Assiut 4,383,289 320.6 73.15
Ismailia 1,303,993 139.5 106.98
New Valley 241,247 94.7 392.68
Qena 3,164,281 266.4 84.18
South Sinai 102,018 50.0 490.20
Sohag 4,967,409 341.7 68.79
Fayoum 3,596,954 207.5 57.70
Bani Souwaif 3,154,100 214.1 67.87
Port-Said 749,371 113.8 151.92
Matrouh 425,624 106.5 250.23
Menia 5,497,095 357.9 65.11
Dakahliya 6,492,381 555.0 85.48
Aswan 1,473,975 187.8 127.42
North Sinai 450,328 138.4 307.32
Monofiya 4,301,601 371.8 86.44
Giza 8,632,021 320.9 37.18
Luxor 1,250,209 125.5 100.41
Al Gharbya 4,999,633 460.0 92.00
Own calculation based on Census data 2017, data of the Ministy of Finance Egypt
and UNFPA (2018).
South Sinai, New Valley, North Sinai, Matrouh, and Red Sea record the
highest per capita expenditures. All five governorates are of strategic im-
portance to the Egyptian regime, either politically or economically. While
all five governorates experienced an increase in expenditures after
2010/2011, the expenditure growth for North and South Sinai can partly
Table 7:
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be interpreted as response to increasing unrest, criminal activities, and ter-
rorist attacks of jihadists and occasionally associated Bedouins that have
been marginalized by Egyptian regimes for decades. This challenge is espe-
cially problematic because of the Sinai Peninsula’s strategic importance for
Egypt. It is the eastern gateway into the country, rich in natural resources,
and a relevant destination for tourism. New Valley and Matrouh are both
close to the Libyan border and of strategic and economic importance as
part of the country’s strategy to secure economic development via large-
scale national projects (Roll 2014). For instance, the government is build-
ing a power plant in Matrouh – backed by a 25 billion USD loan from
Russia – that is expected to deliver about 20% of the country’s annual elec-
trical power production when finished. In the same governorate, the
regime opened a huge military base in 2017, which is meant to respond to
strategic threats from state collapse in Libya (Mohamed Naguib Military
Base) (The Arab Weekly 2017). New Valley is strategically important for
the development of Upper Egypt with the New Valley Project (Toshka
Project) at the forefront. It is supposed to foster agricultural and industrial
production – a project that has been in the making for a long time (initiat-
ed by Mubarak in 1997), but has only recently been revived by as-Sisi
(Demmelhuber and Roll 2009; Mada Masr 2016). Finally, the Red Sea is
one of the world’s most frequented shipping routes, as it links the Suez
Canal with the Gulf of Aden and thus is one of Egypt’s most important
economic hubs.
Verme et al. suggest that the financial gaps between urban and rural ar-
eas in Egypt are less visible than the discrepancies which appear when we
compare Egypt’s four main cities – Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez
– with the rest of the country (Verme et al. 2014). Using the latest available
data of 2015, the World Bank classifies four regions in upper Egypt, name-
ly Sohag, Assiut, Menia, and Qena, as those governorates with the largest
shares of poor and vulnerable populations and the smallest shares of mid-
dle-class population. The same report classifies Cairo, Alexandria, Port
Said, and Suez as those regions with the smallest shares of poor and vulner-
able populations and the largest share of the middle-class populace (World
Bank 2019). A comparison of the per capita expenditures of the eight gov-
ernorates in 2017/2018 makes the fiscal gaps visible (see Figure 10).
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Per capita expenditures of Egypt’s four governorates with the highest
share of poor citizens (Quena, Menia, Assiut, Sohag) compared to the
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Suez and Port-Said fall out of line with exorbitantly higher expenditures
than the poor governorates, but also compared to the spending of Cairo
and Alexandria. Suez and Port-Said have always belonged to Egypt’s histor-
ical, cultural, and economic hotspots. But with the inauguration of one of
as-Sisi’s megaprojects in 2015, which created a new canal that runs in par-
allel to the Suez Canal (the Suez Canal Corridor Area Project) to further
develop the zone into an international trading and industrial hub, the
cities of Suez, P rt-Said, and Ismailia receive even m re financial tt nti n
from the center (Al Arabiya English 2015).
A similar picture appears when we analyze the revenues of Egyptian
governorates. Subnational institutions in Egypt are highly dependent on
central transfers. Although they are allowed to generate their own rev-
enues, the sums that are nominally generated on the local level are in truth
largely loans from the center (International Budget Partnership and Bud-
getary and Human Rights Observatory 2015). Although the publicly avail-
able data on local revenues are scarce, we compiled the per capita revenues
of each governorate between 2013 and 2019. Figure 11 depicts the ac-
counts of the four main cities, Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez, as
well s th se of Soh g, Assiut, Menia, and Qena (the four governorates
with the largest shares of poor and vulnerable populations). The compari-
son suggests a picture similar to the analysis of subnational expenditures.
Again, Suez and Port-Said are the front-runners in terms of revenue alloca-
Figure 10:
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tion, especially during the time of the construction of the new canal be-
tween 2013/14 and 2015/16.
Per capita revenues of Egypt’s four main cities (Suez, Cairo, Alexan-
dria, Port-Said) compared to the four governorates with the highest
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Subnational finance and the central state: High central control and hierarchy
As long as there is no new local administration law that further specifies
fiscal relations, subnational financial affairs are guided by two main fac-
tors: (1) The strong presence of central control and (2) the hierarchy of lo-
cal administrative units. Both factors reinforce the dominance of neopatri-
monial networks. Over the p st few decades, decisions on local bu t
generation and expenditures remained highly centralized with margi al
inclusion of subnational actors. The constitution of 2014 specifies that
each local unit has an independent financial budget whose “resources in-
clude, in addition to the resources allocated to them by the state, original
and additional taxes and fees of a local nature” (Art. 178). Although the lo-
cal units prepare their budget plans and requests, the line ministries de
facto take the final decision. Traditionally, the process of budget allocation
relies on negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and different pub-
lic entities (Barsoum 2018). The hierarchy makes sure that each adminis-
trative unit is monitored by the respective upper level, which in turn pro-
Figure 11:
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vides resources and instructions (Boex 2011). This also affects the fiscal af-
fairs of local units: “The financial body is the governorate and it shall take
charge of preparing the project of the governorate budget including
projects of the local units’ budgets within its scope (Art. 120, law
43/1979)”. Thus, all requests for expenditures at the lower administrative
units must be collected and passed up to the governorate level, where they
are added to an annual budget request for the whole governorate (Art. 120
– 124, law 43/1979). Eventually, the Ministry of Finance determines the lo-
cal budget plans by taking into consideration the requests of the gover-
norates as well as those of central ministries and other involved central en-
tities (Boex 2011).
Way to go? – Long way to go: Careful progress in Morocco and Tunisia,
stagnation in Jordan and Egypt
The era of fiscal decentralization has not yet arrived in the MENA region.
While all four case studies use the language of decentralization and subna-
tional finance, meaningful fiscal decentralization has yet to evolve from
half-hearted legal changes and official rhetoric. Though comparable and
reliable data are still rare, we can detect some trajectories in absolute
spending when we compare the subnational fiscal situation of Egypt, Jor-
dan, Morocco, and Tunisia before and after the Arab uprisings. All coun-
tries increased subnational state expenditures since the 1990s – not least
due to IMF structural adjustment programs – but only Morocco and to
some extent Tunisia record significant progress after 2011 (see Tables 8 and
9). Some of the higher expenditures can be ascribed to general government
spending sprees in response to public protest, but the Moroccan and
Tunisian reforms bear the potential to further increase fiscal decentraliza-
tion in the future. Tunisia’s path to decentralization is inconclusive as of
now, but it suggests a radical break with the hyper-centralization during
Ben Ali’s regime. In Jordan and Egypt, however, the usual annual fluctua-
tions of subnational expenditures remained in place even after 2011.
Egypt’s president as-Sisi is still in the process of consolidating his rule (see
e.g. Noll 2019) and has blocked all meaningful implementation of decen-
tralization, and above all the implementation of fiscal decentralization. As-
Sisi’s focus is set on his mega projects as well as on improving the political
and economic role of the military, rather than on local governance re-
forms. In Jordan, the decentralization law of 2015 had a disappointingly
low impact on fiscal decentralization. The reform did not significantly in-
crease subnational state expenditures, nor did the autonomy of local and
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regional councils allow them to manage their financial affairs. Far-reach-
ing fiscal decentralization could have significant impact on pre-existing
neopatrimonial networks and ties between the center and the local level.
At the present, the Jordanian regime is not willing to risk such changes.
Subnational spending as percentage of GDP
2007/2008 2013 2016
Egypt 4.6 3.38 4.79
Jordan 3.5 2.1 2.3
Morocco 2.2 3.7 3.4
Tunisia 1.9 1.6 2.1
OECD and UCLG (2016a; 2016c); UCLG (2010); OECD and UCLG (2019; 2016b).
Subnational spending as percentage of General Government Spending
2007/2008 2013 2016
Egypt 10.9 13.410 14.911
Jordan 9.6 5.8 8.0
Morocco 7.6 11.8 11.8
Tunisia 9.6 4.3 7.8
OECD and UCLG (2016a; 2016c); UCLG (2010); OECD and UCLG (2019; 2016b).
Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco have all placed emphasis on the regional lev-
el as part of their de jure reforms, but only Morocco has sowed the seed for
sustainable regionalization. This change is beginning to show in the finan-
cial endowments of the Moroccan regions, though the bulk of subnational
spending, revenue generation, and staffing remains at the local level. If
Morocco plans for the regions to be not only investment hubs for the cen-
tral state but autonomous actors, Morocco needs to further accelerate its
regional fiscal decentralization including human resources. Egypt is a
more ambiguous case than the other three countries. Official data suggest
comparatively high subnational state expenditures, without any trace of an
implementation of its decentralization agenda after two power transitions
since 2011. Fiscal decentralization data of most countries list the decentral-
ized institutions’ budgets, but Egypt only records an aggregated number
Table 8:
Table 9:
8 Data point for 2012/2013, own calculation based on MoF and IMF data.
9 Data point for 2015/2016, own calculation based on MoF and IMF data.
10 Data point for 2012/2013, own calculation based on MoF and IMF data.
11 Data point for 2015/2016, own calculation based on MoF and IMF data.
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for subnational administration. While deconcentration on its own would
be a viable element of analysis, it is not clear if subnational administration
only sums up deconcentrated services or if the numbers also include other
state positions.
Regional disparities are central to the decentralization agendas of all
four regimes. Our analysis suggests that decentralization is used in differ-
ent ways to target the center-periphery nexus. Surprisingly, Tunisia still
seems to uphold its general favoritism of the capital and the Sahel, the tra-
ditional origin of its political elites, when we compare per capita expendi-
tures of local councils. While Morocco’s central northern regions also
seem to be the continuous winners of subnational council expenditures in
absolute terms, the per capita analysis shows a more nuanced picture:
Strategically important peripheral regions such as the Western Sahara or
the conflict-prone Oriental Region spend more financial state resources
per capita than the northern center. Political redistribution also occurs in
Jordan: Zarqa, Irbid, and the capital Amman have the largest percentage of
Palestinian communities amongst all Jordanian governorates. Our evalua-
tion illustrates that majority-Transjordanian rural governorates, which are
traditionally connected to the regime, receive larger amounts per capita
than Zarqa and Irbid, the two largest and most urbanized governorates af-
ter Amman. As Jordan’s economic powerhouse, Amman receives equal or
even smaller amounts of per capita financial resources than majority-Tran-
sjordanian governorates. In this respect, it is noticeable that unlike the oth-
er municipalities, Greater Amman Municipality and Aqaba Special Econo-
mic Zone Authority are under direct supervision of the Prime Minister.
Egypt’s data, though very different in its content, suggests relatively little
local administration spending on the capital Cairo, while poor gover-
norates or regions of military interest, such as the Sinai Peninsula, are over-
represented with regard to per capita spending. Our per capita analysis also
supports the above ranking of fiscal decentralization in the MENA: Moroc-
co spent an average of 130.79 USD per inhabitant on decentralization (all
subnational governments, 2019), Jordan follows with 92.92 USD per capita
(201612, municipalities), and Egypt with 74.87 USD per capita (2017/18).
Tunisia is at the rear end with 61.12 USD per capita in 2015, though the
sum is likely to have increased since. Due to a lack of data and the limits of
comparability of the Egyptian data, the years of reference vary in this com-
parison. We should thus be cautious with rash conclusions beyond illus-
trating a trend.
12 Calculation based on 2017 population data, thus likely slightly overrepresented.
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Our analysis also demonstrated that fiscal decentralization in the MENA
suffers from high dependencies on central state transfers, weak subnational
revenue generation, and problems with (local) tax collection. Combined
with strong administrative oversight and general reservations of central ac-
tors and ministries towards subnational entities, the autonomy of subna-
tional governments is low in all countries. Both overstaffing (Jordan,
Egypt) and understaffing (Tunisia, Moroccan regions) occur in our cases
and negatively affect the subnational governments’ capacity to work and
invest. Central actors and initiatives dominate the public sphere and most
projects depend on the cooperation of subnational actors with the regime
or central actors. The cases of Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan suggest that
subnational governments fail to spend fully even the small amounts they
are provided with.
Subnational governments thus often seem ill-equipped to contribute to
the success of decentralization reforms in a significant way. An increase of
human and financial resources as well as implementation capacities are
crucial for successful subnational governance, but our four cases have so
far failed to meet these requirements. Strong political will of the central
regimes is necessary to move reform projects forward. Since the four coun-
tries are lower- to middle-income countries without full-fledged rent
economies, increased financial commitment in any public sector is prob-
lematic. Public treasuries are often stretched thin and decentralization puts
even greater strain on state funds. Further development of fiscal decentral-
ization thus depends on far-reaching structural reforms and reallocations
of resources from the top-heavy ministries down to subnational councils or
deconcentrated ministerial branches. Without a doubt, this would sorely
test established neopatrimonial networks and the political will of MENA
regimes to decentralize.
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Thinking and Working Politically?




This chapter builds on recent works on decentralization in the MENA re-
gion and extends the analysis to the role of external aid donors in decen-
tralization reforms in Morocco and Tunisia (see Demmelhuber et al. 2020;
Vollmann et al. 2020; Vollmann 2020). To do so, I build on the definitions
and detailed accounts of the nature of neopatrimonialism in the MENA re-
gion, in order to focus on the donors’ own diagnoses of the problems that
their programs aim to solve. I furthermore aim to assess the extent to
which donors are “politically aware” of the design and implementation of
their programs, as well as their potential to disrupt entrenched political
and administrative interests, and open up spaces for bottom-up civic en-
gagement and scrutiny.2
By focusing on only two donors in two countries with five program/
project case studies, the chapter illustrates Berthin’s (2018, 6) argument
that aid support does not operate in a linear continuum, but is rather de-
pendent on several contextual variables and incentives. In other words, the
form aid takes on and the mode it is delivered through matters greatly.
6.
1 I would like to thank all the interviewees for their time and useful feedback on an
earlier version of this chapter, and Natalie Margossian for her excellent research as-
sistance. I am also very grateful to Erik Vollmann and Thomas Demmelhuber for
their continued encouragements to complete this chapter, as well as their and
Roland Sturm’s very constructive comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the support from colleagues at the Center of Exper-
tise on Global Governance at The Hague University of Applied Sciences.
2 In general, this area of research does not seem to have been much explored empiri-
cally in the decentralization literature. See Bunk (2018) for an exception and excel-
lent example on the role of donors in the decentralization process in Mozambique.
Dickovick (2013) provides a comprehensive theoretical account of foreign aid and
decentralization. The most recent evaluation of World Bank support to decentral-
ization is World Bank (2008).
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This is particularly relevant regarding the support for decentralized gover-
nance, which is a highly sensitive political issue. As Aliriza (2018, 39) ob-
serves for Tunisia’s decentralization reform, “the degree to which power is
devolved in the framework of decentralization is a matter of politics, con-
testation, and negotiation rather than any top-down, technocratic, discrete
policy roadmap”. Indeed – as Sturm and Demmelhuber put forward in
this volume – the existence of (informal) neopatrimonial networks as well
as of patronage-based relations of dependence and their interplay with for-
mal politics, entails that normative goals of decentralization are rarely, if
ever, achieved. This chapter builds on the assumption common to the oth-
er chapters of this volume: Fiscal decentralization is used as a strategic tool
by central-level neopatrimonial networks to provide incentives that ensure
the loyalty of regional and local elites, which leads to an entanglement of
central, regional, and local elite networks.
Since the 1980s, decentralization reforms have been part of neoliberal
public sector reforms promoted by the World Bank and the IMF. How-
ever, these reforms mostly comprised the delegation of tasks and powers to
subnational branches of central state ministries or other appointed officials
(a process known as administrative decentralization or deconcentration),
rather than to elected subnational governments. Only the latter constitutes
political decentralization (Bergh 2012a; Harb and Atallah 2015; Vollmann
2020).
Clearly, the Arab uprisings originated in socio-economic grievances,
which resulted from long-standing regional disparities within many
MENA countries. Both the MENA regimes that survived the uprisings and
those that newly emerged after the protests subsided saw decentralization
reforms as a possibility to address these grievances and to establish or in-
crease their legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. In addition, Western
donors, including the IMF and the World Bank, were left discouraged
from previous attempts at democracy promotion that had deteriorated into
civil war (e.g. Syria) or failed statehood (e.g. Libya, Yemen), and believed
decentralization reforms to be a less invasive possibility for reform (Voll-
mann 2020, 16; Demmelhuber et al. 2020, 504).
As a result, following the new constitution in 2011, major decentraliza-
tion laws were passed in Morocco in 2015. Regional and local elections
took place the same year. In Tunisia, a new constitution was adopted in
2014. Extensive decentralization laws were passed and local elections were
held in 2018. In both countries, these processes were and still are support-
ed by several multilateral and bilateral donors, such as the World Bank,
UNDP, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (the
German Agency for International Cooperation – GIZ), and USAID.
Sylvia I. Bergh
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However, there is rising concern that such donor cooperation might
help stabilize authoritarian regimes, as has occurred in the area of interna-
tional democracy promotion (Van Hüllen 2019, 883). Indeed, research has
shown that external donors focus mainly on technical issues and ignore
the political instrumentalization of formal structures of decentralization
by domestic elites. They thereby may unwittingly contribute to fostering
clientelism (Bunk 2018, 328, 331).3 As Van Hüllen observes, studies of au-
thoritarian regime stability and change already flourished before the Arab
uprisings. While they provide important insights into the internal dynam-
ics of authoritarianism, they rarely include the interaction with external ac-
tors (Van Hüllen 2019, 871).4 This chapter thus aims to contribute to fill-
ing the knowledge gap around the international dimension of center-pe-
riphery relations in (semi-)authoritarian states.
If we accept the premise that decentralization processes are inherently
political and that donor support may (unwittingly) contribute to authori-
tarian survival by extending neopatrimonial clientelist networks, then it is
relevant to know to what extent donors are aware of and are able to navi-
gate these dynamics. We ask to what extent they are Thinking and Work-
ing Politically (TWP). TWP refers to “politically informed programming”,
i.e. the design of development interventions that reflect and respond to the
wider political context and are embedded in local and regional realities
(Dasandi et al. 2016, 1).5 In particular, we want to know whether donor
programs are based on some form of political economy of decentralization
(PED) analysis6. In its Independent Evaluation Group review of decentral-
ization interventions, the World Bank (2008) emphasized the need to es-
3 Bunk (2018, 328) goes on to say that “domestic elites in turn perceive external
donors as acting informal, in the sense of side-lining formal democratic structures,
such as the parliament. This perceived legitimation deficit of donors may con-
tribute consciously or unconsciously to resistance to externally introduced democ-
ratization by domestic elites.” While the aspect of donors’ legitimation deficit is
very relevant, it lies outside the scope of this article.
4 Van Hüllen (2019, 871) here refers to Bellin (2012); Burnell and Schlumberger
(2010); Schlumberger (2007); Volpi (2017); and von Soest (2015).
5 As Dasandi et al. (2016, 1) note, there has been considerable interest in and debate
on “thinking and working politically” (TWP) over the past decade, principally
with reference to the programs supported by foreign aid donors (Andrews 2015;
Booth and Unsworth 2014; Carothers and de Gramont 2013; Denney and Domin-
go 2017; Hout 2012; Hudson and Leftwich 2014; Rocha Menocal 2014; Whaites et
al. 2015; Yanguas and Hulme 2015).
6 According to Eaton et al. (2011, 5), “political economy analysis is concerned with
the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of
power and wealth among different groups and individuals, and the processes that
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tablish clear political ownership prior to engagement. This goes beyond
“ticking the box” of having adopted a national decentralization policy or
strategy and appreciates that ownership and “political will” are consider-
ably more complex (Eaton et al. 2011, 61-62).7
According to Fritz and Levy (2014, 3), in the late 2000s, Political Econo-
my Analysis (PEA) by the World Bank (as part of the Bank’s Governance
and Anticorruption strategy and financially supported by several European
donor agencies) developed from being an unusual measure commissioned
by a forward-thinking team within the organization, to becoming a rou-
tine discussion point for proposed operations. Interestingly, a review of
eight carefully selected case studies revealed that despite the diversity of
both country settings and problems under consideration, the role of clien-
telism and the significance of incentives on managing political support
was a common theme for all of them (ibid., 8).
I thus derive three research questions which I will be explore in this
chapter. Firstly, to what extent were the main features of the political econ-
omy of decentralization (including fiscal aspects and neopatrimonial net-
works) taken into account when the programs were designed? Secondly, to
what extent was the staff implementing the programs aware of these politi-
cal economy aspects, and to what extent did the implementation of their
programs challenge or consolidate neopatrimonial networks? Thirdly, to
what extent are donor interventions coordinated in order to minimize the
risk of fragmentation and duplication, as well as of national stakeholders
cleverly “playing off” the various donors against each other in order to
maximize the financial benefits without committing to fundamentally
challenging the elite’s vested interests? In line with other chapters in this
volume, I adopt a broad conceptualization of neopatrimonialism that in-
cludes phenomena commonly observed in (semi)authoritarian and transi-
tion regimes, such as clientelism, corruption, co-optation of local elites,
create, sustain, and transform these relationships over time”. When it comes to
PED analysis, at least four major issues should be considered: first, the initial con-
text and motivations for decentralization reform; second, the key actors involved in
decentralization—politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens—and the incentives that
condition their behavior with respect to reform design and implementation; third,
the current stage of reform and its trajectory as it has unfolded since the initial de-
cision to decentralize; and fourth, the role and incentives of key external develop-
ment partners with respect to decentralization, both individually and collectively
(Eaton et al. 2011, 7-8).
7 As Dickovick (2013, 10) points out, central government actors’ “choice” to decen-
tralize reflects an incentive to decentralize, not so-called “political will” (for an ex-
cellent critical conceptual discussion of political will, see Hudson et al. (2018)).
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elite capture of public goods, election fraud and vote-buying, and opening
up controlled spaces for political competition (to facilitate elite rotation,
balancing power relations, etc.).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: The next two sec-
tions discuss the case study selection, the research methods and limita-
tions, respectively. Short backgrounds to the decentralization reforms in
Morocco and Tunisia, as well as brief introductions of the case study pro-
grams and projects will follow. The core of the chapter is structured
around the presentation and discussion of the findings related to each of
the three research questions. The final section concludes this contribution.
Case study selection
The case studies were selected based on an initial inventory of donor pro-
grams to support decentralization in various countries of the MENA re-
gion that hosted projects by the World Bank, the GIZ, and the UNDP.8 I
limited the analysis to World Bank and GIZ programs and projects in Mo-
rocco and Tunisia, given that these external actors’ involvements are sub-
stantial and comparable in terms of their structure and orientation regard-
ing multilateral versus bilateral, loans versus grants, and investment loans
versus technical assistance aid modalities. Morocco and Tunisia are also the
most advanced countries in the region when it comes to decentralization
reforms, yet they exhibit different post-Arab spring trajectories. Table 1
presents an overview of the five case studies discussed in this chapter.9 Un-
fortunately, the GIZ’s project “Support for decentralization in Tunisia”10
could not be included, as interviews did not take place in time.
8 The GIZ is strictly speaking not a donor but an implementing agency for techni-
cal cooperation. When it comes to German development cooperation, it is more
correct to refer to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (known as BMZ) as the donor (Pers. Comm. Interviewee 3 on 31
March 2021). Hence, I sometimes use the term “external actor” rather than
“donor” in this chapter when referring to the GIZ.
9 Note that the Casablanca Municipal Support PforR loan is discussed as part of the
Municipal Performance program. The additional financing loan for the Urban
Development and Local Government Program for Tunisia is not treated as a sepa-
rate program.
10 See GIZ (2021d). This project provides legal advice on how to implement the
constitution in terms of decentralization, and advice to sectoral ministries on how
to decentralize their services to local and regional levels (Interviewee 2). Between
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Overview of program/project case studies11
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2012 -2016, the GIZ project “Decentralisation and support to subnational govern-
ment” was also implemented, see evaluation report (GIZ 2017).








12 Pers. Comm. Interviewee 3 on 31 March 2021.
13 Pers. Comm. Interviewee 4 on 31 March 2021.
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The two World Bank case studies were chosen in particular due to their
considerable size in terms of loan amounts. They moreover directly aim to
significantly change resource allocations to local governments and reduce
financial oversight by the center, which are key elements of potentially dis-
rupting patrimonial elite networks (see Demmelhuber et al. 2020). They
also represent examples of the new World Bank Program-for-Results
(PforR) instrument launched in 2012, which is rapidly becoming a signifi-
cant financing mechanism.15
Under PforR, disbursements are conditional on “results”. The instru-
ment intends to improve the effectiveness of service delivery programs and
14 This number includes the municipalities in which the main project activities took
place, but does not include the number of municipalities in which single activi-
ties were implemented, such as support for website creation and support by sup-
plying sanitary equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic. For an interactive
map, see UMap (2021).
15 Runde (2015) argues convincingly that the rise of the PforR instrument is due to
the changed global donor landscape (including the rise of China) and the need
for the World Bank to reassert its relevance given that an increasing number of
developing countries now enjoy access to global capital markets. The PforR in-
strument means that the World Bank can hold a position in development cooper-
ation as one partner among many. For instance, rather than building 5 km of new
roads that strictly adhere to long-standing labor and procurement guidelines,
while having no influence on the 495 km of roads built by other actors, such as
China, the World Bank can offer its expertise and insist on some adherence to its
standards for the construction of 500 km of roads. It can thus overall make a
much larger impact. The largest PforR portfolios by project count are in Ethiopia,
Tanzania, Morocco, India and Pakistan (see World Bank 2019b, 4, see also graph
on p. 25). The PforR in the amount of US$300 million to support Morocco’s Na-
tional Initiative for Human Development 2 (2012-2016) received satisfactory
ratings on all major criteria (ibid., 12).
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to bridge a perceived instrument gap between investment loans (IL) best
suited to large capital projects, and quick-disbursing policy loans (DPLs)
designed to encourage policy reforms. While ILs must comply with a stan-
dard set of social and environmental as well as fiduciary safeguard policies,
PforR operations assess country safeguard systems and, where necessary,
seek to strengthen them rather than to segregate Bank funds into a special
pool administered through Bank processes. In this way, the project (loan)
can be leveraged to build wider institutional capacity and improve the ef-
fectiveness of the entire program, which is typically co-funded by the gov-
ernment and other donors. Early indications are that PforRs have indeed
increased attention to the importance of results frameworks and encour-
aged partnerships and client government ownership through the focus on
shared goals (Gelb and Hashmi 2014, 1, 3-4).16 As Runde (2015) explains,
linking funding to results gives political capital to reform-minded tech-
nocrats and encourages institutional entrepreneurs to form coalitions with
more senior leaders, who would otherwise favor preservation of the status
quo. For this type of loan, it is thus even more important for World Bank
staff to be TWP, especially in (semi)authoritarian and transition contexts,
such as Morocco and Tunisia.
I have chosen the German agency for international cooperation (GIZ) as
the second external actor to be analyzed in this chapter, given its signifi-
cant (mainly technical assistance) support to decentralization reforms in
the two countries. GIZ conceives itself as a professional and apolitical
agency that implements German or multilaterally financed projects
(Holthaus 2019, 1220; this was confirmed by Interviewee 2). The fact that
it only administers grants rather than loans also make it an interesting case
for comparison with the World Bank programs. Possibly, these two differ-
ent aid modalities open up different types of opportunities for TWP.17
16 There is no room here to discuss the PforR instrument in more detail, but rele-
vant questions arise around program credibility in face of pressure to disburse,
the independence of monitors hired by the country or by the Bank, and the desir-
ability of publishing results linked to the Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs),
which would allow civil society to monitor the veracity of assessments (see Gelb
and Hashmi 2014, 7, 16-19; see also Runde 2015). For an Early-Stage Assessment
of the PforR instrument by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group
(IEG), see IEG (2016).
17 Although it is tempting to compare the World Bank and GIZ in terms of their
leverage vis-à-vis the recipient government, especially when it comes to political
economy-related conditionality, such a comparison would not be appropriate.
Rather than only looking at the GIZ, one would have to compare the World
Bank with the overall portfolio of German development cooperation in the de-
Sylvia I. Bergh
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Research methods and limitations
This chapter relies on a critical reading of the Project Appraisal Docu-
ments for the two World Bank loans (as well as related documents includ-
ing implementation progress reports), and of a limited number of docu-
ments received from GIZ as well as online interviews with five donor offi-
cials conducted during September-December 2020.18 All interviews lasted
approximately one hour, except for one 30 minutes long interview. In line
with the research questions, the interviews aimed at a) getting more infor-
mation on the case study programs and projects, and their Theory of
Change generally; b) assessing the extent to which the design and imple-
mentation of the programs and projects show an awareness of political
economy considerations; and c) evaluating the extent to which there is co-
ordination between donors. In order to enable them to give their candid
views on the topic, the interviewees were promised anonymity and are
hence only referred to as “Interviewee 1”, “Interviewee 2” etc. in the text.
They were also given the opportunity to review a pre-final version of this
chapter. Apart from providing valuable additional information, the five in-
terviewees in some instances requested paraphrasing or nuancing some of
the direct quotations.
This study is limited in several ways. First, research on this topic is re-
stricted by the fact that PEA is frequently treated as sensitive and confiden-
tial, including by national governments themselves. These are reluctant to
open any critical analysis to the public domain, especially on sensitive top-
ics, such as individuals’ or groups’ control over large swaths of economic
activity, or politicians’ use of public funds to repay their electoral cam-
paign supporters. In turn, World Bank (and other donor) country teams
face a strong incentive to maintain a good relationship with the respective
governments in order to avoid programs being stalled (Fritz and Levy
2014, 20). Second, representing the views of only a few donor officials, this
chapter omits the important local perspectives of these reforms and the
centralization sector for both countries. For Tunisia, the latter consists of several
decentralization projects as well as grants and loans provided by the German De-
velopment Bank (known as KfW). It is a portfolio of several 100 million Euros
under auspicies of the BMZ (Pers. Comm. Interviewee 2 on 31 March 2021). See
also the section on “The GIZ projects in Tunisia” for more details.
18 Hence, the interviews in Morocco did not discuss the recent diplomatic tensions
between Morocco and Germany. For details, see for example Bachir (2021).
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donors’ roles in them.19 This chapter moreover does not engage in the dis-
cussion on possible ideological drivers of decentralization reforms promot-
ed by the World Bank.20 However, despite these limitations, this chapter
can offer a new and empirical perspective on donor involvement in decen-
tralization reforms in North Africa, thereby adding to the insights present-
ed in the other chapters of this volume.
A brief background to decentralization in Morocco21
Morocco has three levels of local government: regions, provinces (in rural
areas) and prefectures (in urban areas), and urban and rural municipalities
(communes in French). All local authorities are subject to the supervision
(tutelle) of an officer of the Ministry of the Interior who represents state au-
thority and ultimately reports to the King. Municipalities were first estab-
lished in 1960. They did not have extensive powers or resources until 2002,
when the Third Municipal Charter – and its amended version that became
effective in 2009 – expanded their responsibilities, clarified their role in re-
ducing poverty and exclusion, and included the possibility of entering into
partnerships with local associations. The regime (known as the makhzen,
i.e. the palace and its clients) responded almost immediately to the 2011
protests by announcing a draft constitution. Its first article states that “the
territorial organization of the Kingdom is decentralized” and introduces
the principle of “advanced regionalization” to make regions, in addition to
municipalities, key levels of local government.22 However, it took until
2015 for three Organic Laws (OLs) to be issued, which specified and opera-
tionalized the spirit of the 2011 Constitution at the municipal, regional,
and provincial/prefectural levels. The region has no authority over the
provinces/prefectures and municipalities – the three separate OLs are (de-
liberately?) ambiguous. This allows the King to arbitrate between various
19 For in-depth accounts of the local perceptions and cultural framings of the decen-
tralization reform in Tunisia, see Salman (2017) and Yousfi (2019).
20 See Salman (2017) for the argument that the World Bank is pushing decentraliza-
tion reforms as they ultimately enable municipalities to become creditworthy,
which means that they could engage in public-private partnerships with the pri-
vate sector and eventually take on loans from the World Bank to finance their in-
vestments without sovereign guarantees.
21 This section is mainly based on Bergh (2020), see also Bergh (2017) and chapter 4
(this volume) for a much more detailed description.
22 For an analysis of the advanced regionalization process, see Bergh (2021).
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power centers and interests, significantly reducing the accountability be-
tween levels and towards the citizens.
Compared to the 2009 Municipal Charter, the powers of the municipal
council have barely been modified by the 2015 law. However, there now
exists the possibility for citizens and local associations to submit petitions
to the municipalities, and provisions to increase the transparency of mu-
nicipal affairs.23
There are three main challenges to the decentralization process in Mo-
rocco: legal ambiguities, financial resources, and human resources. The
lack of a clear framework and implementation provisions mean that the
2015 OL on municipalities still largely exists only on paper. Moreover, the
tutelle has not fully disappeared. Municipalities are very dependent on cen-
tral government transfers financially, and municipal budgets are still far
from being able to cover the increasing needs of municipal infrastructure,
equipment, and services (see also chapter 5). Local councilors are largely
untrained. This allows the King to present himself as the only institution
capable to respond to citizens’ needs and expectations.24
Indeed, programs such as the National Initiative for Human Develop-
ment (known under its French acronym INDH) that bypass local govern-
ments and give more power to the Ministry of the Interior are another ex-
ample of the monarchy’s use of (purposefully incomplete) decentralization
reforms that work to the regime’s advantage (Bergh 2012b). As Bohn and
Vollmann (chapter 4) describe in detail, neopatrimonial networks are well
anchored within the makhzen, top representatives of the Ministry of the In-
terior and other government ministries, business elites, political party
elites, and the relationships between them. Decentralization reforms are
used to disperse power and responsibilities between elites, to enlarge net-
works profiting from state funding, and to hinder effective coordination
among them in order to neutralize their potential threat to regime stabili-
ty.
23 It remains to be seen how the new law governing information access is used at the
local level to enforce these transparency provisions. See Shalaby and Bergh (2020).
24 Similarly, Vollmann et al. (2020, 22) argue that “institutional failure of elected in-
stitutions is used to highlight the virtues of the palace’s supposed technocratic ap-
proach. An example of this is the widespread rejection of the first wave of flawed
regional development plans, political infighting in city councils or the suspension
of the regional council of Guelmim-Oued Noun by the Minister of Interior in
May 2018.”
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The World Bank’s Municipal Performance Program-for-Results program in
Morocco
The Municipal Performance Program-for-Results targets around 100 mu-
nicipalities in almost all regions in Morocco,25 including all municipalities
with a population of more than 50,000 inhabitants, and municipalities
that are a provincial administrative centers (chef lieu; World Bank 2019a,
23).26 It has an overall operating cost of 760 million USD, of which the
Moroccan government contributes 346 million, the World Bank 300 mil-
lion, and the French Agency for Development 114 million (World Bank
2019a, 7-8).
The rationale of the program – as described in the World Bank’s Pro-
gram Appraisal Document (PAD) – is based on Morocco’s sustained ur-
banization trend. This trend entails the increase of poverty pockets in cities
and high unemployment rates, as well as huge needs for infrastructural in-
vestment (exacerbated by climate-induced shocks, such as floods, land-
slides, droughts, wild fires, and heat waves; World Bank 2019a, 13, 15, 31).
The PAD (World Bank 2019a, 13) further notes that the implementation
of decentralization reforms remains a priority, as the country’s population
continues to display low levels of trust in administration and high levels of
dissatisfaction with the quality of public services. Indeed, it argues that
“the Government’s decentralization agenda stems from the recognition of
the pivotal role of municipalities in renewing the social contract in Moroc-
co” (World Bank 2019a, 14). The PAD also points out that the 2011 Con-
stitution in its article 136, “establishes the principle of administrative free-
dom of municipalities, thus acknowledging the end of the administrative
control or tutelle of the Central Government over municipalities” and in-
stead moves toward support or accompagnement. This qualitative change
“provides the opportunity to move [from compliance] towards a perfor-
mance-based approach to supporting municipalities, but also calls for an
25 The Program area includes the regions of Béni Mellal-Khénifra, Casablanca-Settat,
Drâa-Tafilalet, Fès-Meknès, Marrakech-Safi, Oriental, Rabat-Salé-Kénitra, Souss-
Massa and Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma; the provinces of Guelmin, Tan-Tan and
Sidi Ifni; and the municipality of Assa (World Bank 2019a, 23).
26 The combined population of the targeted municipalities represents more than
80 % of Morocco's urban population and nearly 50 % of its total population.
These are municipalities where improvements in institutional and service delivery
performance are expected to have the largest impact and where most of Moroc-
co’s demographic growth and thus the highest urban infrastructure investment
needs will be concentrated in the future years (World Bank 2019a, 20).
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ambitious capacity building program to address municipalities’ existing ca-
pacity constraints” (World Bank 2019a, 14, 17).
Indeed, the PforR loan is meant to strengthen the mechanisms for allo-
cating and transferring large parts of the 30 % Value Added Tax (Taxe sur la
Valeur Ajoutée, TVA). The TVA is transferred to municipalities after incen-
tivizing municipalities to (a) increase their institutional capacity; (b) im-
prove their performance in the delivery of municipal services; and (c) en-
sure their financial sustainability and capacity to finance the required in-
vestments (World Bank 2019a, 17). As Interviewee 1 explained:
The idea is that by the end of the program [i.e. at the end of 2024]
there would be 5.5 billion Dirham27 transferred in performance-based
grants from the government to the municipalities. And out of this, 4
billion would come from the donors, and 1.5 would come from the
Compte d’affectation special (CAS) TVA. […] That [amount] does not
come from the unconditional transfers. So they are not reducing un-
conditional transfers to finance this.
In other words, the performance score does not affect the unconditional
transfers that municipalities rely upon to finance their recurrent expendi-
ture, such as salaries.
The Municipal Performance Program has its origins in the Casablanca
Municipal Support Program, which the World Bank had financed earlier
with the same loan type (PforR), and which was widely regarded as very
successful. Hence, the new Municipal Performance Program would be
able to learn from and build on the Casablanca experience, for example na-
tionally rolling out the digitalization of administrative procedures for the
issuance of building permits and commercial licenses, a digital revenue
management system, and the digitalization of municipal civil registrars
(World Bank 2019a, 17). According to Interviewee 1, personal relation-
ships also mattered, as the wali28 of Casablanca became the wali at the DG-
CL29 around the time that the World Bank was preparing the project in
Casablanca. At first, the idea was to repeat the Casablanca project in other
cities, but the discussions lead to the design of the national level program
supporting municipal performance across Morocco instead.
27 1 USD is worth approx. 9 Dirham.
28 The wali is the governor, appointed by the King and part of the Ministry of the
Interior’s hierarchy.
29 The governor or head of the Directorate General of Local Governments (Direction
Générale des Collectivités Locales – DGCL) in the Ministry of the Interior is
amongst others responsible for the implementation of decentralization reforms.
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The bank’s justification for using a PforR loan rather than a DPL lies in
the PforR instrument’s successful record of accomplishment (including in
Morocco). An additional factor is that “the PforR instrument appears well
fitted […] as it allows to support an ambitious Government program of re-
forms based on performance improvement and the achievement of con-
crete results, while financing a large number of investment subprojects de-
veloped and implemented by a broad range of municipalities” (World
Bank 2019a, 19). As Interviewee 1 explained:
We finance a program, we don’t finance specific expenditure, and so
for municipal development projects it’s much better because when
you finance municipal expenditure potentially you finance hundreds
or thousands of contracts, so if I need to do this procurement no-objec-
tion [procedure] on every small contract […] it’s not going work. With
the PforR it’s possible to do this at the program level so you assess the
systems for fiduciary management, for environmental and social man-
agement30 [etc.], you try to identify gaps at the system level and what
you monitor is how well the systems work instead of giving a no-objec-
tion on each and every transaction. That allows you to define a one bil-
lion dollar program and to say, ‘I’m going to finance 200 million out
of this 1 billion’, and you are not going to determine which contracts,
which transactions fall under my 200 million; I’m looking at the pro-
gram, and as long as the program works with systems that I find ad-
equate, I can disburse based on results.
The program is structured around three main subprograms, of which sub-
program 1 on “developing and implementing a performance-based grants
transfer system on Participating Municipalities” is the most relevant for
this chapter, as it potentially affects pre-existing patronage networks
(World Bank 2019a, 20).31 As explained in the PAD (World Bank 2019a,
21), the subprogram
30 The appraisal for a PforR loan is informed by a technical assessment with a focus
on strategic relevance and technical soundness of the program and its expenditure
framework, a fiduciary assessment with a focus on the procurement and financial
management arrangements, and an environmental and social systems assessment
with a focus on the potential environmental and social impacts and risks (see IEG
2016, ix; see also the World Bank’s 2017 Program-for-Results policy [World Bank
2017] – here, neither the terms “political” nor “political economy assessment” are
mentioned; the same is true for the World Bank PforR directive 2020 (World
Bank 2020c)).
31 The other subprograms are Subprogram 2: strengthening the institutional frame-
work for inter-municipal cooperation; and Subprogram 3: enhancing the organi-
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will introduce an annual performance assessment of the Participating
Municipalities, based on a performance framework consisting of Mini-
mum Mandatory Conditions (MMCs) and Performance Indicators
(PIs). The subprogram will incentivize municipalities to improve their
performance through financial incentives consisting of performance-
based investments grants. The performance grants will be allocated to
municipalities based on an objective and transparent formula taking
into account each municipality’s population, its achievement of the
MMCs, and its score on the different PIs. With support from the
World Bank and the French Development Agency (AFD), the DGCL
and the General Inspectorate of Territorial Administration (Inspection
Générale de l’Administration Territoriale, IGAT) have developed a per-
formance assessment framework consisting of a set of MMCs related to
the existing legal provisions and of PIs articulated around complemen-
tary themes […] targeted toward ensuring improvement of municipal
performance and service to citizens.
Interviewee 1 explained the underlying idea as follows:
The idea is not to punish anyone, it’s just to identify the capacity gaps,
incentivize the municipality to close those gaps through peer pressure
and financial incentives, and give them the tools to do so. That’s a
pretty simple model, you don’t start from scratch, because you already
have 10-12 existing projects for which you have a list of indicators. You
don’t have to go through a lot of, let’s say, philosophical questions on
what is performance, how do you measure it, [you can] look at differ-
ent models, and those models tend to be quite similar because munici-
pal management is not rocket science; the basics of managing munici-
pal revenues, of managing municipal expenditures, reaching out to
your citizens, they are pretty much the same whether you are in a rural
panjayati raj in India or in Casablanca.
Germany’s interests in the MENA region and the GIZ projects in Morocco
Before turning to the GIZ projects in Morocco, it is useful to give a brief
background to Germany’s involvement in the region. The country has
maintained a prominent diplomatic, commercial and development pres-
zation and human capacities of Participating Municipalities (World Bank 2019a,
20).
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ence in the MENA for several decades, focused mostly on supporting polit-
ical stability and promoting economic co-operation, with active engage-
ment from German civil society groups and political party foundations.
The 2011 Arab uprisings and their aftermath influenced Germany’s domes-
tic and international politics and resulted in the presence of several hun-
dred thousand mostly Syrian refugees in Germany since late 2015. The
growing importance of the MENA region for Germany is reflected in
sharp increases in humanitarian and development aid to the region, which
more than quadrupled from around EUR 750 million annually to around
EUR 3.6 billion between 2011 and 2017. In 2015, Morocco overtook Egypt
as the largest MENA recipient of German aid, and aid to Tunisia more
than doubled from around EUR 87 million in 2009 to nearly EUR 188
million in 2016 (Furness 2020, 71, 75-76).
However, as Furness (2020, 71) points out, this remarkable increase has
not been accompanied by a strategic policy statement that sets out the ob-
jectives of Germany’s MENA aid program. The main regional policy paper
of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und En-
twicklung, BMZ) dates from 2008. It candidly pointed out the dangers of
increasing poverty, societal instability, political repression and demograph-
ic change, and warns that security and migration problems are likely to
emerge. It outlines three – partially unconnected – core areas for co-opera-
tion, in which Germany is an international leader: water, renewable ener-
gy, and vocational training (Furness 2020, 71, 75).
The 2008 MENA concept paper remained on the BMZ’s website until
mid-2018. There has been no follow-up publication for a regional aid poli-
cy framework in response to the post-Arab spring context. This is reflected
in Germany’s actual aid spending, which largely followed patterns estab-
lished before the Arab uprisings. Additional spending has overwhelmingly
concentrated on two areas, i.e. humanitarian aid in response to the Syrian
civil war and loans for renewable energy generation in Morocco (which is
expected to serve Germany’s energy needs as well). However, an internal
position paper published in August 2014 added “governance and educa-
tion” as a co-operation sector, and promised to focus on four specific prob-
lems: youth unemployment; economic instability; the democratic deficit;
and stability in crisis countries, especially with regard to the humanitarian
crisis in Syria. To respond to these issues, the BMZ launched a EUR 400
million-budget line called “Special Initiative for Stability and Develop-
ment in North Africa and the Middle East” (SI MENA) the same year (Fur-
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ness 2020, 71, 75-76).32 Indeed, given its name, it is not surprising that Fur-
ness concludes his study on Germany’s post-Arab uprisings MENA aid pro-
gram that “while there is little evidence of purposeful securitization of aid,
stability has been privileged over support for unpredictable political
change” (Furness 2020, 72, 75).33
All three GIZ projects studied in this chapter (see Table 1 above) origi-
nate from and are funded by the SI MENA. In Morocco, they coincided
with the adoption of the organic laws on regions, provinces, and munici-
palities (2015), which further advanced the regionalization as well as de-
centralization processes. As Interviewee 4 explained, “it was really about
jumping on the train and taking the train into the right direction here in
Morocco regarding this whole opening towards more decentralization, re-
gionalization, deconcentration and with this, democratization. There is
this hope that this reform process launched in Morocco […] after 2012
would also bring more democratic elements into everyday governance.”
The GIZ project entitled “Supporting the regionalization process in Mo-
rocco” (which officially started in 2017 but was effectively launched only
in September 2018 and ended in January 2021), focused on supporting the
advanced regionalization reform in four regions: Casablanca-Settat, Mar-
rakesh-Safi, Oriental and Souss-Massa. It operated primarily by training
representatives of the regional councils to represent the needs of their citi-
zens, and educating employees from regional administrations on setting
up a functioning administrative structure. The project also assisted the re-
gions in establishing a system to monitor regional development plans and
provided training for civil society organizations and advisory bodies on
equal (gender) rights, the promotion of young people, and local economic
development.34
32 Germany refused to reduce the capacities of its bilateral agencies in favor of mul-
tilaterally implemented projects after the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effective-
ness (Holthaus 2019, 1220). On the German website on this “Sonderinitiative zur
Stabilisierung und Entwicklung in Nordafrika, Nahost”, it is stated that 395,1
million Euros have been committed (“bereitgestellt”) for 75 projects, to be imple-
mented between October 2014 and December 2022 (see BMZ 2021a). For com-
mitments by the German Development Bank (KfW) in Morocco, see KfW
(2021a).
33 It is – of course – possible that the absence of clearly formulated strategic docu-
ments reflects a policy of “strategic ambiguity” for Germany to avoid being held
responsible for non-fulfilled commitments later on (Furness 2020, 73).
34 See GIZ (2021c). There is no space here to present the advanced regionalization
reform in detail, but see Bergh (2021) and Vollmann et al. (2020).
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The second project implemented by GIZ in Morocco, called “Strength-
ening citizen-centered local government” (which ran from October 2015
to January 2021; with a funding volume of 5.33 million Euros) focused on
capacity building to make services more efficient, transparent and accessi-
ble, as well as on increasing citizen participation in municipal planning
and political decision-making. In nine medium-sized cities (each with be-
tween 60,000 and 500,000 inhabitants; see table 1 for details), the project
worked with political decision-makers and administrative staff to improve
the administrative processes of the services and to set up citizens’ advice
bureaus. In these bureaus, citizens receive advice and information about
available services and administrative processes. They are moreover referred
to the relevant departments.35 
A brief background to decentralization in Tunisia36
Since the country’s independence, local governments in Tunisia have been
under the scrutiny and control of the central government. They were
significantly constrained in terms of resources and did not enjoy au-
tonomous fiscal powers. The aftermath of the 2011 revolution saw a crisis
in state authority at the local level: Local groups attacked municipal build-
ings and there was a widespread refusal to pay taxes. The issue of regional
inequalities, which arguably triggered the revolution, continued to be a
pressing issue. The new political elite, who was involved in the constitu-
tional drafting process and composed of individuals with no role in the
former regime, agreed on the decentralization of power as a guarantee
against the return of authoritarian rule and as a structural response to un-
just and imbalanced development policies. Chapter Seven of the constitu-
tion entitled “Local Authority”, affirmed elected local and regional govern-
ment as being autonomous institutions with financial and administrative
autonomy and significant powers. Chapter Seven also abolished all a priori
control by central government over local or regional authorities’ decisions.
These provisions were a radical departure from the highly centralized
framework of decision-making in Tunisia and in much of the Arab world.
In order to implement Chapter Seven, the Department of Local Authori-
35 See GIZ (2021a).
36 This section is mainly based on Kherigi (2020), see also chapter 4 (this volume)
and Aliriza (2018), Baccouche (2016), Bel Haj Amor (2020), Salman (2017),
Yerkes and Muasher (2018).
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ties of the Ministry of Interior, which in 2016 split off into the separate
Ministry of Local Affairs (MLA), began drafting the new Local Authorities
Code in March 2014. It was adopted in April 2018, just before the first
election of municipal councils in May 2018.
The hyper-centralization of the Tunisian regime meant that prior to
2014, 70 % of the country was not municipalized and 86 of the now exist-
ing 350 municipalities were created after 2014. A majority still awaits the
strengthening of their capacities (Vollmann and Bohn, chapter 5 in this
volume, citing Tarchouna 2019). The municipal councils face huge chal-
lenges in governing effectively at the local level; mainly because the other
ministries refuse to recognize the MLA’s authority to lead and shape the
reforms that directly affect their own powers and resources. This means
that key aspects of decentralization remain unaddressed, such as reforming
local taxation, local planning powers, the role of deconcentrated authori-
ties, and mechanisms for coordination and cooperation. It also means that
the developmental objectives of decentralization have largely been side-
lined. Indeed, the new Code is incomplete, in conflict with a plethora of
existing laws, and remains vague on administrative decentralization, which
will be subject to a 27-year process of negotiation with various ministries.
Fiscal decentralization is equally weak37 and proposals to give municipali-
ties new fiscal powers were resisted fiercely by the Ministry of Finance.
However, municipal councils elected in 2018 have begun to lobby for
greater powers and resources and are strengthening their national federa-
tion, which bodes well for the future.
In terms of neopatrimonial networks, Bohn and Vollmann (chapter 4 in
this volume) note that even though Ben Ali was ousted in 2011, the econo-
mic elites in Grand Tunis and the Sahel and most cadres of the former
regime’s party (the Democratic Constitutional Rally, RCD) remained rela-
tively unscathed. The latter competed massively in the 2018 local elections,
while the former used the transition period to become active in political
parties (also to gain immunity as MPs). This means that regional dispari-
ties continue (to the disadvantage of interior regions) and ministerial offi-
cials as well as local administrations mostly remain in place. Most impor-
tantly, old ties between tutelle agents, economic actors, and ministerial
elites continue to be salient, which leads to intransparent decisions and fi-
nancial allocations at the expense of new entrepreneurs from the interior
regions (ibid.). It remains to be seen if donor-financed decentralization
programs can break these ties.
37 See chapter 5 for details.
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The World Bank’s Urban Development and Local Governance Program in
Tunisia
The World Bank’s Urban Development and Local Governance Program in
Tunisia (launched in 2014), served as a model for the Moroccan program
and in part involved the same World Bank staff members. The program is
financed by a loan of 300 million USD, with the Tunisian government
contributing an additional 63 million USD. It was supposed to end in
2019, but was extended until 2023, with an additional loan of 130 million
USD (World Bank 2014, vi; World Bank 2020b; Interviewee 5). The PAD’s
country context diagnostic mentions regional disparities, high youth un-
employment, and the need to ensure social peace and security as the main
challenges for the Tunisian government. While the urbanization rate is
very high, Tunisian municipalities only play a minor role in urban/local
development. They suffer from low revenues and expenditure levels,
widespread dissatisfaction with their service delivery, and exceptionally li-
mited engagement of citizens, as well as a strong system of tutelle that con-
strains their decision-making and independence (World Bank 2014, 1-2, 6).
The PAD notes, “Tunisian municipalities have not provided ‘invited
spaces’, within which citizens are able to engage meaningfully with the ‘lo-
cal state’ or to voice their preferences and priorities. Issues of account-
ability and participation have become more prominent, gaining impor-
tance in the wake of a post-revolutionary crisis of political legitimacy and a
general deterioration in municipal services” (World Bank 2014, 3).
The PAD refers to the commitments to decentralization as noted in the
2014 Constitution, which includes “fully devolved and empowered LGs
with autonomy for executing their mandates of providing local services ac-
cording to transparent principles of participation by, and accountability to,
their citizens”. Similar to the dynamic in Morocco, the PAD further notes
that “the changes mandated by the Constitution regarding local gover-
nance are transformational, as they effectively reverse the highly central-
ized previous structure, whereby central oversight and approval (tutelle)
was exercised on all facets of Local Government accountability, decision-
making, and capital works and service delivery-related investments”
(World Bank 2014, 2).
At the time the program was designed, municipalities were regulated
and monitored by the General Directorate of Local Governments (Direc-
tion Générale des Collectivités Publiques Locales – DGPCL), a key direc-
torate within the Ministry of the Interior, which was transferred to the
Ministry of Local Affairs (MLA) in 2016. In addition to its regulatory func-
tions, the DGPCL is also responsible for managing the Local Government
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Common Fund (FCCL, Fonds Commun des Collectivités Locales), which pro-
vides municipalities with annual block grants to support their operating
budgets. In addition, there is the Municipal Development Fund (CPSCL,
Caisse des Prêts et de Soutien des Collectivités Locales), which reports to the
MLA and includes the Ministry of Finance on its board. It provides munic-
ipalities with access to credit as well as to central Government funding to
finance municipal investments (loans and capital grants; World Bank
2014, Interviewee 3 and Interviewee 5). The FCCL allocations to munici-
palities are purpose block grants entirely at the discretion of municipalities
and were characterized as relatively transparent in the PAD (World Bank
2014, 3-4). However, the capital grants allocated by the central government
were described as less predictable and transparent. At the municipal level,
all investment needs were (and still are) systematized within Municipal In-
vestment Plans (known as PICs). Financing for these PIC investments was
mobilized from CPSCL loans to municipalities, central Government subsi-
dies (managed on behalf of the center by CPSCL), and own-source munici-
pal revenues. Central Government capital grants accounted for about a
third of municipal investment expenditures. However, the problem was
identified to be rooted in the fact that municipalities “face the increasingly
serious issue of growing municipal debt, driven largely by the requirement
that they borrow from the CPSCL to finance their capital investments”
(World Bank 2014, 3, 5). Indeed, the PAD notes that half of all municipali-
ties were unable to make debt payments and were technically in default.
The fact that the final decision on investment selection cannot be taken by
the municipalities, but is instead controlled by the central level, “funda-
mentally weakens the potential of municipalities to practice participatory
governance and establish sound social contracts with their citizens”
(World Bank 2014, 7).38
As in Morocco, the Program consists of three sub-programs, the first of
which is again the most important one. It deals with municipal infrastruc-
ture delivery and receives the bulk of the loan (US$ 591 million).39 It aims
at reforming the problematic capital grants system by giving the munici-
palities the sole discretion over them (without any ex ante control by the
central government). Key investment areas are road construction, rehabili-
tation and upgrading, street lighting, urban drainage/sewerage and other
38 For a more elaborate description of the municipal finance system at the time, see
World Bank (2014, 15-18).
39 Subprogram 2 targets improving access to municipal infrastructure in disadvan-
taged neighborhoods. Subprogram 3 focuses on capacity support for improved
LG institutional development and accountability (World Bank 2014, 11-12).
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environmental improvements, solid waste collection and street cleaning,
parks and some recreation facilities, markets and slaughterhouses (World
Bank 2014, 11-12).
The innovation lies in the fact that the capital block grants would be
partly performance-based to incentivize the 264 Tunisian municipalities
that existed in 2014.40 As in Morocco, the grant system would operate
through two steps. The first is subject to the municipality meeting basic
minimum mandatory conditions (MMCs), the second rewards municipal-
ities according to their level of performance as determined by annual and
independent performance assessments against predetermined criteria.
These criteria include the implementation of participatory planning and
transparency initiatives (World Bank 2014, 8, 15-16).41 The program fur-
ther envisages the design and launch of a new e-Portal (Portail des
Collectivités Locales). The portal would be a platform for sharing budget,
procurement, and audit information for all LGs, as well as the results of
LG performance assessments accessible to the public (and, progressively,
the e-Portal would also host LG information on Participatory Planning
and Participatory Budgeting processes; World Bank 2014, 17-18).42 Munici-
pal borrowing from the CPSCL to implement the PICs would still be pos-
sible, but the CPSCL lending guidelines would be reformed in order to es-
tablish a stable balance between maximizing borrowings by the LGs and
maintaining their financial viability (World Bank 2014, 12). Given that the
Bank’s own contribution was likely to provide about 82 % of overall gov-
ernment program financing, it had (and arguably still has) great leverage
to bring about significant changes, as contained in the Program Action
Plan (PAP), Results Indicators (RIs) and Disbursement Linked Indicators
(DLIs; World Bank 2014, 10).43
40 Interviewee 5 explained that the 86 new municipalities “are not submitted to the
performance indicators. They are subject only to the minimal conditions because
they are new – there wasn’t an administration before, so it was decided that they
will lighten up the process for them in the first years and then later on they will
get up to speed with the rest of the municipalities”.
41 See Bellamine (2015) for a scathing critique of the new allocation formula as it
appeared to contradict Article 12 of the constitution mandating “positive discrim-
ination” toward marginalized areas in development projects.
42 See Portail des collectivités locales [Local Collectivities Portal], Tunisian Ministry of
Local Affairs and the Environment (2021).
43 See World Bank (2014, 21) for a list of DLIs.
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According to Interviewee 5, three performance assessments have been
conducted:
We were really on track, we did two rounds of assessments before the
elections, one after the elections […] and despite the challenges of not
having municipal councils [in 2014], we still went through in launch-
ing the system and the elected municipal councils arrived on a relative-
ly functioning system [in 2018]. Indeed, most municipalities were able
to get satisfying scores in their annual performance assessment in 2019,
but due to the COVID 19 crisis, the government decided to put on
hold the 2020 annual performance assessment until further notice.44
The GIZ projects in Tunisia
In contrast to the ambiguous regional policy described earlier, Germany
quickly pledged its support to post-revolution transformation in Tunisia
(including in the Constitutional drafting process) and developed a clearly
visible bilateral agenda. Germany portrayed itself as a legitimate partner, as
the country is a (former) member of the community of transitional democ-
racies and a state that managed regional unification (Holthaus 2019, 1225).
Indeed, most GIZ-led projects in Tunisia are funded by the BMZ and focus
on decentralization, communal development, and administrative reform
(Holthaus 2019, 1223).45 This is because the German development cooper-
ation, together with the World Bank and AFD, agreed with the Tunisian
Government on a “Reform Matrix” for the governance sector, including a
strong focus on decentralization. Accordingly, the GIZ projects are to a
large extent part of the PforR program.46
44 See also World Bank (2020b, 12).
45 For commitments by the German Development Bank (KfW) in Tunisia, see KfW
(2021b).
46 Pers. Comm. Interviewee 2 on 29 March 2021. This reform matrix is part of the
“reform partnership” under the Marshall Plan with Africa. The partnership was
concluded in 2017 and is a bilateral contribution to the G20 Compact with Africa
initiative. It initially only provided support for reforms in the financial and bank-
ing sector, but since 2020 includes support for the modernization of public ad-
ministration. In 2019, the BMZ newly committed a total of 294.8 million Euros,
with 139.4 million Euros of that amount being allocated under the reform part-
nership (see BMZ 2021b).
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Interviewee 2 stated,
the strategic background of all the donor interventions […] on this is-
sue is the democratic change of the Arab revolution and the necessity
to create legitimacy for the new democratic structures vis à vis the
times of Ben Ali, because [there has to be] a ‘democratic dividend’ that
the citizens really feel in an economic way but also in terms of relation
to public authorities that the government and the situation in the re-
gion has changed.
Interestingly, Interviewee 2 also referred to the German federal model as a
rationale to promote decentralization because of its expected benefits for
the citizens.
As for the GIZ project in Tunisia studied here, it is called “Initiative for
municipal development in Tunisia”. The project’s duration is from 2015 to
2023 and has a funding volume of 10.64 million Euros.47 The project is
quite similar to the municipal project in Morocco, as it focusses on train-
ing municipal employees and setting up citizens’ offices. It also supports
digitalization in partner municipalities in order to develop municipal ser-
vices (e-services) and digital participation formats (e-participation). The
discussion below focuses on the setting up of citizens’ offices, which is the
most relevant aspect for this chapter. Interviewee 2 explains that the idea
of having one-stop-shops for municipal services is not an only German
idea, as many countries employ this system. Interviewee 2 states, “For our
projects we have been inspired by our strong experience working on that
also in Armenia and Georgia with the governments there; we have created
lots of citizen spaces and digitalized them. So this was inspired from our
work there during the time we created this program in 2015. Maybe it’s a
German fingerprint but not a German solution.”
Assessing the extent of TWP in the design stage
This section presents and discusses the findings related to the first research
question. It examines to what extent the main features of the political
economy of decentralization (including fiscal aspects and neopatrimonial
networks) were taken into account when designing the programs.
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According to the World Bank, the Moroccan municipalities’ main prob-
lem lies in the “lack of incentives of Moroccan municipalities to strategi-
cally plan and effectively execute their investment budgets” (World Bank
2019a, 2). However, while the PAD notes that many municipalities had
not yet voted on their five-year municipal action plans (Plans d’Action
Communaux, PAC), it identifies the reasons for this “lack of incentives”
solely in capacity constraints. This pertains to “weak capacities in terms of
quality project management, including procurement, environmental and
social management, a lack of sufficient qualified human resources (HR), a
lack of modern technological equipment, and technical and administrative
difficulties” (World Bank 2019a, 16). Indeed, potential political reasons are
not mentioned, with the exception of a brief section in the PAD that notes,
“the weak accountability relationship between municipalities and their
citizens does not provide sufficient incentives for the municipalities to per-
form effectively” (World Bank 2019a, 16). However, rather than talking
about local elections as a key issue in this relationship, the PAD points to
the lack of municipal asset inventories and low levels of civic organization
as the main issues, the latter of which are results of “historical limits on
space for both information sharing and opportunities to engage” (World
Bank 2019a, 16). World Bank staff nevertheless seem aware that there is a
fine line between fostering the “right” and “wrong” type of Citizen En-
gagement (CE). As the PAD notes, political risks
stem from the introduction of innovative CE mechanisms: the open-
ing of space for citizen participation can create high expectations that
need to be properly managed and responded to, to avoid frustration
and discontent. To mitigate this risk, the Program will build capacities
at the municipal level to design, manage, and respond to citizens’ de-
mands for transparency, information, and participation (World Bank
2019a, 50).
In other words, the “supply” side of accountability must first be opera-
tional to then accommodate the requirements of the “demand” side.
In Tunisia, the World Bank Program was mainly designed to help the
government reform the capital grant system. While the PAD does not
mention political economy considerations explicitly, they are clearly part
of the rationale:
The complexity of the inter-relationship between accessing grants, uti-
lizing loans and providing counterpart funding, combined with the
centralized system of determining eligibility for the grant funds is con-
sidered opaque and potentially inequitable. The system operates
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through procedures that are not perceived as transparent, objective
and measurable, and are not predictable in a manner that facilitates
consultation and effective planning (World Bank 2014, 6).
Apart from the political fluidity (notably the uncertainty of the timing of
local government elections) as a risk for the program, the PAD observes
that reforms such as the capital grant reforms “have proven to be difficult
to implement and present a risk of capture by groups within the line min-
istries and the MoEF”. Fostering government ownership is mentioned as
the key strategy to mitigate (this) risk as “challenging activities and pro-
posed reforms have been lengthily discussed with the counterparts during
preparation and the Program builds upon a suite of ongoing and solid dia-
logue on decentralization and local governance reform […]” (World Bank
2014, 36).
The passages cited here reflect the findings observed by the IEG’s early
assessment of PforR operations, which conclude that political economy
constraints are behind many of the issues addressed by DLIs and PAPs.
However, these constraints are rarely discussed directly, and critical analy-
sis tends to address only low-level issues. Through simple literature search-
es, the IEG evaluation found several examples where outside parties, such
as researchers, had raised critical views about the actual state of procure-
ment and other fiduciary practices that do not seem to be reflected in the
PforR assessments. Instead, the focus typically lies on institutional reforms
to address corruption, including program-specific measures, often without
presenting any convincing arguments that such measures will work in the
case of the new programs. However, the IEG further notes, “interviews
with team members during IEG missions confirmed their awareness of is-
sues”. The lack of published analysis is reportedly a result of borrower-gov-
ernment sensitivity (IEG 2016, xi, 31).48
In the case of the GIZ projects, it was difficult to assess the extent to
which political economy analytical work was carried out, since it was not
possible to review any project appraisal documents.49 Interviewee 3 point-
ed out, “we always have some trend analysis etcetera, but then I’m not al-
48 The IEG assessment noted that the Systematic Operations Risk-rating Tool intro-
duced for PforR operations in January 2016 measures political and governance
risk as one of nine risk categories. Another category measures the related aspect of
institutional-capacity risk. It concludes, perhaps too optimistically, that “the use
of this new tool is likely to address the political economy challenges raised in this
report” (IEG 2016, 59).
49 On the Advanced Regionalisation Project, a PPT entitled Atelier global de
planification opérationnelle du projet ARA – Présentation du projet ARA dated 25
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ways sure that in the end the analysis will be used in the practical work.
I’m not sure if a ‘peace and conflict’ analysis exists, I’ve never seen it in
Morocco”. This stands in contrast to Interviewee 2, who asserted that for
Tunisia, “of course we have our internal documents, and we conduct in-
depth peace and conflict, human rights, and gender analysis during project
appraisal missions”. Interviewee 2 explained that the BMZ usually formu-
lates the country strategy based on political analysis performed by Ger-
many-based academics, but that it is not very comprehensive for some
countries – including Tunisia. This can be explained by the sudden rise of
Tunisia as focus-country since the Arab spring and migration crisis. In-
deed, “it still has B status, like a secondary country where we usually only
work in two sectors with a limited range of projects, but it’s actually one of
the biggest portfolios in Germany development cooperation currently” (In-
terviewee 2). According to the same interviewee (Interviewee 2), mandato-
ry risk management monitoring activities, where decisions are taken on
the operational, country director, embassy or even ministry level, assure
the quality of project implementation.
Indeed, even if a detailed analysis of the political economy of Moroccan
decentralization/regionalization reforms existed, it would not have mat-
tered in terms of selecting the four regions on which the GIZ project fo-
cused: The Ministry of the Interior decided on this matter, based on politi-
cal party distribution (according to Interviewee 3). However, upon further
probing, it seems that prior GIZ experience in some regions also played a
role, for example in the Marrakesh-Safi region. The German development
cooperation (also through the work of political party foundations, such as
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation) had already set up a Maison de l’élu,
which provides training for municipal and regional councilors. GIZ staff
mostly seem to gather knowledge about the regions and their political and
administrative representatives “on the job” (Interviewee 3). For Tunisia, In-
terviewee 2 also stressed the importance of relying on in-house political
economy knowledge:
For the day-to-day analysis we are all dependent on our colleagues here
in the country who work here and are part of the system, we have
maybe one advantage, we have large teams on the ground [with
Tunisian experts], who stay […] in country, for a longer period of time
April 2019 was received from Interviewee 3. It was used to triangulate other data
sources (i.e. websites and interviews). For the “Strengthening citizen-centred local
government”, the document entitled Jamaa Mouwatena – La participation
citoyenne portée par les communes was provided by Interviewee 4.
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than maybe if a project ends and another consultancy gets the contract
and bring their staff.50
Indeed, the GIZ offices in Tunisia and Morocco are both very large: At the
end of 2019, the GIZ office in Tunis had 303 national and 90 international
employees. In Morocco, there were 271 national and 53 international em-
ployees.51 Similarly, GIZ staff in Tunisia are very well aware of the risk
that their projects might be instrumentalized by political parties, such as
the Ennahda party, which has attempted to profit from the central govern-
ment’s control over the local level. As Interviewee 2 observed,
mayors use donor projects like this to present themselves towards the
political level and also in terms of being candidates for certain pos-
itions. So it’s highly politicized, although you could think it’s just a
small project on citizen spaces; luckily it is not much about resources
from our side, because our major contribution is technical advice,
skills and we fund some renovation works, but we have a good experi-
ence until now.
To summarize, I found that the World Bank’s (publicly available) analysis
of the Tunisian situation is quite explicit regarding elite capture, while it is
more technocratic and depoliticized in the Moroccan case. In both coun-
tries, the GIZ seems to rely mostly on political economy expertise found
in-house and/or acquired on-the-job.
Program implementation: Challenging or consolidating neopatrimonial
networks?
This section discusses the findings on the second research question: To
what extent were the case study programs aware of neopatrimonial net-
works, and did they challenge or consolidate these networks?
50 In general, German development cooperation implemented by GIZ involves a
high number of local senior experts including team leaders in the projects in the
country who have the role of providing regular analysis. In addition, the M&E
system is conflict sensitive and includes Risk Monitoring (Interviewee 3, pers.
Comm. 29 March 2021).
51 For the figures on Tunisia, see GIZ (2020b). For Morocco, see GIZ (2020a). Num-
bers could not be found for the World Bank country offices. See Honig (2020) for
an interesting study on the effects of the World Bank’s policy (part of the Strate-
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Findings from the World Bank program in Morocco
For the Municipal Performance Program in Morocco, it is clear that the
World Bank staff is aware of the challenges posed by the shift from a logic
of control and discretion to one of transparency and performance. Intro-
ducing a performance framework which establishes a transparent and sim-
ple dashboard of what constitutes good municipal management, repre-
sents a challenge to the traditional organization in the DGCL based on sec-
toral divisions and silos (Interviewee 1). In order to overcome potential re-
sistance and to build broad-based support (beyond the former wali of
Casablanca, see above), the World Bank organized exchange visits with the
individuals involved in the corresponding program for Tunisia. For exam-
ple, a workshop featuring the head of the Tunisian CPSCL helped explain
the program and generate buy-in on the Moroccan part, as it presented a
clear model to follow (Interviewee 1). Indeed, the PAD acknowledges that
the Municipal Performance Program was modelled largely on the World
Bank’s Urban Development and Local Governance PforR in Tunisia. It
also mentions a study tour by Moroccan officials to Tunisia, which was or-
ganized in April 2019 to inform on the design of the operation (World
Bank 2019a, 21). Interviewee 1 confirmed that this visit was organized for
civil servants and a group of mayors representing all major political par-
ties. It significantly contributed to increasing their motivation for and
ownership of the program.
A further helpful factor was that the IGAT took on the role of indepen-
dent verification agency required to verify the Disbursement Linked Indi-
cators (DLIs). For the last eight years, the World Bank and IGAT have suc-
cessfully worked on several programs together. IGAT’s main organization-
al mission is to assess the management of local governments at the various
(municipal, provincial and regional) levels in Morocco. Hence, it was easy
for the civil servants working there to appropriate the annual performance
assessment conducted as part of the PfoR program (Interviewee 1).
Apart from relatively technical areas, such as improved expenditure and
revenue management, strengthened human resources, and improved ser-
vice delivery,52 the performance assessment framework also includes sever-
al criteria whose critical assessment determines whether performance-
52 This is done through citizen satisfaction measurement tools, the digitalization of
key administrative services, and the improvement of municipal services, such as
household waste collection, commercial licenses, and civil registry (World Bank
2019a, 21).
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based investment grants are allocated or not. These criteria have the poten-
tial to upset entrenched interests. They include standards of enhanced gov-
ernance and transparency, such as citizen participation, the disclosure of
key information, systematic measurement of citizen feedback, and imple-
mentation of the right to petition at the level of municipalities. Social and
environmental management criteria also include “political” aspects. Exam-
ples are the effective functioning of the consultative group on equity,
equality of opportunities, and gender sensitive approaches (Instance de
l’Equité, de l’Egalité des Chances et de l’Approche Genre, IEECAG), and the
adoption of a planning process that identifies and addresses the specific
needs of women and men in infrastructure and service delivery (World
Bank 2019a, 21).
Although the World Bank loan was only approved by the World Bank’s
Board in November 2019 and became effective in April 2020, the DGCL
launched an initial round of annual performance assessments already in
May 2019. Initial results of the performance assessment were presented
and discussed with the participating municipalities in a series of regional
workshops held in July 2019. The objective of this initial round was to es-
tablish the new performance-based approach ahead of the 2021 elections
(World Bank 2019a, 22). The PAD identified the main political risk as be-
ing
related to the municipal council renewal following the elections that
will be held in 2021, during the first phase of the Program cycle.
Specifically, non-incumbent elected municipal authorities will need to
be rapidly familiarized with the Program in the post-election period.
To mitigate these risks, the Program will account for electoral incen-
tives and risks in the design and choice of MMCs, PIs, and PAPs. In
addition, ad hoc consultations and capacity-building activities with in-
coming municipal authorities will help build buy-in and understand-
ing of the opportunities of the Program.
According to Interviewee 1, the 2019 cycle was carried out through self-as-
sessment and online documentation by municipalities without on-site veri-
fication, yet it was still possible for the DGCL to roughly assess whether
the data was reliable or not, given their own information systems. The
2019 cycle was a test-round rather than a fully-fledged assessment, in order
to acquire a sense of where the municipalities stand on the different indi-
cators. The World Bank and the Ministry of the Interior agreed that it was
important to start disbursing the grants to the municipalities well before
the 2021 elections, in order to avoid any suspicion of the Ministry of the
Interior trying to influence them (Interviewee 1).
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The formula for allocating the funds to the 100 municipalities in the
program is straightforward. A share of 30 to 40 % of the total amount is
divided equally between all municipalities; the remainder is distributed
proportional to the population size according to the 2014 census. If a mu-
nicipality does not meet any of the five minimum criteria, it will not re-
ceive any funds. If it meets all minimum criteria, it receives 40 % of its en-
velope; the rest is dependent on its performance score. Furthermore, if a
municipality does not receive anything in the first year, its share is trans-
ferred to the following year. This increases the incentive for the municipal-
ity to improve its performance (Interviewee 1).
At the workshops held in July 2019, the municipalities’ scores on meet-
ing the MMCs were presented, and the DGCL announced that those mu-
nicipalities who had not yet met the MMCs would be granted three or
four further months to meet them. According to Interviewee 1, “it worked
surprisingly well. Only 11 municipalities had met the 5 minimum condi-
tions in May, and I think 87 of them did by November”.53 All Minimum
Mandatory Conditions are legal obligations, such as the publication of fi-
nancial statements (stipulated in the 2015 organic law on municipalities).
Hence, Interviewee 1 asserts that this result is “a sea change that they were
able to drive with a relatively modest amount of money, because the enve-
lope allocated is 200 million DH, so it’s 20 million dollars for 100 munici-
palities, so it’s not huge”.54
The potential of the Municipal Performance program to disrupt en-
trenched tutelle practices by the DGCL are thus significant. It tries to estab-
lish grants unencumbered by restrictions, apart from being designated for
investment. In other words, the program tries to make the central state of
Morocco shift from a logic of tutelle to one of accompagnement, despite the
fact that many of the civil servants at the DGCL remain in their positions,
and must hence undergo a shift in mindset. Therefore, the program staff
had to insist that once the grants are transferred to the municipalities, it is
the responsibility of the municipal council to take all decisions related to
appropriating and spending the funds, without prior approval by the DG-
53 However, although the preliminary results of the CY19 performance assessment
cycle indicate that 83% of participating municipalities have met the MMC, com-
pared to an initial target of 60% in 2020, this is yet to be verified by the Indepen-
dent Auditor (IGF). Implementation Status & Results Report Municipal Perfor-
mance Program (P168147), dated 2 March 2021 (World Bank 2021, 7).
54 Almost all 100 municipalities have their performance and financial statements
published on the website Performance Communes, https://www.perfor-
mancecommunes.ma/fr/public/ (Interviewee 1).
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CL or any other form of tutelle. The latter would mean a perpetuation of
the old system, in which every (small) grant and disbursement requires the
municipality to submit documentation to the provincial office, with some-
times uncertain outcome or follow-up (Interviewee 1).
However, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the 2019 performance grant
transfers have not yet taken place. In August 2020, the DGCL sent letters
to the municipalities informing them of the amount allocated to them.
This amount was supposed to be transferred before the end of the 2020
budget cycle. Some municipalities receiving the letters started informing
the press. This raised suspicion over attempted influence on the elections,
forcing the DGCL to react by explaining that the program is meant to eval-
uate municipal administration every year, even after the elections. On the
other hand, the letters also stimulated some healthy competition between
municipalities, e.g. mayors using Twitter to announce proudly that they
would receive a grant to reward them for good performance (Interviewee
1).
It is too early to say whether this program will reduce the discretion
over intergovernmental transfers on the part of the Ministry of the Interi-
or. For example, one of the DLIs includes the provision that “The Ministry
of Interior has updated the rules and regulations governing fiscal transfers
to municipalities and included the performance grant window as an inte-
gral part of the fiscal transfer framework”, yet this is not due until 1 July
2021. In addition, the COVID-19 crisis and the imposed lockdown restric-
tions delayed the launch of the 2020 performance assessment (World Bank
2020a, 4). However, it seems that the World Bank is optimistic that the
municipalities will achieve the DLIs, since the political and governance
risk has been downgraded from substantial to moderate. This occurred be-
cause “training modules are being developed to familiarize municipalities
and the incoming elected officials with the system, its process and benefits,
thus mitigating the risks of post-election (in 2021) issues in the roll-out of
the municipal performance assessment” (World Bank 2020a, 6; see also
World Bank 2021, 6; it is not clear what exactly is meant by “issues”).
Findings from the World Bank program in Tunisia
As for the World Bank’s program in Tunisia, change occurred in three are-
nas. First, the reform of the block grant system clearly reduces the central
government’s discretion in the area of fiscal transfers. In the past, the gov-
ernment used to negotiate with municipalities on their budget require-
ments and they would have to submit a list of specific projects that they
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wanted to finance (Interviewee 5). Not surprisingly, the reforms of the fis-
cal decentralization system encountered resistance at multiple fronts and
from various stakeholders. For example, there was resistance to the idea of
de-linking the capital grants transfer from the obligation of municipalities
to borrow simultaneously from the CPCL. The institutions and civil ser-
vants involved feared a curtailing of their roles and of the extent to which
they could control the local level through this system: “There was a lot of
resistance [and they asked], ‘what is the caisse going to become […] if it
doesn’t do credit anymore?’. […] [We told them that] if a municipality
wants to take credit then you have to provide them that service but you
cannot condition the grant transfer to credit, and this was a big combat at
the institutional level” (Interviewee 5).
Resistance also formed against the shift to performance-based capital
grant transfers. Some policy-makers believed that in a post-revolution
country embracing decentralization, a performance-based system of trans-
ferring funds to municipalities would interfere with the principle of mu-
nicipal autonomy. Simultaneously, some stakeholders in the central ad-
ministration wanted to uphold the discretionary element in deciding on
municipal finances. In the words of Interviewee 5,
Tunisia is a very administratively ruled country; it’s not a politically
ruled country; the administration is really powerful. […] I think politi-
cians who rightfully thought that the decentralization process is the
main pillar of the new social contract in Tunisia didn’t know the de-
tails of it. […] When you have a lack of knowledge and understanding
of what the decentralization process must look like and how you
should move it forward, […] I think that’s where the disconnect hap-
pens and that’s where the administration takes over. […] That’s what
we are facing today very clearly again.
Referring to the current inertia, Interviewee 5 added that the new system
was put in place during a unique “flection point”, when decentralization –
rather than economic transformation – was seen as the main pillar of re-
inventing the social contract post-revolution. The same interviewee
claimed that it would be hard to reverse these reforms now.
The second arena of change is at the level of municipalities themselves.
The new portail des collectivités locales includes all the financial information
and performance indicators for each municipality, which has spurred a
competitive dynamic. In the words of Interviewee 5:
A lot of healthy competition is happening […]. This data helped create
a real transformation after elections, which means that as new munici-
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pal councilors and new mayors arrived, they looked at their data of
2016-2017 and said ‘really? We didn’t achieve our performance, we
missed 10 million Dinar for some stupid reason, we didn’t publish our
procurement plan, or we didn’t share our budget on time, or we didn’t
do this…?’ So we saw a lot of municipalities shift 180 degrees [and
climb up the rankings quickly]. […] So I think it worked very well and
it was primarily a great instrument for mayors and municipal councils
to get more resources for their municipalities and also to show that
they actually managed to transform the performance of their munici-
pality by their arrival. So that I think is a great achievement, you
know, ‘I’m elected, I have a team with me, I have an institution with
me as well which is the municipality, and I can make a difference, I
can shift things around.’ And that’s important.
Asked whether the portal is being used by the public at large, Interviewee
5 replied that it is visited by NGOs, civil society and also individuals who
are interested, although not yet by the ordinary citizen.55
The third arena of change concerns the relations between municipalities
and citizens, which have been reformed through the program’s conditions
around transparency. This includes, for example, the obligatory conduct of
public hearing meetings and reporting to citizens on the budgeting and
implementation of municipal projects. In addition, all municipalities are
audited yearly by the Cour des Comptes [National Court of Audit], which is
an entirely new measure. Interviewee 5 further pointed out that “publish-
ing the procurement plan is extremely important, […] because you just
can’t give the same enterprise 12 contracts for 12 years in a row. People are
looking into those things and start seeing that, ‘ah okay, there are anoma-
lies’”.56
55 The Implementation Status & Results Report TN-Urban Dev. and Local Gover-
nance (P130637) dated 28 October 2020 (World Bank 2020b, 14) mentions that
“From January to April 2020, we witnessed a 300% increase in monthly users on
the LG portal (15,000 monthly users) compared to the same period last year”.
56 This positive outlook contrasts with the assertion by the well-reputed NGO Al-
Bawsala, which concluded that the “national transparency rate” at the municipal
level (essentially determined by the positive responses to request for access to in-
formation) had declined significantly between 2018 and 2019. This, however,
could also be a result of the high number of new municipalities that were created
during that period (see L'Economiste Maghrébin 2020).
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Findings from the GIZ’s projects in Morocco
Although the World Bank’s leverage cannot be compared with that of the
GIZ (see footnote 17), it is clear that the way the German development co-
operation has divided the roles between the GIZ and the German Develop-
ment Bank (KfW) – among other German actors – means that the GIZ is
not directly involved in policy decisions. More research is needed on the
exact nature of the relationship between the GIZ and KfW. However, it
seems that the GIZ’s technical assistance is not directly linked to loans con-
tracted by the KfW, as is the case with donors such as the World Bank, the
French Development Agency and others. As Interviewee 5 put it, these lat-
ter donors “leverage well their two arms of their intervention – so they
would work on a loan and then while preparing the loan, you could shake
a lot of things. While if you are just doing a TA you can rarely do things in
a transformative manner. You could eventually help and support, and do
studies but when you reach to the negotiations table you don’t have lever-
age”. Interviewee 2 concurred by saying “if a [GIZ] project of 5 million is
not funded anymore, it will not really harm any decision-maker in the gov-
ernment, but if you talk about 400-500 million euros, that’s something”. 57
The GIZ’s limited leverage was indirectly referenced by Interviewee 3,
speaking on the GIZ project on advanced regionalization in Morocco. He
explained that at the beginning,
these four regions [i.e. Casablanca-Settat, Marrakesh-Safi, Oriental and
Souss-Massa] were very interested [to be part of our project], but they
mixed something up, they thought GIZ was a big donor who would
put in a lot of money for regional development. Of course, this is a
misconception, because we were there to promote good governance,
and capacity building in the region, and promote citizen participation
and things like that. […] But they accepted it, there was generally no
problem.
More importantly, the GIZ project on advanced regionalization stands
apart from the DGCL itself. As Interviewee 3 explained, “in the beginning,
it was also [stated] in the project proposal to go into monitoring of the re-
gionalization process on a country-wide level within the ministry. They
didn’t want it at all, they said, ‘o.k. you can do monitoring but for the re-
57 According to Furness (2020, 81), officials in the BMZ and other ministries are
working to bring about the closer alignment of technical co-operation projects
with the large financial co-operation initiatives in Tunisia.
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gions [only]’.” The GIZ’s influence is arguably also limited because of the
way that the advanced regionalization process is organized in Morocco,
and in particular, due to the artificial separation between decentralization
and deconcentration processes. Interviewee 3 explained that “for me it’s
clear that if you start decentralization you need also this deconcentration,
and then I learnt quickly that it is completely separated, there is another
Ministry at the front of this process, and I [was told that I] should not care
about it.”58
When it comes to supporting citizen participation, the GIZ project on
advanced regionalization has partnered with the National Democratic In-
stitute (NDI) to support the consultative committees (instances consultatifs),
which are mentioned in the organic law of the regions.59 However, GIZ
and NDI are unable to prevent the co-optation of some civil society mem-
bers or the exclusion of others. Regional council members often claim the
right to decide on membership, frequently appointing themselves in the
process, which is contrary to the purpose of these committees. They are
supposed to monitor the work of the regional councils and give indepen-
dent inputs. In some regions, consultative committee members are not
even allowed to enter the regional council building in order to attend
meetings (Interviewee 3).
For its part, the GIZ project on ‘strengthening citizen-centered local
government’ in Morocco contributed to increasing scrutiny by the citizens
over municipal affairs through establishing complaint mechanisms inside
its partner municipalities. A satisfaction survey conducted as part of the
project showed high levels of perceived (financial) corruption or related
practices, such as favoritism and the mixing of roles and functions. The lat-
ter issue refers to the conflict of interest that stems from the fact that many
councilors also head local associations and hence may use their access to
municipal funds to support their own associations (see also Bergh (2017)).
This situation led the GIZ to not work with organized civil society groups,
but rather with individual citizens (Interviewee 4). This high level of
58 As Vollmann et al. (2020, 24-25) argue, “regional dependency on central govern-
ment transfers has increased after the reforms and tight staffing impedes the po-
tential for an autonomous implementation of projects. The de facto strong super-
vision by the Ministry of Interior represents strict central control mechanisms for
the implementation of reforms” (see also Bergh (2021) for a similar argument).
59 There are three such consultative committees: One is related to the principals of
equity, equality of opportunities, and gender sensitive approaches; one is related
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awareness of corrupt practices among citizens is arguably a promising sign
that they are or will be using the complaint mechanisms to expose them.
Indeed, a related issue the GIZ addressed in Morocco is that municipali-
ties need to become more able to respond to increased citizen engagement.
Both the administrative staff and councilors were – and still are – afraid of
stressful encounters and confrontations with citizens. The project thus ran
trainings for the reception staff (le personnel de l’acceuil communal) on how
to engage with citizens and on how to successfully perform conflict man-
agement and mediation. According to Interviewee 4, the project was suc-
cessful in mitigating these tensions by creating a competence pool of indi-
viduals trained in communication with the public and on participatory
measures in seven municipalities.
Findings from the GIZ’s project in Tunisia
A similar dynamic occurred within the GIZ’s project in Tunisia, which has
thus far created 13 citizen offices. In the words of Interviewee 2,
so it sounds very operational, the idea of citizen office, but it touches
on information and power-base, both on the local and national level.
If you re-organize a municipality, not letting in the citizens to every of-
fice anymore, this touches existing structures in terms of corruption,
so you reduce the possibility for each and every agent in each and ev-
ery step of a procedure to take bribes, you create transparency, and this
can really touch local power structures.
Finally, the GIZ’s project in Tunisia also seems to have empowered the
municipalities vis-à-vis the central administration. As Interviewee 2 ex-
plained, due to the change in the legal framework (self-determination),
municipalities can [now] decide on their own whether they want to
open up a citizen office and how to organize themselves and this has
touched very much the former comprehension of political leaders that
if the Ministry of Local Affairs or the Interior says something, the mu-
nicipalities have to follow. […] It was also a learning process for the
decision makers, as questions were asked, ‘Are we allowed to do this?
And how does it fit in our organigram which has maybe been advised
by the ministry, because it’s totally different?’ […]. Currently we have
60-70 cities who demand a citizens office, but it is not yet in the offi-
cial government policy, so it is our task right now to work on a scaling
up strategy to include it in public policies at the national level.
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Indeed, the GIZ also helps municipalities and the federation of cities to
lobby the central government, by conducting evaluations of the perfor-
mance of citizen offices in order to prove that they have a positive impact.
Summary of findings
The findings presented here demonstrate that the implementation of the
two World Bank programs clearly threaten the discretionary power and
entrenched ex-ante tutelle practices held by central administration staff, es-
pecially in the area of fiscal transfers. They also provide strong incentives
for municipalities to comply with transparency-enhancing legal obliga-
tions, such as the publication of financial statements. There are further-
more signs that they encourage a healthy competition between municipali-
ties. While this chapter did not examine the BMZ’s leverage over the de-
centralization reforms (e.g. through loans provided by the KfW), it seems
that the GIZ’s technical expertise and significant staffing does not translate
into real influence on the reform implementation process, although it pro-
vides important support to strengthen state-society relations at the local
level. The GIZ projects analyzed here seem to have contributed to higher
levels of scrutiny by citizens over municipal affairs, thereby interfering
with existing structures of corruption, and to increased empowerment of
the municipalities vis-à-vis the central administration.
The extent of donor coordination, and technical assistance overload?
The third research question inquires about the extent of donor coordina-
tion around the decentralization reforms, which would minimize the risk
of fragmentation and duplication as well as of national stakeholders “play-
ing off” various donors against each other to maximize their benefits with-
out committing to fundamentally challenging the elites’ vested interests.
In Morocco, the GIZ project on municipalities has worked closely with
the World Bank program. As interviewee 4 explains, “some of the things
we helped our municipalities get to do regarding, for example, the satisfac-
tion surveys or complaints mechanisms is something that is part of the
World Bank indicators. And almost all our partner municipalities are now
part of the hundred municipalities which are within the Bank’s program”.
However, in general, we know that donor coordination is hampered by
the fact that the DGCL seems to prefer to keep each donor isolated from
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others (see Bergh 2016, 13). In other words, it is possible that the regime’s
strategy regarding donors is similar to its strategy vis-à-vis domestic elites,
i.e. “divide and rule”.60
In Tunisia, most of the municipalities in which the GIZ works are also
part of the World Bank’s program (Pers. Comm. Interviewee 2 on 29
March 2021). In general, there seems to be a shared vision between differ-
ent donors, not least because the decentralization process in Tunisia is still
very basic. As Interviewee 5 observed, “we are not thinking very creatively
about sophisticated details yet, we are really in the foundation of it and in
the foundation you can’t disagree much at this point in time”. This was
confirmed by Interviewee 2, especially regarding donor coordination
around support for the newly created municipalities.61
However, the sheer volume of technical assistance for decentralization,
at least in Tunisia, could become problematic. As Interviewee 5 pointed
out:
There is an overburden today in Tunisia with a lot of technical assis-
tance. There are millions and millions of dollars thrown into the de-
centralization process in terms of technical assistance. I think there is a
fatigue of that and there is a confusion. […]. There’s too much of it
and there is limited government absorption capacity. You need to mul-
tiply your government by 20 to be able to absorb all those studies and
TA and consultants roaming around on this topic. […] You know, the
donor community loves this topic, as we said it’s part of the social con-
60 According to Vollmann et al. (2020, 7), the regime encourages political competi-
tion through decentralization reforms as part of a broader strategy to balance
power relations between elites on all levels of government. The 2004 OECD-DAC
study on donor support to decentralization (OECD 2004, 10) concluded that
donor coordination is generally considered weak, both at national and local gov-
ernment levels. This is due to the common belief that donor co-ordination should
be the government’s responsibility rather than that of donors themselves, the
need for agencies to deliver a readily identifiable product, and governments’ pref-
erence of dealing with donors on an individual basis (see also Ismail (2019, 6) on
the fragmentation of donor technical assistance in North Africa).
61 However, the 2019 CoMun evaluation report (GIZ 2019, 8) notes an example of
incompatibility between GIZ and the World Bank projects, as the “sustainability
of the [participatory budgeting] instrument is threatened by a conflict with the
CPSCL, which regards the participatory budgets supported by GIZ as incompati-
ble with the conditions it has established jointly with the World Bank for munici-
palities wishing to draw on funds from the Bank’s Programme for Urban Devel-
opment and Local Governance that is implemented countrywide”.
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tract, part of voice and accountability, I understand why they love it
but I think they are loving it too much.
The Tunisian government’s reaction is arguably one of disbelief at the
sheer amounts involved, but it has limited leverage in redirecting the
funds to funding municipal investments themselves as TA mostly comes in
the form of grants, not loans, and it may see the benefits in terms of local
employment creation. Interviewee 5 concluded by saying that “for the
country, there needs to be a rethought about of how we support the decen-
tralization process, how do we leverage each other effectively, that’s ex-
tremely crucial”.
Conclusion
This chapter explored the role of two dominant external actors in the de-
centralization reforms in Morocco and Tunisia, namely the World Bank
and the GIZ, and the extent to which they “Think and Work Politically”
(TWP). Regarding elite capture, in its design stage the World Bank’s analy-
sis (as reflected in the Program Appraisal Documents) is quite explicit for
Tunisia, while it uses more technocratic and depoliticized language in the
Moroccan case. The GIZ seems to rely mostly on political economy exper-
tise found within its large pool of local staff as well as expertise acquired
on-the-job by its international staff, especially in the Moroccan case.
The findings of this chapter moreover demonstrate that through their
focus on removing ex-ante tutelle practices held by central administration
staff in the area of fiscal transfers, the implementation of the two World
Bank programs very likely disrupts neopatrimonial networks. Through
their PforR aid modality and significant financial size, the programs also
provide strong incentives for municipalities to comply with transparency-
and accountability- enhancing legal obligations. On the other hand, as an
implementing agency providing technical assistance only, the GIZ’s
projects operate predominantly at the “local” level of the central-local rela-
tions. By providing important support to strengthening the “demand-side”
of accountability within decentralization reforms, for example through set-
ting up citizen bureaus, the GIZ projects have the potential to interfere
with existing local structures of corruption. The programs and projects re-
viewed here thus reflect the conceptual distinction that “making decentral-
ization work is about more than just supporting local governments; it is
about strengthening the system of governance in which decentralized gov-
ernments take part” (Dickovick 2013, 7); whereby the GIZ focuses more
Sylvia I. Bergh
190
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748920731, am 25.10.2021, 16:20:15
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
on the former and the World Bank on the latter. By including important
components of downward accountability through different types of inter-
ventions, both actors’ interventions arguably contribute to mitigating the
risk that decentralization leads to the reconstruction of clientelism at the
local level in both countries (Eaton et al. 2011, 24).
Evidence for the third research question is more limited. In both coun-
tries, the broad geographical coverage of the World Bank programs in-
cludes most of the municipalities participating in GIZ projects. It appears
that when decentralization processes are at a more “basic” stage, donor co-
ordination is stronger (and the ability of the government to play off vari-
ous donors therefore weaker). Thus, donor coordination in Tunisia is more
pronounced than in Morocco. Particularly in Tunisia, the issue of an over-
load of technical assistance at the expense of funding municipalities them-
selves was raised as an urgent concern. However, this focus on technical as-
sistance could also be a deliberate strategy by donors to minimize the risk
for political manipulation and neopatrimonial exploitation of their in-
volvement.
By analyzing the mechanisms of the donor programs and their relative
influence on entrenched local interests, the chapter further nuances (and
updates) the argument made by Vollmann et al. (2020, 26) that the re-
forms in Morocco (and Jordan) “may have helped to appease protesters
and threats from the periphery for a while […but that] a potential drive for
change is hindered by a vast fiscal dependency of decentralized institutions
on central state transfers, the enduring de jure and de facto control on be-
half of the center, as well as by the strong presence of subnational elite cir-
cles that are primarily mirroring central elite compositions”. Indeed, the
authors conclude rather pessimistically and categorically that “so far, the
implementation of decentralization reforms in Jordan and Morocco con-
tributed to authoritarian upgrading rather than an empowerment of sub-
national autonomy in the sense of western donors’ and civil society ac-
tivists’ expectations”.62
The findings presented in this exploratory chapter show that the World
Bank (with support from other donors, including Germany) is aware of
the local political context in both Morocco in Tunisia, and is utilizing the
significant loan volumes to exercise considerable leverage on changing
center-periphery relations towards more autonomy for municipalities.
These findings appear evident despite the limited available data, and des-
62 See also Khakee (2018) for case studies on illustrating the complex mechanisms
linking democracy aid and hybrid regime strengthening in the Moroccan case.
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pite the fact that Morocco and Tunisia – like many countries in the region
– are using the Covid-19 pandemic as an excuse to re-centralize certain
powers under emergency rule.63 A further finding is that while the GIZ is
not as centrally involved in key political economy aspects, due to the limi-
ted mandate granted by the BMZ, its work on the “demand” side of coop-
tation holds significant potential to generate civilian scrutiny of local pa-
tron-client relations. Particularly the establishment of citizen offices may
strengthen accountability mechanisms and curb the tolerance toward cor-
rupt behavior.
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